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ABSTRACT 
  
 
This thesis examines the development of the first offshore Marine Protected Area 
(MPA) on the UK Continental Shelf, the Darwin Mounds area of cold-water 
coral reefs discovered in 1998 off the North-West coast of Scotland.  Following 
the 1999 Greenpeace High Court judgment and subsequent rulings by the 
European Court of Justice, the EC Habitats Directive is now deemed to apply 
throughout Member States’ territories (i.e. out to 200 nautical mile limits of their 
Exclusive Economic/Fishery Zones).  Damage to the Darwin Mounds area 
caused by deep-water trawling fishing activity has been observed and in 2003, at 
the UK’s request, the European Commission imposed a ban on bottom trawling 
in the area, which became a permanent measure in 2004.  This move was made 
possible by the revised Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and represents the first 
instance of a closure for nature conservation, rather than fish stocks, under the 
CFP.  
 
Through a detailed legal and policy analysis, a program of semi-structured 
interviews with stakeholders, regulators and specialists in the field, and 
participant observation at regional workshops, this thesis explores the unique 
circumstances and sequence of events that led to the protection of the Darwin 
Mounds.  A subsequent attempt to use the same legal mechanism to ban pair-
trawling for sea bass in the English Channel (which results in the unintentional 
bycatch and mortality of dolphins and porpoises), met with less success.  These 
two cases are explored within a theoretical framework derived from the social 
and natural sciences.  The related issues of implementing a precautionary and 
ecosystem-based approach to marine conservation, and the role of science in 
policy-making are examined with regard to European initiatives currently under 
development.  Eventually, networks of offshore MPAs will be designated 
throughout European marine waters, including around the UK.  This thesis aims 
to contribute to the knowledge concerning the rights and use of space in the 
offshore marine environment, tensions between different policy initiatives, and 
the challenges and prospects for offshore marine nature conservation.    
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1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
  
 
“The world’s oceans are fundamental to the development and sustainability of 
human society, the maintenance of peace, and the health of the biosphere” 
(Costanza et al., 1998:198) 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 1998, an area of deep-sea cold-water coral known as the Darwin 
Mounds was discovered 100 nautical miles (nm) northwest of Scotland, within 
the United Kingdom’s (UK) Exclusive Fisheries Zone (EFZ).1  Following a 
Greenpeace campaign to halt oil and gas industry activity in UK offshore waters, 
in November 1999 an English High Court ruling commonly referred to as the 
‘Greenpeace Judgment’2 interpreted the EC Habitats Directive to apply out to the 
limit of the UK’s 200nm EFZ.  Consequently the UK is now required to protect 
species and habitats in this area, and has since been revising its national 
implementation legislation, the Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) Regulations 
(1994), to include not only its EFZ but the entire continental shelf over which the 
UK exercises sovereign rights.   
 
The UK has put forward proposals to the European Commission for designating 
the Darwin Mounds and a few other offshore marine sites as candidate Special 
Areas of Conservation (SACs) under the Habitats Directive.  However this 
process and the revision of the UK’s Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) 
Regulations has been delayed and the European Commission recently took the 
UK to court for, inter alia, not having properly implemented its Regulations in 
                                                     
1
 The UK has a 200nm Exclusive Fishing Zone (EFZ), pursuant to section 1(1) of the Fishery 
Limits Act 1976, which serves the same function as an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  See 
the discussion on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea below in Chapter 2, 
section 2.2.2 regarding EFZs and EEZs. 
2
 R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Greenpeace (No. 2) [2000] 2 CMLR 
94. 
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the offshore zone.3  This is an important development as it implies that other 
Member States have the same obligation to ensure the Directive is implemented 
out to 200nm, even though the Greenpeace Judgment, being of a national rather 
than European court, is not binding on other Member States.  The European 
Commission now ‘contends that within their Exclusive Economic Zones the 
Member States have an obligation to comply with Community law in the fields 
where they exercise sovereign powers and that the directive therefore applies 
beyond territorial waters’ (Case C6-04, paragraph 115).   
 
In 2003, the Darwin Mounds area was closed to bottom-trawling fishing activity 
under the emergency closure provisions of the revised Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) Basic Regulation 2371/2002.  This closure was extended and made 
permanent in 2004, and as a result the Darwin Mounds became the UK’s first 
offshore Marine Protected Area (MPA).  Through a detailed policy analysis, 
semi-structured interviews with involved stakeholders, and participant 
observation at UK and European stakeholder forums on marine environmental 
management, this thesis examines the legal and political ramifications of the 
Greenpeace Judgment and Darwin Mounds offshore MPA, and explores the 
tensions between different policy initiatives relating to offshore marine 
conservation.  A subsequent attempt by the UK to use the same legal process to 
ban pair-trawling for sea bass in the English Channel to protect dolphins and 
porpoises from accidental capture in fishing nets was less successful, and this 
study outlines the key issues and stakeholder perspectives on the reasons for this 
variation in policy outcomes.   In examining these two case studies, this thesis 
aims to provide an analysis of the challenges and prospects for the effective 
implementation of conservation objectives in the offshore marine environment. 
 
The legal framework for offshore marine conservation involves commitments to 
designating offshore MPAs on the global, regional (i.e. European) and UK level, 
and is set out in detail in Chapter 2.  Theoretical frameworks for establishing 
                                                     
3
 Case C-6/04, Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland.  Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 9 June 2005.  Case 
C-131/05, Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. 
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effective legal regimes for environmental protection are explored in Chapter 3. 
These require an interdisciplinary approach when addressing the offshore marine 
environment, incorporating approaches from both the social and natural sciences.  
Compared with the experience to date of European Member States with 
terrestrial protected areas, MPAs pose new challenges both scientifically and 
legally, given the complexity of the marine environment and the European 
Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over managing fisheries in European 
waters4 (see section 1.1.2 below).   
 
Ten years ago, a workshop5 on the sustainable governance of the world’s oceans 
held in Portugal put forward six  ‘Lisbon Principles’ (Costanza et al., 1998).  
These principles and the threats to the marine environment they were designed to 
address are still valid today.  Listed below in Table 1.1, the Lisbon principles 
provide a barometer for assessing whether the international community has made 
progress on addressing threats to the marine environment.  In their discussion on 
applying the principles, the authors focused on some examples of international 
strategies ‘that can incorporate many of the Lisbon principles simultaneously’ 
(Costanza et al., 1998:199).  The last of these was the designation and 
enforcement of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs).6 
 
                                                     
4
 While Member States remain responsible for nature conservation, jurisdiction over fisheries 
management within European waters (i.e. from 12nm to 200nm) was ceded to the European 
Commission in the 1970s.  See Chapter 2, section 2.3.4.1. 
5
 This workshop was held in July 1997 and was co-sponsored by the Independent World 
Commission on the Oceans and the Luso-American Development Foundation.  The resulting 
Lisbon Principles were published in a Science article (Costanza et al., 1998) co-authored by 
scientists from the US, Sweden, Portugal and Australia.  
6
 The other suggested applications of the Lisbon principles were (i) share-based and co-managed 
fisheries, (ii) integrated watershed management, and (iii) environmental bonding. 
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Table 1.1  Lisbon Principles on Sustainable Governance of the Oceans 
PRINCIPLE DEFINITION 
Principle 1 
Responsibility 
Access to environmental resources carries attendant 
responsibilities to use them in an ecologically 
sustainable, economically efficient, and socially fair 
manner. 
Principle 2 
Scale-matching 
Decision-making on environmental resources should (i) 
be assigned to institutional levels that maximize 
ecological input, (ii) ensure the flow of ecological 
information between institutional levels, (iii) take 
ownership and actors into account, and (iv) internalize 
costs and benefits. 
Principle 3 
Precaution 
In the face of uncertainty about potentially irreversible 
environmental impacts, decisions concerning their use 
should err on the side of caution. 
Principle 4 
Adaptive 
management 
Given that some level of uncertainty always exists in 
environmental resource management, decision-makers 
should continuously gather and integrate appropriate 
ecological, social and economic information with the 
goal of adaptive improvement. 
Principle 5 
Full cost allocation 
All of the internal and external costs and benefits, 
including social and ecological, of alternative decisions 
concerning the use of environmental resources should be 
identified and allocated. 
Principle 6 
Participation 
All stakeholders should be engaged in the formulation 
and implementation of decisions concerning 
environmental resources. 
(From Costanza et al., 1998:198) 
 
1.1.1  Marine Protected Areas 
The term Marine Protected Area (MPA) can be used to describe any marine area 
that is given some kind of special protection, usually for conservation and/or 
fisheries benefits.  A widely-accepted, general definition of an MPA offered by 
the World Conservation Union (IUCN) is ‘an area of land and/or sea dedicated to 
the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and 
associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other means’ (IUCN, 
1994).  In 1994, the IUCN defined a series of seven protected area categories 
based on primary management objectives, listed in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2  IUCN Protected Area Categories  
CATEGORY DEFINITION 
Ia – Strict Nature Reserve 
 
Protected area managed mainly for 
science 
Area of land and/or sea possessing 
some outstanding or representative 
ecosystems, geological or 
physiological features and/or species, 
available primarily for scientific 
research and/or environmental 
monitoring. 
Ib – Wilderness Area 
 
Protected area managed mainly for 
wilderness protection 
Large area of unmodified or slightly 
modified land, and/or sea, retaining its 
natural character and influence, 
without permanent or significant 
habitation, which is protected and 
managed so as to preserve its natural 
condition. 
II – National Park 
 
Protected area managed mainly for 
ecosystem protection and recreation 
Natural area of land and/or sea, 
designated to (a) protect the ecological 
integrity of one or more ecosystems for 
present and future generations, (b) 
exclude exploitation or occupation 
inimical to the purposes of designation 
of the area and (c) provide a foundation 
for spiritual, scientific, educational, 
recreational and visitor opportunities, 
all of which must be environmentally 
and culturally compatible. 
III – Natural Monument 
 
Protected area managed mainly for 
conservation of specific natural 
features 
Area containing one, or more, specific 
natural or natural/cultural feature 
which is of outstanding or unique value 
because of its inherent rarity, 
representative or aesthetic qualities or 
cultural significance. 
IV – Habitat/Species Management 
Area 
 
Protected area managed mainly for 
conservation through management 
intervention 
Area of land and/or sea subject to 
active intervention for management 
purposes so as to ensure the 
maintenance of habitats and/or to meet 
the requirements of specific species. 
V – Protected Landscape/Seascape 
 
Protected area managed mainly for 
landscape/seascape conservation and 
recreation 
Area of land, with coast and sea as 
appropriate, where the interaction of 
people and nature over time has 
produced an area of distinct character 
with significant aesthetic, ecological 
and/or cultural value, and often with 
high biological diversity.  Safeguarding 
the integrity of this traditional 
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interaction is vital to the protection, 
maintenance and evolution of such an 
area. 
VI – Managed Resource Protected 
Area 
 
Protected area managed mainly for 
the sustainable use of natural 
ecosystems 
Area containing predominantly 
unmodified natural systems, managed 
to ensure long term protection and 
maintenance of biological diversity, 
while providing at the same time a 
sustainable flow of natural products 
and services to meet community needs. 
(From: Kelleher and Recchia, 1998) 
 
Several types of management regimes can be classified as MPAs, one of the 
more robust being Marine Reserves, defined as ‘areas in which the extractive use 
of any resources (living, fossil or mineral) is prohibited, along with any form of 
habitat destruction’ (Palumbi, 2002).  Marine Reserves, also referred to as No-
Take Marine Protected Areas (NTMPAs), are considered to be the most 
restrictive type of MPA, and fit within the “Ia” and “Ib” protected area categories 
set out by the IUCN (above).  Whether or not NTMPAs are the most effective 
mechanism for conservation is debatable, as some argue that modern fisheries 
management approaches such as quotas and technical measures may be better 
suited to conserving fish stocks, as NTMPAs are perhaps too site-specific to 
achieve this aim (Jones, 2006a).   
 
Although this thesis addresses offshore marine conservation in Europe, a system 
of designating MPAs recently released by the United States is worth mentioning 
here, as it classifies key characteristics and related attributes to describe any 
potential MPA, and the IUCN has not yet published a similar scheme specific to 
marine designations. The United States is currently developing a network of 
national MPAs and held a five month public consultation on the issue, which 
ended in February 2007.  The classification system is given in Table 1.3. 
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Table 1.3  United States’ Classification System for MPAs 
CHARACTERISTIC ATTRIBUTES 
Conservation Focus  One or more of the following: 
     Natural Heritage 
     Cultural Heritage 
     Sustainable Production 
Level of Protection Afforded  One of the following: 
     Uniform Multiple-Use 
     Zoned Multiple-Use 
     Zoned with No-Take Area(s) 
     No-Take 
     No-Impact 
     No-Access 
Permanence of Protection  One of the following: 
     Permanent 
     Conditional 
     Temporary 
Constancy of Protection One of the following: 
     Year-round 
     Seasonal 
     Rotation 
Ecological Scale of Protection One of the following: 
     Ecosystem 
     Focal Resource 
(From the US MPA website: mpa.gov) 
 
This is a useful, simplified framework for evaluating the comparative rationale 
and strategy behind the establishment of various types of MPAs, and may be of 
use to the designation of networks of MPAs that have recently been called for in 
the international arena, outlined below. 
 
1.1.2  International commitments to offshore MPAs 
In its 25th report to Parliament in December 2004, the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution described the impact of fishing on the marine 
environment as ‘the greatest individual threat to the environment in the seas 
around the UK’ (RCEP, 2004:21) and called for a network of NTMPAs 
amounting to 30% of the UK’s EFZ.  When the RCEP report was released, Ben 
Bradshaw (then Minister for Nature Conservation and Fisheries) stated in the 
press that preserving marine life was ‘the second biggest environmental 
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challenge the world faces after climate change’.7  In recent years, there has been 
growing impetus at the international level for the establishment of networks of 
MPAs in order to address this threat (see Table 1.4, below).  The Plan of 
Implementation put forward by the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg called for a representative network of 
MPAs to be established by 2012,8 a goal reiterated in 2003 at the IUCN World 
Parks Congress with a further commitment to strictly protect at least 20-30% of 
each habitat type, i.e. closed to all forms of extractive use.9  Given that only 
0.04% of the world’s oceans are currently designated as MPAs and an even 
smaller fraction, 0.01%, are NTMPAs, such an expansion poses a substantial 
challenge (Jones, 2006a; Pauly et al., 2002).   
 
Also in 2003, a joint Ministerial meeting of the Helsinki and OSPAR 
Commissions held in Bremen resulted in a work programme aimed at 
designating a network of inshore and offshore MPAs by 2010.10  In 2004, the 
WSSD commitment was reinforced at the seventh Conference of Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in Kuala Lumpur, with a target to 
establish by 2012 (in the marine realm, and by 2010 terrestrially) a global 
network of ‘comprehensive, representative and effectively managed national and 
regional protected areas’.11  
 
 
                                                     
7
 BBC News article Fish areas ‘need drastic action’, 7 December 2004.  Available online: 
(//news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4072503.stm). 
8
 World Summit on Sustainable Development Plan of Implementation, available online: 
(www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/summit_docs/2309_planfinal.htm) at 31.(c). 
9
 Recommendations of the Vth IUCN World Parks Congress, Durban, South Africa, available 
online: 
(www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa/wpc2003/pdfs/outputs/recommendations/approved/english/pdf/r2
2.pdf) at point 5.22. 
10
 Ministerial meeting of the OSPAR Commission, Bremen, 25 June 2003, available online: 
(www.ospar.org/eng/html/md/Bremen_statement_2003.htm), at point 11. 
11
 CBD COP 7 Decision VII/28 on Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e)), available online: 
(www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.aspx?dec=VII/28).  
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Table 1.4  Recent international initiatives for networks of Marine Protected 
Areas applicable in the North East Atlantic 
 
CONFERENCE GOAL SCOPE YEAR 
World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (Rio +10), 
Johannesburg 
Network by 2012 Global 2002 
IUCN World Parks Congress, 
Durban 
Network by 2012,  
20-30% strictly 
protected 
Global 2003 
OSPAR/HELCOM Bremen 
Statement 
Network by 2010 Regional 2003 
CBD 7th Conference of Parties, 
Kuala Lumpur 
Network by 2012 Global 2004 
(From De Santo and Jones, 2007a:2) 
 
Although it has yet to pass a moratorium on deep-sea trawling, the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) issued Oceans and the Law of the Sea 
Resolutions12 in 2003 and 2004 urging the international community to take 
immediate action towards the conservation and sustainable use of marine 
resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction.  At the November 2004 World 
Conservation Congress in Bangkok, the IUCN called on the UNGA to place an 
interim ban on bottom trawling on the high seas in 2005 until a legally binding 
management regime is established to conserve deep-sea biodiversity from fishing 
impacts.  The IUCN also recommended that the UN call for a similar interim ban 
in 2006 in areas covered by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 
(RFMOs) until management frameworks are in place.  These efforts have been 
undermined by nations with strong fishing interests and unwilling to place 
restrictions on high seas activities, such as Iceland, and the UN trawling 
moratorium is at present considered to be ‘dead in the water’.13  
 
In the European Community (EC)14, following three years of consultation, a draft 
Marine Strategy Directive15 was released in 2005, aimed at achieving a ‘good 
                                                     
12
 UNGA Resolutions A/RES/58/240, A/RES/59/24 and A/RES/59/25 available online: 
(www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/gares1.htm). 
13
 ‘Trawling moratorium dead in the water’ Inter Press Service article by S. Leahy, 23 November 
2006, available online: (ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=35585). 
14
 This thesis refers to the European Community (EC) rather than European Union (EU), as 
fisheries are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the EC while the EU comprises the three 
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environmental status’ for European marine waters by 2021. The EC also recently 
adopted a Green Paper on Maritime Policy in June 2006, which is open to 
consultation for one year and aims to launch a debate about a future maritime 
policy for the European Union. However, a coalition of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) has already pointed out that the proposed Marine Strategy 
Directive falls short of the ambitious targets set out in earlier drafts and the 
definition of ‘good environmental status’ remains unclear. If the proposed 
Directive is to serve as a pillar for the developing maritime policy, this definition 
needs to be uniform across Member States to prevent duplication and promote 
synergy between the two European initiatives.16  
 
The primary legal instruments available to the EC to address fisheries 
management and marine nature conservation are, respectively, the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) and the Habitats Directive.17  While the CFP is managed 
under the Directorate General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs (DG Fish), the 
Habitats Directive is under the responsibility of the Directorate General for the 
Environment (DG Environment).  This bifurcation has its roots in the Treaty on 
European Union, where fisheries management is addressed under the Agriculture 
Title (Articles 32-38, formerly 38-46), and environmental management lies 
within the Environment Title (Articles 174-5).  Both the CFP and the Habitats 
Directive impose binding obligations on Member States, the CFP in the form of 
Regulations and Decisions, and the Habitats Directive via its requirement of 
Member States to transpose the Directive into their national legislation.   
 
                                                                                                                                               
‘pillars’ of (i) the EC, (ii) justice and home affairs and (iii) a common Foreign and Security 
policy. 
15
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
Framework for Community Action in the field of Marine Environmental Policy [SEC (2005) 
1290], available online: (europa.eu.int/comm/environment/water/marine/dir_505_en.pdf).  
16
 This coalition includes Greenpeace, Birdlife International, Oceana, the International Fund for 
Animal Welfare (IFAW), the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Seas at Risk, the Fisheries 
Secretariat, the European Coastal Union, the European Environment Bureau (EEB) and the 
Coastal Union.  Their position statements can be found at: 
(eu.greenpeace.org/issues/oceans_coalition.htm). 
17
 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of 
Wild Fauna and Flora, OJ L 206, 22.07.92, p.7. 
Chapter 1:  Introduction and Overview 
 28 
From a legal standpoint, a key issue arises from this situation: given the 
jurisdictional separation between fisheries management issues controlled by DG 
Fish on the one hand and nature conservation under the auspices of DG 
Environment on the other, how can a Member State of the EC address 
overlapping nature conservation issues that occur as a result of the activities of 
EC fishing vessels?  As will become evident later in the discussions on the 
Darwin Mounds MPA and the attempted ban on pair-trawling for sea bass, the 
role of precaution and degree of threat is at the interface of this tension.  
 
1.2  AIMS OF THESIS 
 
1.2.1  Interdisciplinary synthesis  
This thesis aims to address the challenges, issues and opportunities associated 
with the development of a regulatory framework for offshore MPAs through a 
detailed legal and policy analysis, a programme of semi-structured interviews 
with stakeholders and regulators, and observations at regional workshops and 
conferences relevant to marine conservation in order to gain an understanding of 
different issues from different perspectives.  The rationale behind this 
methodology is to provide an interdisciplinary synthesis, combining a legal 
framework with empirical results from interviews and framing the analysis 
within theories from both the social sciences on environmental regime 
effectiveness, and the natural sciences on complex adaptive systems and 
ecosystem management.  Theoretical approaches to assessing environmental 
regime effectiveness are questioned later in the thesis, given the outcomes of the 
case studies examined and the results of the interview process. 
 
Methodologically, this thesis takes an approach termed by Dryzek (2005:75) as 
‘administrative rationalism’, i.e. it examines the discourse of the expert rather 
than the citizen or producer/consumer in environmental problem solving.  The 
issues explored in this analysis are more ‘top-down’ rather than ‘bottom-up’, that 
is they involve legal obligations and targets set by governments and the 
international community, and how these can be achieved through national 
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initiatives.  Consequently, the interview process concentrated on representatives 
from different stakeholder groups, rather than the stakeholders themselves.   
 
The methodological approach of this thesis is discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 4.  In combining a legal analysis with semi-structured interviews and 
participant observation at workshops and conferences, this thesis aimed to 
provide a detailed picture of the challenges and opportunities for offshore marine 
conservation in the North-East Atlantic.  The next section lays out the research 
questions and analytical strands that run through the thesis, and the institutions 
examined during the empirical analysis.      
 
1.2.2  Research questions, analytical strands and institutions examined  
When the PhD commenced in the fall of 2003, the Darwin Mounds MPA had 
just been established a few months earlier and the concept of offshore MPAs in 
European waters was quite new.  Over the past three and a half years, research on 
the topic has grown in the regulatory arena, but progress on developing and 
implementing nature conservation measures in offshore waters has been slow.  
Therefore the questions this thesis aimed to address remain pertinent, and are as 
follows: 
 
• What are the challenges to the developing regime of offshore Marine 
Protected Areas? 
 
• What are the problems, gaps and issues with the current regime? 
 
• What role is played by the relevant actors and their regulators and what 
are their perspectives? 
 
• What is the potential impact of legislative reform currently underway? 
 
• How does the UK’s situation differ from that of other EU states under the 
same legal obligations?   
 
• What lessons are to be learned for offshore MPAs as a whole?  
Recommendations? 
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It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to the understanding of approaches to 
offshore marine conservation in the North-East Atlantic and elucidate answers to 
the above questions.  Key analytical strands running throughout the thesis which 
emerged during the interview process include the role of science and precaution 
in environmental decision-making, the impact of the bifurcation between 
fisheries management and nature conservation, and the implementation of an 
ecosystem-based approach to managing the complex marine environment.  
 
Figure 1.1 below gives a general overview of the institutions and players 
involved in designating and managing MPAs in UK offshore waters and the 
North-East Atlantic. In order to address the research questions given above, this 
thesis included analyzing perspectives from as many of the most relevant bodies 
as possible.     
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Figure 1.1  Map of institutions and players involved in designating MPAs 
 
 
 
 
 
This map shows the overarching international conventions directly applicable in 
the region, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) and the 
OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North 
East Atlantic, whose MPA designation capacities are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2.  The UK and EC are both parties to OSPAR, and the EC is a party to 
NEAFC on behalf of its member states, including the UK.  The secretariats of 
both of these institutions are located in London.  With respect to the UK 
government, decisions taken to designate domestic MPAs are undertaken based 
on advice from DEFRA, the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural 
UK Government European 
Commission 
Scottish Executive 
DEFRA 
SEERAD 
SFPA 
JNCC 
English 
Nature 
DG Env DG Fish 
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Habitats 
committee 
ACFA 
STECF 
Epistemic / 
legal 
community 
NGO  
community 
User 
community 
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Affairs.  DEFRA in turn receives advice and information from executive 
agencies and executive non-departmental public bodies, including English 
Nature18 and the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC).  JNCC delivers 
the UK and international responsibilities of the four country nature conservation 
agencies: Council for Nature Conservation and the Countryside, the Countryside 
Council for Wales, Natural England and Scottish Natural Heritage.     
 
Following the process of devolution within the UK which occurred in the late 
1990s (discussed below at the end of Chapter 2 and in Chapter 7 at section 
7.2.3), there now exist devolved parliaments or assemblies in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland.  Figure 1.1 includes Scottish institutions as these were 
directly involved in the designation of the Darwin Mounds offshore MPA.  The 
Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department (SEERAD)19 is 
responsible for advising the UK government on environmental issues within 
Scottish territory, including fisheries.  The Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency 
(SFPA) of the Scottish Executive monitors compliance of the fishing industry 
with UK, EC and international fisheries laws and regulations in ports and at sea 
(within the Scottish component of the UK’s EFZ, and beyond under monitoring 
agreements with NEAFC).  Fisheries Research Services (FRS) is an agency of 
the Scottish Government Marine Directorate and provides scientific support and 
advice on several marine and aquatic issues, including fisheries.  SEERAD and 
SFPA are headquartered in Edinburgh, and FRS is split between Aberdeen and 
Perthshire. 
 
Decision-making on the European level with regard to MPAs is centered in the 
European Commission in Brussels.  The Directorate General for Fisheries and 
Maritime Affairs (DG Fish) and the Directorate General for the Environment 
(DG Environment) are responsible for fisheries and nature conservation, 
                                                     
18
 During the period in which this thesis was undertaken, this body was known as English Nature.  
It has subsequently been combined with the environment activities of the Rural Development 
Service and the Countryside Agency’s Landscape, Access and Recreation division, and 
renamed Natural England.    
19
 As in the previous note, this body has changed since the research for this thesis was 
undertaken.  Since 2007, many of SEERAD’s functions are now undertaken by the new 
Scottish Executive Environment Directorate. 
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respectively.  As discussed later in the thesis (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.6 and 
Figure 2.7) the DGs are each advised by subsidiary bodies, the Habitats 
Committee on the part of DG Environment, and for DG Fisheries, the Advisory 
Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA, a stakeholder forum), the 
Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) and the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES).  ACFA and STECF 
are comprised of stakeholders and experts, respectively, who meet regularly to 
provide recommendations.  The secretariats of both groups are provided by the 
European Commission in Brussels.  ICES, which provides independent scientific 
advice (discussed in more detail later in the thesis in the context of the Darwin 
Mounds closure) is headquartered in Copenhagen. 
 
In addition to these institutions, there are other, external, players involved in the 
designation and monitoring of MPAs in UK offshore waters and the North-East 
Atlantic.  Representatives from the epistemic and legal communities were 
included in this analysis, as well as representatives from Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) involved in promoting marine conservation.  Particular 
NGOs involved in the case studies discussed in this thesis include Greenpeace, 
the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Institute for European 
Environmental Policy (IEEP), Oceana, and the Royal Society for the Protection 
of Birds (RSPB).  Representatives from the user community were also included 
in this analysis.  The National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations (NFFO), 
located in York, represents fishermen from England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
on the UK and international level.  The Scottish Fishermen’s Federation (SFF) 
does the same for Scottish fishermen and is located in Aberdeen.  In terms of the 
oil and gas side of the user community, the Department for Trade and Industry 
(DTI, located in Aberdeen)  the UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA, 
based in London) and for historical purposes, the Atlantic Environment Frontier 
Network (AFEN).  While not directly responsible for the designation of MPAs, 
these outside interests do play influential roles in the decision-making processes 
of both the UK and EC, as evidenced by the case studies examined in this thesis.  
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1.2.3  Justification and contribution 
This thesis represents the first attempt to elucidate the policy process that took 
place during the designation of the Darwin Mounds MPA, from the perspective 
of players in the process and within the context of offshore marine conservation 
initiatives in the North-East Atlantic.  Previous peer-reviewed work published on 
the Darwin Mounds has focused on their discovery, geological origin, 
biogeochemistry, and observations of damage to the corals caused by bottom-
trawling fishing methods (Bett, 2001; Gage, 2001; Hall-Spencer et al., 2002; 
Masson et al., 2003, Roberts et al., 2003 and 2006; Hughes and Gooday, 2004; 
Kiriakoulakis et al., 2004; le Goff-Vitry et al., 2004; Waller and Tyler, 2005; 
Wheeler et al., 2005; Roberts et al., 2006; Kiriakoulakis et al., 2007).  In 
addition to the scientific literature, WWF produced reports highlighting the need 
for protecting the area before the closure was implemented (Gubbay et al., 2002; 
Andersson et al., 2003). 
 
During the course of the PhD, two articles based on preliminary results were 
published in peer-reviewed, international journals.  The first, based on the legal 
framework given below in Chapter 2, detailed the development of the Habitats 
Directive and explored the legal ramifications of the Greenpeace Judgment and 
commitments to offshore MPAs given the different political outcomes of the 
Darwin Mounds and pair-trawl ban (De Santo and Jones, 2007a).  The second 
article was presented at the 3rd International Symposium on Deep Sea Corals in 
2005, detailing the policy process that led to the Darwin Mounds closure and 
incorporating perspectives of key players in the process (De Santo and Jones, 
2007b).  Aside from the aforementioned NGO reports and articles in the news 
media, the papers that resulted from this thesis represent the first social science 
analyses of the Darwin Mounds closure. 
 
Addressing offshore MPAs poses challenges different not only to the terrestrial 
environment, but also inshore marine areas.  The further one moves offshore, the 
fewer stakeholders are directly affected.  Deep-sea ecosystems themselves pose 
different management challenges than those inshore, as organisms in dark, high 
pressure environments tend to exhibit slower growth and lower reproductive 
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capacity than their shallow-water counterparts.  For example, the commercially 
exploited deep-sea fish species orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus) does not 
reproduce until it is 20-30 years old, and can live up to 150 years or more 
(Fenton et al., 1991).  Only some 0.0001% of the deep sea floor has been 
explored to date, hence it has often been said that we know more about the 
surface of the moon than we do about the deep-sea (UNEP, 2006).  While this 
thesis does not address the management of the High Seas (i.e. beyond 200nm, a 
global commons), it aims to provide insights for management within the 200nm 
EEZ/EFZ that may be useful to consider in the designation of protected areas 
further offshore.   
 
In contrast with protected sites closer to shore, very little has been written on the 
designation and management of offshore MPAs.  This proved challenging during 
the early phase of the doctoral research, as there were few sources to consult that 
could provide a base against which to compare the situation of the Darwin 
Mounds.  Rather, the story of how this cold water coral reef was discovered and 
protected presented a unique and interesting set of circumstances that merited 
further exploration.  When the UK was subsequently unsuccessful in its attempt 
to ban pair-trawling for sea bass in the English Channel using the same legal 
mechanism that had protected the Darwin Mounds, this outcome allowed for a 
comparative analysis and also a chance to reflect on what these events indicate 
for the future of European marine policy.  The difference in outcomes between 
the two case studies also highlighted the fundamental tension between fisheries 
management and marine nature conservation in the North-East Atlantic and the 
complex interaction between politics and law in European waters.  The following 
introduction to the Chapters sets out the order of the thesis, highlighting the key 
issues explored.  
 
1.3  INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTERS 
The present chapter provides an introduction to offshore MPAs and sets out the 
aims and contribution of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 comprises the legal review conducted in the first year of the PhD (and 
subsequently updated).  Global, regional and local (i.e. UK) commitments and 
legislation are examined in light of their applicability to offshore marine nature 
conservation.  This chapter includes a detailed analysis of the development of the 
Habitats Directive (EC Directive 92/43/EEC) and the revised Common Fisheries 
Policy (EC Regulation 2371/2002).   
 
Chapter 3 examines theoretical approaches to environmental regime 
effectiveness and the role of science in policy-making with regard to marine 
nature conservation and fisheries management.  Particular attention is given to 
the implementation of the precautionary principle and ecosystem approach and 
the ways in which these commitments have been ingrained in developing 
European marine protection legislation.  While the precautionary principle could 
have been addressed in Chapter 2, it is discussed here in the context of the 
ecosystem approach, as the two are often linked in European environmental 
legislation.  This chapter also addresses the difficulty of protecting the marine 
environment given its complex, adaptive nature. 
. 
Chapter 4 outlines the methodologies employed in this thesis, i.e. incorporating 
a detailed legal/policy analysis with semi-structured interviews and participant 
observation at relevant stakeholder workshops and conferences on UK marine 
environmental issues.  Within the context of the interview methodology, this 
chapter provides an outline of the questions/themes addressed and the 
professional affiliations of the perspectives included in the analysis. 
 
Chapter 5 tells the story of the UK’s first offshore MPA, the Darwin Mounds 
area of cold-water coral, from its discovery in 1998 to its protection as a closed 
area under the revised CFP in 2003.  This chapter is based largely on oral 
histories given by key players in the process who were interviewed after the 
closure.  The success of this initiative is analysed in light of issues raised during 
the interview process.   
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Chapter 6 describes the UK’s attempt to ban pair-trawling for sea bass in the 
English Channel, drawing on the legal process and perspectives from an array of 
stakeholders and experts.  Implications for future management scenarios are 
discussed within the context of key issues that emerged during the analysis of the 
pair-trawl ban and Darwin Mounds closure, namely the role of science and 
precaution in environmental decision-making, and the bifurcation between 
marine nature conservation and fisheries management in European waters. 
 
Chapter 7 provides a discussion and reflection on issues raised by the Darwin 
Mounds closure and UK pair-trawl ban, in particular the limitations of using 
environmental regime theory for predicting outcomes in the designation and 
implementation of offshore MPAs.  This chapter also examines implications of 
the two case studies and developing legislation for the successful application of 
an ecosystem approach to European marine conservation.   
 
Chapter 8 gives an overview of conclusions and recommendations for future 
efforts towards marine conservation in the North-East Atlantic and suggests 
areas for further research. 
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2 
 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
  
 
“I am indeed lord of the world but the law is lord of the sea” 
(Roman Emperor Antoninus) 
 
OVERVIEW 
This chapter examines existing global, regional and domestic (UK) legislation 
relevant to the application of MPAs in the North-East Atlantic, including a 
detailed examination of the origins and development of the EC Habitats 
Directive and the evolution of legislative jurisdiction with regard to fisheries 
management in Europe under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).  First, 
however, certain legal definitions on territoriality and sovereignty should be 
outlined for the purpose of framing this analysis with respect to the primary 
contribution of the Greenpeace judgment, i.e. delineating the territorial scope of 
the Habitats Directive. 
 
2.1  GENERAL LEGAL CONTEXT 
Under international law, states are sovereign and have equal rights and duties as 
members of the international community despite economic, social, political or 
other differences.1  The doctrine of the sovereignty and equality of states has 
three principal outcomes, namely that states have (i) a jurisdiction, prima facie 
exclusive, over a territory and a permanent population living there; (ii) a duty of 
non-intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other states; and (iii) the 
dependence of obligations arising from customary law2 and treaties on the 
consent of obligor (Brownlie, 1990:287).   
                                                     
1
 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res. 2625 (xxv) 
(1970). 
2
 Two elements are required to establish the existence of a  rule of customary international law: 
(i) general and consistent practice adopted by States, and (ii) opinio juris, the conviction that 
the practice concerns a matter which is the subject of legal regulation and is consistent with 
international law (Churchill and Lowe, 1999:7). 
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Consequently, the sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction of a state over its 
territory signifies that it alone has the competence to develop policies and laws in 
respect of the natural resources and the environment of its territory, which 
comprises: (i) the land within its boundaries, including the subsoil; (ii) internal 
waters, such as lakes, rivers and canals3; (iii) the territorial sea, which is adjacent 
to the coast, including its seabed, subsoil and the resources thereof4 and (iv) the 
airspace above its land, internal waters and territorial sea, up to the point at 
which the legal regime of outer space begins (Sands, 2003). 
 
In addition, states have limited sovereign rights and jurisdiction over other areas, 
including: a contiguous zone adjacent to the territorial seas5; the resources of the 
continental shelf, its seabed and subsoil6; certain fishing zones7; and the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).8  Figure 2.1 gives a schematic representation 
of ocean zone designations, and Figure 2.2 outlines the UK’s marine 
administrative boundaries, outlining its territorial sea, Exclusive Fishing Zone 
(EFZ9) and continental shelf.  It follows then that certain zones fall outside the 
territory of any state, and in respect of these no state has exclusive jurisdiction.  
These areas, which are sometimes referred to as the global commons, include the 
high seas and its seabed and subsoil, outer space, and, according to a majority of 
states, the Antarctic (Sands, 2003:710).  The atmosphere is also sometimes 
considered to be a part of the global commons.  
 
 
                                                     
3
 UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982/1994), Article 8. 
4
 UNCLOS, Article 2; on archipelagic waters as national territory, see UNCLOS, Article 48. 
5
 UNCLOS, Article 33. 
6
 UNCLOS, Articles 76 and 77. 
7
 Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (1974) ICJ Reports 3, at paragraph 52. 
8
 UNCLOS, Articles 55 and 56. 
9
 Some states have established Exclusive Fishing Zones (EFZs) rather than Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZs), such as the UK, in the late 1970s.  The EFZ in combination with exclusive 
rights over sea-bed resources from the Continental Shelf regime give the UK all it wants at 
present from an EEZ (Churchill and Lowe, 1999). 
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Figure 2.1  Maritime Zones Established by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(Adapted from Churchill and Lowe, 1999:30) * or 100nm from the 2500nm isobath 
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Figure 2.2  The UK Offshore Area showing the Territorial Sea, EFZ and 
Continental Shelf boundaries 
 
   
(Reproduced with permission from the JNCC website on marine SACs: 
www.jncc.gov.uk/ProtectedSites/marine/sac_marine.html)
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The rules of international environmental law have evolved such that they pull on 
states in two directions: while states have sovereign rights over their natural 
resources, they must not cause damage to their environment.  These objectives 
are set out in Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which remains the 
cornerstone of international environmental law.10  Twenty years later, the 
drafting of Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration only added two words to the 
language used by Principle 21, namely that ‘states have the right to pursue their 
own environmental and developmental policies’.  Taken together, Principle 21 
and Principle 2 establish the basic obligation underlying international 
environmental law (Sands, 2003). 
 
However, the legal regime of sovereign rights and territorial jurisdiction as 
outlined above, despite its codification as customary international law, does not 
accurately reflect the complex trans-boundary nature of the environment itself.  
The fluid nature of the marine environment poses significant challenges to 
management scenarios, an area that is explored later in this dissertation.11  The 
interdependence of ecological issues poses a fundamental problem for 
international law, and explains why international cooperation and the 
development of international environmental standards are difficult and 
increasingly essential: international law faces the challenge of reconciling the 
fundamental independence of sovereign states with the inherent fundamental 
interdependence of the environment (Sands, 2003). 
 
                                                     
10
 According to Principle 21, ‘States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’.  That Principle 21 reflects customary law was 
confirmed by the ICJ’s 1996 Advisory Opinion on The Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons (Sands, 2003).  
11
 The complex nature of the marine environment and its implications for management 
approaches is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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2.2  GLOBAL CONVENTIONS AND INITIATIVES 
An important concept used to compare international politics across issue areas is 
that of international regimes.12  With respect to the environment, a useful 
definition of an international regime is ‘a system of principles, norms, rules, 
operating procedures, and institutions that actors create or accept to regulate and 
coordinate action in a particular issue area of international relations’13 (Chasek et 
al., 2006:17).  Most regimes take the form of a binding agreement or legal 
instrument.  On global environmental issues, the most common form of legal 
instrument are treaties (also referred to as conventions, accords, agreements and 
protocols), which may either contain all the binding obligations expected to be 
negotiated or it may be followed by a more detailed legal instrument elaborating 
on its norms and rules.   
 
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties14 defines a treaty as ‘an 
international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed 
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more 
related instruments and whatever its particular designation’.15  This definition 
emphasizes the idea that a convention is intended to create international legal 
rights and obligations between parties; whether the creation of such binding 
obligations is intended will usually be clear from the characteristics of the treaty 
and the circumstance in which it is adopted (Sands, 2003:126).  If a convention is 
negotiated in anticipation of further elaborating texts (i.e. protocols), it is termed 
a framework convention (Chasek et al., 2006:19).  Framework conventions 
usually establish a set of general principles, norms and goals for cooperation on 
an issue (including a regular Conference of Parties (COP)) rather than imposing 
binding obligations.  Instead, the protocols subsequently negotiated under the 
                                                     
12
 The concepts of regime effectiveness and interaction are explored in more depth in Chapter 3. 
13
 Chasek et al. (2006:17) further define principles as beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude;  
norms as standards of behavior; rules as specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action; 
operating procedures as prevailing practices for work within the regime; and institutions as 
mechanisms and organizations for implementing, operating, evaluating and expanding regimes. 
14
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980, 8 ILM 679 
(1969). 
15
 Vienna Convention, Article 2(1)(a). 
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framework convention set out specific obligations of parties (e.g. the Kyoto 
Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). 
 
Non-binding agreements such as codes of conduct and plans of action, are 
termed ‘soft law’ and can also be viewed as regimes, though with varying 
degrees of effectiveness in attaining their goals.  Non-binding agreements do 
influence state behavior to some extent, however legally-binding obligations 
related to environmental protection tend to be more effective.   
 
The international legal regime for protecting marine species and habitats 
involves both global and regional rules.  These regimes can be further broken 
down into those that address species protection versus those that focus on habitat 
protection, and/or a combination of the two.16  With regard to habitat 
conservation, protected area conventions fall into two types: those that provide 
for geographic areas to be defined where activities may be prohibited or 
restricted, and those that prohibit or regulate a narrow range of activities and 
provide for the identification of areas particularly sensitive to these activities 
where more stringent protection applies (Kimball, 2001).   
 
On the global level, there are three conventions/programs that define 
geographical areas for special protection.  Two of these cover a wide range of 
areas, the 1972 World Heritage Convention17 and the 1971 Man and the 
Biosphere Program.18  The third focuses on wetlands, the 1971 Ramsar 
Convention.19  Three global framework conventions directly applicable to the 
                                                     
16
 There is also a wealth of legislation addressing marine pollution, contributing indirectly to 
species and habitat protection, however this thesis addresses more direct measures and hence 
omits discussion of marine pollution legislation. 
17
 The 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
(World heritage Convention).  Marine and coastal areas may be designated as ‘natural and 
cultural areas of outstanding value’ but only if they lie within the territory of a contracting 
party (i.e. not beyond the 12nm territorial sea). 
18
 With respect to the marine environment, the 1971 Man the Biosphere Program’s protection 
scheme is focused on ‘integrated biodiversity strategies for islands and coastal areas’ (i.e. not 
directly applicable to the European offshore marine area).  Its Biosphere Reserves do not 
function under a legally-binding convention (Kimball, 2001).  
19
 The 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially for Waterfowl 
(Wetlands or Ramsar Convention), though not applicable offshore, is an example of successful 
international cooperation in the realm of habitat protection.  
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conservation of biodiversity in the European marine offshore environment are 
the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES), the 1983 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 
(UNCLOS), and the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity (CBD).  In addition, 
relevant international forums that addressed offshore MPAs worth mentioning in 
this section include the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) and the 2003 IUCN World Parks Congress held in 
Durban, South Africa.  The following section goes into more detail on these 
global framework conventions and initiatives.  As this thesis was submitted for 
examination in September 2007, the remainder of this chapter is current up to 
that date.  
 
Table 2.1 lists European parties to the global and regional conventions discussed 
in the next two sections of this chapter, and was compiled from Convention 
membership lists as of September 2007.  The key players for the purposes of this 
thesis are the UK and EC, both of whom are parties to most of the conventions 
discussed below.  Exceptions include CITES (to which the UK is a party but the 
EC is not), and NEAFC (in which the EC acts on behalf of the UK, but the latter 
has no independent representation).   
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Table 2.1  European parties to global/regional conventions 
 
EC Members 
2007 CITES UNCLOS CBD 
C
M
S 
Be
rn
 
O
SP
A
R
 
N
EA
FC
 
A
a
rh
u
s 
Austria Acc X,I,S X X X -- -- X 
Belgium X X,I,S X X X X -- X 
Bulgaria Acc X,I,S X X X -- -- X 
Cyprus X X,I,S X X X -- -- X 
Czech Republic Succ X,I,S Apv X X -- -- X 
Denmark X X,I,S X X X X X Apv 
Estonia Acc X,I,S X -- X -- -- X 
Finland Acc X,I,S Acp X X X -- Acp 
France App X,I,S X X X X -- Apv 
Germany X X,I,S X X X X -- X 
Greece Acc X,I,S X X X -- -- X 
Hungary Acc X,I X X X -- -- X 
Ireland X X,I,S X X X X -- -- 
Italy X X,I,S X X X -- -- X 
Latvia Acc X,I,S X X X -- -- X 
Lithuania Acc X,I,S X X X -- -- X 
Luxembourg X X,I,S X X X X -- X 
Malta Acc X,I,S X X X -- -- X 
Netherlands X X,I,S Acp X X X -- Acp 
Poland X X,I,S X X X -- -- X 
Portugal X X,I,S X X X X -- X 
Romania Acc X,I,S X X X -- -- X 
Slovakia Succ X,I Apv X X -- -- Acc 
Slovenia Acc X,I,S X X X -- -- X 
Spain Acc X,I,S X X X X -- X 
Sweden X X,I,S X X X X -- X 
UK X X,I,S X X X X -- X 
 
        
EC -- X,I,S Apv X X X X Apv 
Iceland Acc X,I,S X -- X X X -- 
Norway X X,I,S X X X X X X 
Switzerland X -- X X X X -- -- 
Russia Succ X,I,S X -- -- -- X -- 
(As of September 2007) 
 
KEY Acc = Accession  
X = Ratified/Party* Acp = Accepted 
I = 1994 UNCLOS Implementation Agreement Apv = Approved 
S = 1995 UNCLOS Straddling Stock Agreement Succ = Succeeded predecessor signatory 
*The Vienna Convention establishes a state’s consent to be bound by a treaty in Articles 12-
15.  Ratification, Acceptance and Approval are legally equivalent actions but only applicable 
to states that sign a treaty when it is open for signature.  Accession refers to when a state joins 
a treaty after it was open for signature.   
Chapter 2:  Legal Framework 
 47 
2.2.1  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES), 1973 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) entered into force in 1975 and as of 2007 there were 172 
Parties.  Although the EC is not a Party, several European countries are, 
including the UK (the EC has however adopted legislation20 providing for its 
implementation).  The Convention aims to regulate the unsustainable harvesting 
and trade of wild plant and animal species through a permit system based on 
whether the species is listed in the treaty’s three Appendices.  Appendix I 
includes species threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by 
trade.21  Appendix II includes species not presently threatened with extinction, 
but which may become so if their trade is not strictly regulated.22  Appendix III 
includes species which a party to the convention identifies as being subject to 
regulation within its jurisdiction for the purposes of  preventing or restricting 
exploitations, and as needing the cooperation of other parties in the control of 
trade.23  
 
The Convention’s guidelines take an ecosystem-based approach by requiring 
management to take into account all significant habitats throughout the range of 
the species.  CITES provides varying degrees of protection to roughly 5,000 
species of animals and 28,000 species of plants.  Its three Appendices include 
several species of cetaceans, marine turtles and corals, however efforts to 
designate certain depleted marine fish species (such as Atlantic bluefin tuna) for 
protection under the Convention have been unsuccessful (Kimball, 2001).   
 
In October 2006, CITES and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of 
the United Nations signed a Memorandum of Understanding, formalizing a 
working relationship to cooperate in the management and conservation of fish 
species.  While CITES has not been very successful to date in addressing 
                                                     
20
 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 82/3626, OJ L 384, 31.12.82, p.1, as amended.  In 1997, this 
was replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 338/97, OJ L 61, 03.03.97, p.1, as amended. 
21
 CITES, Article II(1). 
22
 CITES, Article II(2). 
23
 CITES, Article II(3). 
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offshore marine conservation issues, it has relevance in this geographic area 
given the inclusion of fish species found offshore within its Annexes.  A growing 
number of commercially exploited fish species have come under CITES controls 
in recent years, including the basking and whale sharks (included in Appendix II 
in 2002) and the great white shark and humphead wrasse in 2004.  At the latest 
Conference of Parties (COP) to CITES in June 2007, proposals for the inclusion 
of more species included the spiny dogfish, porbeagle shark, European eel, pink 
coral, sawfishes, Banggai cardinelfish, Caribbean spiny lobster and smoothtail 
spiny lobster.  However, following extensive discussions only two of these made 
it onto the CITES Appendices, the European eel and sawfishes.  Nonetheless, 
this is a positive development given the European eel is a popular food in many 
countries, and the further inclusion of valuable marine species in the CITES 
regime reflects growing concern about the accelerating decline of the world’s 
oceans and fisheries.24 
 
2.2.2  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
1982/1994 
The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) provides a 
comprehensive framework for addressing marine issues and provides strong and 
binding obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment.  Its 
principles and mechanisms have been realized through specialized legal 
instruments to support an ecosystem-based and precautionary approach to 
sustainable ocean use.  The linkages among these agreements are helping to 
construct a web of international commitments that increasingly include all 
sources of ocean stress (Kimball, 2001).  The Convention briefly addresses the 
issue of protected areas/species in Article 194(5), which provides that measures 
taken under Part XII (on the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment) ‘shall include those necessary to protect and preserve rare or 
                                                     
24
 CITES press releases: (1)‘Governments to consider new CITES trade controls for high-value 
marine and timber species’, 28 February 2007, available online:  
(www.cites.org/eng/news/press/2007/070228_cop14.shtml)  and (2) ‘CITES updates wildlife 
trade rules to meet the emerging challenges of the 21st century’, 15 June 2007, available online: 
(www.cites.org/eng/news/press_release.shtml). 
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fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered 
species and other forms of marine life’.   
 
Given the important ramifications for offshore management inherent in the Law 
of the Sea Convention (LOSC), some background is necessary to understand 
both its implications and the difficulties inherent in its negotiations.  There have 
been four major attempts by the international community to codify the law of the 
sea, beginning with a League of Nations initiative in 192425 that resulted in a 
conference in the Hague in 1930.  Though unable to reach an agreement about 
the geographic extent of territorial waters (i.e. waters under full sovereign 
jurisdiction of coastal states), the Hague conference led to draft articles that had 
some influence in developing further initiatives.  The first UNCLOS, held in 
Geneva in 1958, succeeded in adopting four conventions on: (i) the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone; (ii) the High Seas; (iii) the Continental Shelf; and 
(iv) Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, all of 
which were ratified except the fourth.  The question of the breadth of the 
territorial sea was not resolved in the 1958 conference either, and thus a second 
Conference (UNCLOS II) was convened in 1960 to discuss this issue and the 
related question of fishery limits.  It failed by only one vote to adopt a 
compromise solution entailing a six-mile territorial sea plus six-mile fishery zone 
(Churchill and Lowe, 1999).  Agreement on the breadth of maritime zones was 
not reached until the completion of UNCLOS III, after prolonged negotiations.26  
 
Of direct importance to the offshore MPA regime, the LOSC established 
maritime zones including a 12nm territorial sea and 200nm Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ)27, both under the sovereign jurisdiction of a coastal State (see 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 above).  Within the 12nm territorial sea, states are sovereign 
                                                     
25
 The League of Nations appointed a Committee of Experts to determine issues for codification, 
including territorial waters, piracy, exploitation of marine resources, and legal status of State-
owned merchant ships. 
26
 UNCLOS III held its first session in 1973 and was not adopted as a convention until 1982.  
27
 As mentioned earlier, the UK claims an Exclusive Fishing Zone (EFZ) rather than EEZ (supra, 
note 9).  Most of the other developed States that initially claimed EFZs have converted these to 
EEZs following the adoption of the LOSC.  As the UK has not, this thesis refers to its EFZ 
when addressing the UK situation directly, but reverts to the term EEZ when discussing the 
regime generally. 
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over the seabed, subsoil, and the air space above the sea.28  The innocent passage 
of foreign vessels is permitted within the 12nm zone, and coastal states are 
allowed to adopt laws regarding navigation, protection of cables and pipelines, 
fisheries, pollution, scientific research, and customs, fiscal, immigration and 
sanitary regulations.29 
 
The EEZ extends up to 200nm from the baseline30, within which coastal states 
have ‘sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing’ the fish stocks therein.31  These rights are subject to several 
duties.  Coastal states must take the necessary management measures to ensure 
that their fish stocks are not endangered by over-exploitation.  Stocks are to be 
maintained at or restored to ‘levels which can produce the maximum sustainable 
yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors […] and 
taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any 
generally recommended’32 sub-regional, regional or global minimum standards 
(Churchill and Lowe, 1999:289).  These duties are broadly formulated and leave 
room for coastal states to set any level of total allowable catch, as long as it does 
not lead to over-exploitation.  The EEZ regime agreed during the UNCLOS III 
negotiations addresses the problems of sustainable exploitation of open access 
resources by designating living resources under the jurisdiction of coastal states.  
The rights and duties of other states in the EEZ include freedom of navigation, 
over-flight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines (with some 
limitations subject to the coastal State’s powers of consent and pollution control). 
 
Nearly 99% of the world’s fisheries now fall under some nation’s jurisdiction 
and a large percentage of the world’s reserves of oil and gas are found in EEZs.   
Consequently there is a need for rational, well-managed exploitation of these 
                                                     
28
 UNCLOS, Article 2(2).  The development of the concept of the territorial sea is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, which focuses primarily on offshore waters, i.e., beyond 12nm.  For a 
historical overview of the territorial sea, see Churchill and Lowe (1999, chapter 4). 
29
 UNCLOS, Article 21. 
30
 The baseline, from which the outer limit of the territorial sea and EEZ are measured, is defined 
as the ‘low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by 
the coastal State’ (UNCLOS, Article 5). 
31
 UNCLOS, Article 56(1). 
32
 UNCLOS, Article 61(3). 
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resources.  If all coastal states were to establish 200nm EEZs, roughly 36% of 
the sea would fall under this jurisdiction (Churchill and Lowe, 1999).  Though 
not a large percentage of the oceans, this phytoplankton-rich area encompasses 
over 90% of commercially viable fish stocks and approximately 87% of the 
world’s known submarine oil deposits (Churchill and Lowe, 1999).  Nationals of 
other states fishing in an EEZ must comply with the measures, laws and 
regulations adopted by the State that holds jurisdiction in that zone, including 
conservation laws.33   
 
Whereas a coastal State holds full sovereign rights over the seabed and its 
resources as well as the overlying water in its EEZ, the continental shelf (CS) 
regime agreed under the LOSC is more limited.  A coastal State is entitled to a 
CS consisting of (i) the sea bed reaching 200nm from the baseline of the 
territorial sea and (ii) subject to the ‘Irish Formula’,34 any area of physical 
continental margin (referred to as the ‘outer’ CS) beyond it (Churchill and Lowe 
1999:149).  The minimum breadth of the CS is set as 200nm (i.e. not less than 
the EEZ), a legal definition that differs from its geological classification.  The 
maximum seaward limit of the CS is set as either within 350nm of the baseline or 
within 100nm of the 2,500 meter isobath.35  Given this dual definition of the 
maximum extent of the CS, i.e. 200nm or up to 350nm, it is not surprising that 
many nations have focused their national legislation towards the larger definition 
where possible.   
 
The rights of the coastal State are limited to the exploration and exploitation of 
the seabed and sub-soil of its CS.  Consequently, sedentary species (such as 
coral) are considered to be under the exclusive control of the coastal State, while 
non-sedentary species (such as fish) are open to exploitation as one of the 
freedoms of the high seas. 
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 UNCLOS, Articles 62(4) and (5). 
34
 Where the continental margin extends beyond 200nm, the outer limit of the legal CS is 
determined by the application of a complex test known as the ‘Irish Formula’.  The limit is 
either (i) a line connecting points not more than 60 miles apart, at each of which points the 
thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1% of the shortest distance from such point to the 
foot of the continental slope, or (ii) a line connecting points not more than 60 miles apart, 
which points are not more than 60 miles from the foot of the slope.   
35
 UNCLOS, Articles 76(4) and (5).   
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Two factors complicating UNCLOS negotiations were fishing rights and oil 
exploration.  A profound increase in fishing effort occurred during the twentieth 
century due to rising demand, growth in fishing industries in developing 
countries, and most importantly, tremendous advances in technology for catching 
and processing fish.  The world’s total fish catch increased from 15 million tons 
(mt) in 1938 to 28mt in 1958, 64mt in 1974 and 90mt by 1990, though it began 
to decline by the year 2000 (Birnie and Boyle, 2002:646).  As global fish stocks 
decreased, conflicts arose and between 1974 and 1979 alone there were some 
twenty disputes over cod, anchovies or tuna and other species between, for 
example, the United Kingdom and Iceland, Morocco and Spain, and the United 
States and Peru.  The designation of exclusive sovereignty over the sea and its 
fish stocks understandably played an important role in UNCLOS negotiations.  
The importance of oil interests as a driving force in the formation of the LOSC is 
evident in the fact that UNCLOS III was launched shortly after the October 1973 
Arab-Israeli war and its resulting oil embargo and skyrocketing prices.  At the 
time, only two percent of the continental shelf had been explored and hopes were 
high for further discoveries. 
 
The LOSC entered into force in 1994, despite the non-involvement of key states 
with reservations about the Treaty’s provisions on the deep sea bed (such as the 
United States and, initially, the UK36).  As of September 2007, the Convention 
had 155 Parties.37  Two subsequent legal instruments, the 1994 Implementation 
Agreement and 1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement38 have served as 
implementation vehicles for the Convention with significant implications for the 
offshore zone.  The Straddling Stock Agreement focuses primarily on the 
management of fish stocks in the high seas (i.e. beyond 200nm), however it also 
addresses areas under national jurisdiction in its Articles 5 (general principles), 6 
                                                     
36
 The UK ratified UNCLOS and its 1994 Implementation Agreement in 1997, and the Straddling 
Stocks Agreement in 2001.  The US remains outside this Convention. 
37
 As of September 2007, 130 States had ratified the 1994 Implementation Agreement and 67 had 
ratified the 1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement. 
38
 The Implementation Agreement entered into force on 28 July 1998 and the Agreement on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks entered into force 11 December 
2001. 
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(the precautionary approach) and 7 (management and conservation).  Concurrent 
with the Straddling Stocks Agreement, the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations sponsored a voluntary Code of Conduct on Responsible 
Fisheries in 1995.  Though this code is an example of soft law, i.e. not legally 
binding, it sets out principles and international standards of behavior for 
responsible practices with the aim of conserving ecosystems and using the 
precautionary approach.  It also recommends the development and application of 
selective and environmentally safe fishing gear and practices.39 
 
In its preamble, the LOSC states as its goal the establishment of ‘a legal order for 
the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will 
promote the peaceful use of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient 
utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the 
study, protection and preservation of the marine environment’.  In addition to its 
achievement of having finally codified states’ maritime zones, it attempts for the 
first time to provide a global framework for the rational exploitation and 
conservation of the sea’s resources and the protection of the environment (Birnie 
and Boyle:348).  UNCLOS is consequently one of the most far-reaching and 
influential of global environmental regimes, and its provisions on the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment are considered by many states to 
reflect generally applicable principles or rules of customary law (Sands, 
2003:396).     
 
2.2.3  Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 1992 
Negotiated under the auspices of UNEP, the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity was signed by 153 states and the EC at the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED, also known as the Rio Conference 
or Earth Summit).  It entered into force in 1993 and as of September 2007 it had 
189 parties including the EC and the UK. The CBD established objectives for the 
comprehensive preservation of biological diversity, reflecting aims of the 1980 
IUCN World Conservation Strategy (Sands, 2003:516).  As a framework 
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 Article 6(6). 
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convention, it does not obligate signatories to any measurable conservation 
objectives, though it requires development of national strategies for the 
conservation of biodiversity.   
 
Article 8 of the CBD requires parties to (i) establish a system of protected areas 
where special measures need to be taken to protect biological diversity and (ii) to 
promote the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of 
viable populations of species in natural surroundings.  In 1995, the second 
Conference of the Parties (COP II) focused on marine and coastal biodiversity, 
resulting in the non-binding Jakarta Mandate on Marine and Coastal 
Biodiversity.40  This mandate aims to increase understanding of the value and 
effects of marine and coastal protected areas on sustainable use and to develop 
criteria for their establishment and management.  It encourages the integration of 
protected areas into wider strategies so that external activities do not adversely 
impact marine and coastal ecosystems.  The marine living resources program 
element (one of five established under the mandate) includes action to identify 
key habitats on a regional basis, and to prevent their physical alteration and 
destruction as well as protecting and restoring spawning and nursery areas and 
other important habitat (Kimball, 2001).   
 
The UK published a Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP) in 1994 in response to 
Article 6 of the CBD, to develop national strategies for biodiversity conservation 
and the sustainable use of biological resources.  The BAP committed the UK 
government and its agencies to 59 programs aimed at conserving species and 
habitats, developing public awareness and understanding, and contributing to 
biodiversity work in Europe and internationally.  A Biodiversity Steering Group 
was subsequently established to advise the government on implementation of the 
BAP, involving several levels of membership such as central and local 
government, statutory nature conservation agencies, industry, the scientific 
community, agricultural representatives and conservation NGOs.  Following the 
Biodiversity Steering Group’s 1996 recommendations to the UK Government, a 
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 See implementation document by de Fontaubert et al. (1996).  
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framework of Groups was established to further the process.  The UK BAP 
produced a report on the first five years of its work in 2001, ‘Sustaining the 
Variety of Life’.  Throughout the development of the UK BAP work it was 
evident that its successful implementation would depend on ensuring effective 
action at the local level.  Consequently there are now over 160 local biodiversity 
action plans in some stage of development in the UK.   
 
With regard to marine BAPs, following the establishment of a UK Marine BAP 
Coordinating Group (comprised of statutory agencies) in May 2000, a report 
detailing the UK BAPs for maritime species and habitats was published in 
October 2000.41  The CBD supports existing arrangements for habitat protection 
by calling on states to establish a network of protected areas at the national level 
where special conservation measures are needed.  In January 2004, the CBD’s ad 
hoc technical expert group on marine and coastal protected areas published 
‘Technical Advice on the Establishment and Management of a National System 
of Marine and Coastal Protected Areas’.42  At the seventh Conference of the 
Parties (COP VII) in February 2004, decision VII/S was taken on marine and 
coastal biodiversity, implementing the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development commitment to establishing a global network of MPAs by 2012 
(see section 2.2.4 below).   
 
The CBD’s comprehensive approach to species, ecosystem and genetic diversity 
and its endorsement of an ecosystem approach43 to biodiversity conservation 
strengthen the impetus for an ecosystem-based approach to marine conservation 
(Kimball, 2001).  This Convention’s strongest contribution may lie in promoting 
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 UK Biodiversity Group Tranche 2 Action Plans, Volume V – maritime species and habitats, 
October 2000. 
42
 CBD Technical Series No. 13, available on the CBD website: 
(www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/cbd-ts-13.pdf). 
43
 The Ecosystem Approach is considered by the CBD to be the primary framework for achieving 
sustainable development, by maintaining fully functioning ecosystems.  It is hoped that an 
Ecosystem Approach will help to reach a balance of the three objectives of the convention: 
conservation; sustainable use; and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of 
the utilization of genetic resources (CBD, 2000).  See chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion 
of the Ecosystem Approach. 
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a more systematic approach to the use of the large number of international 
agreements promoting coastal/marine protected area designations. 
 
2.2.4  World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), 2002 / IUCN 
World Parks Congress, 2003 
Two recent global environmental initiatives are worth mentioning in the context 
of offshore MPAs.  Ten years after the Rio Summit, the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) was held in Johannesburg in the autumn of 
2002.  In its Plan of Implementation, the WSSD addressed the marine 
environment in a section on ‘protecting and managing the natural resource base 
of economic and social development’.44  The Summit agreed, inter alia, (i) to 
encourage the application of the ecosystem approach to the world’s oceans by 
2010; (ii) to maintain or restore fish stocks to maximum sustainable yields by 
2015 where possible, with the aim of achieving these goals for depleted stocks 
on an urgent basis; (iii) to implement the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) plan for managing fishing capacity45 by 2005; (iv) to implement the FAO 
plan to prevent illegal fishing46 by 2004; and (v) to establish a regular UN 
process for assessing the state of the marine environment by 2004.  The 
Johannesburg text says little about how these aims will be realized or who will 
be responsible for their implementation.  At its eleventh session in May 2003, the 
UN Commission on Sustainable Development negotiated a work program for 
implementing the outcomes of the WSSD over the next 15 years.  One of its 
seven themes was ‘Oceans and seas, marine resources, small island developing 
states, disaster management and vulnerability’. 
 
A year after the WSSD, in 2003 the fifth IUCN47 World Parks Congress held in 
Durban, South Africa, produced specific recommendations for the development 
                                                     
44
 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, available on the UN Division for Sustainable 
Development website: (www.un.org/esa/sustdev). 
45
 FAO International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity, 1999. 
46
 FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing, 2001. 
47
 The World Conservation Union (IUCN) is a Swiss-based organisation with members from 140 
countries including 70 states, 100 government agencies, more than 750 NGOs.  One of its 
many functions is to provide policy advice and technical support to the secretariats and Parties 
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of MPAs in its commitments and policy guidelines for protected areas world 
wide.48  In particular, the Congress called on international bodies and all nations 
to establish a global system of effectively managed, representative networks of 
marine and coastal protected areas by 2012 (including strictly protected areas 
that amount to at least 20-30% of each habitat, see Table 1.4 in Chapter 1).  The 
Congress also called for the restoration of depleted fish stocks by 2015, the 
application of the ecosystem approach to ocean and fisheries management by 
2010 and the establishment of at least five ecologically significant and globally 
representative High Seas MPAs by 2008.  While the objectives set out by the 
IUCN are more detailed than the 2002 WSSD Plan of Implementation, neither is 
legally binding.  Nonetheless, they may still contribute to the development of 
future binding commitments.49 
 
The IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA) is involved in a 
partnership with the WWF on a MPA Management Effectiveness Initiative, and 
presented a guidebook50 on the topic at the Durban Congress.  These guidelines 
are designed to provide tools to MPA practitioners and facilitate a learning 
network to improve management effectiveness.   
 
2.3   REGIONAL CONVENTIONS AND COMMISSIONS 
Regarding offshore marine conservation in the North-East Atlantic, relevant 
regional regimes include the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory 
Species of Wild Animals (CMS or Bonn Convention), the 1979 Bern Convention 
on the Conservation of European Wildlife and their Habitats, the 1992 OSPAR 
Convention on the Protection of the Environment of the North East Atlantic, the 
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) and the 1998 Aarhus 
Convention (regarding access to environmental justice).  The following section 
                                                                                                                                               
of international conventions.  It also monitors World Heritage sites, assesses global 
biodiversity and convenes World Parks Congresses every four years. 
48
 The recommendations of the fifth World Parks Congress can be found on the IUCN website: 
(www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa/wpc2003). 
49
 While the 2002 WSSD Plan of Implementation (like the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and 1992 
Rio Declaration) was not intended to create legal rules and obligations, it may reflect rules of 
international law or contribute to the development of such rules, other than by treaty law 
(Sands 2003:126). 
50
 The document is available on the project website: (effectivempa.noaa.gov/guidebook). 
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goes into more depth on these treaties and their relevance in the context of 
offshore marine conservation.  For a listing of European parties, see Table 2.1 
above. 
 
2.3.1  Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 
(CMS or Bonn Convention), 1979 
The CMS entered into force in 1983 and focuses on the conservation of 
migratory species throughout their range. Its two Appendices list species at two 
levels of risk, those requiring immediate action and those with an unfavorable 
conservation status.  As a framework convention, it provides guidelines for 
subsequent Agreements protecting particular species/regions (such as the 1992 
Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas 
(ASCOBANS)).51  As of September 2007, the CMS had 105 Parties from Africa, 
Central and South America, Asia, Europe and Oceana (and including both the 
UK and EC), who are required to conclude Agreements benefiting migratory 
species, with the aim of restoring or maintaining their favorable conservation 
status.  Both of the Convention’s Appendices include marine species and 
migratory seabirds and several relevant Agreements have been concluded.  The 
CMS is considered to be particularly interesting for three reasons:   (i) it covers 
an unusually broad range of threats to listed species, (ii) its provisions are 
unusually rigorous in their restrictions and (iii) it establishes a precedent in 
international wildlife law for providing subsidiarity agreements which focus 
attention and efforts on particular species (Lyster, 2000).   
 
The Bonn Convention stresses that states are the protectors of species within 
national boundaries, while recognizing that the conservation and effective 
management of migratory species require the concerted action of all states within 
whose boundaries they spend a part of their lifecycle (Birnie and Boyle, 
2002:606).  Its preamble has been cited as the clearest articulation yet in a 
                                                     
51
 Other Agreements concluded under the CMS with a marine focus include the 1990 Agreement 
on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea Area; the 1996 Agreement on the 
Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area 
(ACCOBAMS); and the 1999 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Conservation 
Measures for Marine Turtles of the Atlantic Coast of Africa. 
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wildlife convention in force of the Brown Weiss doctrine of intergenerational 
equity52, in stating that ‘each generation of man holds the resources of the earth 
for future generations and has an obligation to ensure that this legacy is 
conserved and, when utilized, is used wisely’ (Birnie and Boyle, 2002:606). 
 
2.3.2  Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and their 
Natural Habitats, 1979 
The Bern Convention was negotiated under the Council of Europe and came into 
force in 1982.  Although the Convention initially had mostly economically 
developed countries of Northern Europe as Parties, including the EC, it has since 
expanded its membership to Central and Eastern European countries.  As of 
September 2007, it had 45 Parties, including 39 Member States of the Council of 
Europe (which includes the UK), as well as the EC, Monaco and four African 
States.  The Bern Convention’s objectives are (i) to conserve wild fauna, flora 
and their habitats; (ii) to promote cooperation between states; and (iii) to give 
particular emphasis to endangered and vulnerable species, including endangered 
and vulnerable migratory species.  It applies to all species and their habitats, 
regardless of their scarcity, and is applicable to visiting migratory species as well 
as European species found outside of Europe (Sands, 2003).  The Convention 
lists species in three Appendices and imposes explicit mandatory obligations.  
Parties are obliged to take appropriate and necessary legislative and 
administrative measures to ensure the conservation of the habitats of wild fauna 
and flora (Reid, 2002).  Implementation of the Bern Convention falls under the 
jurisdiction of a Standing Committee composed of representatives, one from 
each Party.  The Committee produces recommendations and proposals for 
                                                     
52
 This doctrine is threefold: (i) Conservation of Options: Each generation should conserve the 
diversity of the natural and cultural resource base so that the options of future generations are 
not unduly restricted; (ii) Conservation of Quality: Each generation should maintain the quality 
of the planet so that it is passed on in no worse condition than that in which it was received; 
and (iii) Conservation of Access: Each generation should provide its members with equitable 
rights of access to the legacy of past generations and conserve this access for future generations 
(Brown Weiss, 1990). 
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improving the effectiveness of the Convention and may adopt amendments to the 
Appendices.53   
 
In December 1999 at its 19th meeting, the Bern Convention specifically 
addressed the conservation of marine habitats and species in Europe, reviewing a 
preliminary report,54 which also emphasized the need for protection in offshore 
and deep sea areas.  The consensus of this meeting however was to delay 
creating a working group on marine biodiversity until a more complete 
assessment of the work of other related organizations had been compiled.  There 
was however general agreement on the need to look for synergies with all 
conventions in the regional seas and other appropriate organizations under the 
Bonn Convention.  In its subsequent meetings in 2000 and 2001, the Bern 
Convention Standing Committee has addressed marine turtle conservation, but 
not habitat protection in general.  As discussed below in section 2.4, the origins 
of the EC Birds and Habitats Directives can be found in the provisions of the 
Bern Convention.  As the Directives are legally binding and impose more 
detailed obligations than the Convention, they can be seen as having a more 
practical impact on the conservation of wildlife and habitats.  However, the 
Convention still contributes to nature conservation in Europe by extending 
commitment and co-operation among its Parties (i.e. to its non-EC members as 
well) and it also provides further legal recognition for the needs of certain 
endangered species (Reid, 2002).  
 
2.3.3  OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North East Atlantic, 1992   
The OSPAR Convention came into force in 1998, replacing the 1972 Oslo 
Dumping Convention and 1974 Paris Convention, and it has sixteen Parties55 
                                                     
53
 For example, in December 1991 over 400 species were added to Appendix I, to which an 
additional 107 Eastern European species were added in December 1996 (Sands, 2003). 
54
 Castello, M. (1999) Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural 
Habitats, Draft Report ‘Conservation of Marine Habitats and Species in Europe’, Strasbourg, 
13 October 1999, T-PVS (99) 56. 
55
 Belgium, Denmark, the EC, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. 
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including the EC and the UK.  Its coverage56 includes the North East Atlantic 
and Arctic, including the North Sea and comprising internal waters and territorial 
seas as well as applying to high seas and the seabed and subsoil.  A map of the 
area covered under the OSPAR Convention is given in Figure 2.3.  OSPAR is 
primarily focused on addressing marine pollution in the regions covered, in a 
comprehensive and simplified approach, i.e. regulating all pollution sources in a 
single instrument.   
 
Though aimed primarily at addressing pollution, OSPAR also contains important 
provisions in its Annex V on the protection and conservation of marine 
ecosystems and biodiversity.   In early 1998, it was unclear whether OSPAR had 
precedence over the EC with regard to the protection of species and habitats in 
the EEZ, given the Member States’ full competence within territorial waters.  As 
a result, Annex V (on the Protection and Conservation of the Ecosystems and 
Biological Diversity of the North East Atlantic) was added to the Convention at 
the 1998 Ministerial Meeting of the Commissions in order to cover the area 
beyond territorial waters in the North East Atlantic.57  Regarding fishery issues, 
OSPAR stipulates that their management is referred to the authority or 
international body competent for such issues.  Thus questions of fishing rights 
for Member States of the EC must be taken under the EC’s Common Fisheries 
Policy. 
 
                                                     
56
 The OSPAR Regions are (i) the Arctic: the OSPAR maritime area north of latitude 62ºN, but 
also including Iceland and the Færoes; (ii) the Greater North Sea: the North Sea, the English 
Channel, the Skagerrak and the Kattegat to the limits of the OSPAR maritime area, bounded on 
the north by latitude 62ºN, on the west by longitude 5ºW and the east coast of Great Britain, 
and on the south by latitude 48ºN; (iii) the Celtic Seas: the area bounded by, on the east, 
longitude 5ºW and the west coast of Great Britain and on the west by the 200 meter isobath 
(depth contour) to the west of 6ºW along the west coasts of Scotland and Ireland; (iv) the Bay 
of Biscay/Golfe de Gascogne and Iberian coasts: the area south of latitude 48ºN, east of 11ºW 
and north of latitude 36ºN (the southern boundary of the OSPAR maritime area); and (v) the 
Wider Atlantic: the remainder of the OSPAR maritime area. 
57
 The UK ratified OSPAR in 1998 and Annex V and Appendix 3 (identifying human activities 
for the purpose of Annex V) in 2000.  Implementation of Annex V is undertaken by the 
OSPAR Biodiversity Committee.   
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Figure 2.3  Map of OSPAR Area 
 
 
(From the OSPAR website: www.ospar.org) 
 
In addition to an expanded use of Annexes, other significant legal developments 
under OSPAR include a commitment to ‘sustainable management’ (rather than 
development, hence an endorsement of sustainability as an emerging 
international legal concept); an incorporation of the precautionary principle and 
polluter pays principle in the Convention; a commitment to increased public 
participation; and the creation of a new Commission with the power to take 
legally binding decisions and participate in compliance (Sands, 2003).  The 
OSPAR Commission, comprised of one representative from each Party, may 
adopt legally-binding decisions as well as non-binding recommendations.  The 
Commission is also required to assess compliance and call for steps to improve 
it, including new measures of assisting Parties in carrying out their obligations.58    
OSPAR is also unique in containing rules on the right of access to environmental 
information, a first for an international treaty.     
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 Article 23. 
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Preceding OSPAR, International Conferences on the Protection of the North Sea 
have been held since 1984, providing an opportunity for Ministers to make 
commitments to protecting the environment.  In March 2002, the fifth 
International Conference on the North Sea was held in Bergen, Norway.  The 
resulting Bergen Declaration addresses the use of an ecosystem approach and the 
establishment of a network of MPAs in the North Sea by 2010, among other 
issues.  In its section on the Conservation, Restoration and Protection of Species 
and Habitats, the Bergen Declaration invited the ‘competent authorities to study 
the practicability of the application of the EC Wild Birds and Habitats Directives 
beyond the territorial seas of EC Member States to the limits of their offshore 
jurisdiction’.   
 
In June 2003, the first joint Ministerial Meeting of the Helsinki59 and OSPAR 
Commissions was held in Bremen, Germany, resulting in the establishment of a 
joint HELCOM/OSPAR Work Programme on MPAs.  This Programme aims to 
ensure that by 2010 there is a network of ecologically-coherent and well 
managed MPAs for the maritime areas of both HELCOM and OSPAR.  In 
addition to specifically addressing MPAs and an ecosystem approach in the 
Annexes to the resulting Bremen Declaration, the Commissions also declared an 
intention to take forward and broaden the approach of the EC Birds and Habitats 
Directives ‘in order to ensure the conservation of the full range of habitats and 
species in the marine environment within the jurisdiction of the EC Member 
States in accordance with the objectives of those directives, and suggest to the 
EC initiatives for these purposes’.  OSPAR MPAs are to be designated 
throughout the North East Atlantic, including the high seas, based on criteria for 
site selection agreed on by OSPAR Ministers (using management guidance 
prepared by the OSPAR Biodiversity Committee) and legal mechanisms for their 
protection and management are to be determined by the member Parties 
(Johnston 2004). 
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 The Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area.  
Its Parties are Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Russian 
Federation and Sweden, together with the European Community. 
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The JNCC released a report (JNCC, 2004) on this initiative, exploring the 
concept of an ‘ecologically coherent network’ of MPAs as this concept is not 
formally defined60 and the report includes several recommendations regarding 
the design of such a network, reflecting the biogeographic variation that is 
present across the OSPAR area.  In 2006, OSPAR released its first report61 on 
the status of the OSPAR network of MPAs.  As of 2007, six of the twelve coastal 
Contracting Parties had proposed 81 MPAs for the network, most of which lie 
within territorial waters; only Norway and Germany proposed sites within their 
EEZs (3 Norway, 1 Germany).  All of the sites proposed by EU Member States 
were either wholly or partially Natura 2000 sites, and there were no proposals for 
MPAs in areas beyond national jurisdiction.  Table 2.2 gives the OSPAR MPA 
nominations to date, comprising a total area of 25,093 km2 (the total OSPAR 
Area comprises 14,167,037 km2 but that figure includes waters with significant 
ice cover in the Arctic).  There are prospects for further OSPAR MPA 
nominations but their potential varies. The development of OSPAR’s MPA 
Programme in parallel with the current process of designation for inshore and 
offshore marine SACs under the Habitats Directive presents an overlap in 
jurisdiction that is likely to lead to inherent institutional tensions, an issue 
explored later in the thesis (see Chapter 7). 
 
                                                     
60
 The JNCC defines an ‘ecological network’ of MPAs as follows: a network comprising an 
ecologically representative and coherent mix of land and/or sea areas that may include 
protected areas, corridors and buffer zones, and is characterized by interconnectivity with the 
landscape and existing socio-economic structures and institutions (JNCC, 2004). 
61
 OSPAR Commission 2005/2006 Report on the Status of the OSPAR Network of Marine 
Protected Areas, available on the OSPAR website: (www.ospar.org/documents/). 
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Table 2.2  OSPAR MPA nominations as of 2007 
Party (# of sites) Sites Type (where given) 
Portugal (1) 
525 km2 
Formigas/Dollabarat bank (Azores) Nature reserve, 3,628 
ha is also a Natura 
2000 site 
Selligrunnen 
Røstrevet  
Sularevet  
Iverryggen 
Tisler 
Norway (6) 
1,905 km2 
Fjelknausene 
All except 
Selligrunnen have 
fisheries closures to 
bottom-trawling gear 
Helgoland Seabird Protected Area Natura 2000 SPA 
Schleswig-Holstein Wadden Sea National Park and 
Natura 2000 SCI 
SPA-Eastern German Bight  Natura 2000 SPA 
Germany (4) 
11,923 km2 
Lower Saxony Wadden Sea National  
     Park 
Natura 2000 SPA and 
SAC 
Koster-Väderö archipelago Some enhanced 
protections including 
fisheries restrictions 
Gullmarn fjord Some enhanced 
protections 
Norde älv estuary Fisheries closures 
Kungsbacka fjord Nature reserve 
Fladen  
Sweden (6) 
639 km2 
(all sites overlap 
Natura 2000 
sites) 
Lilla Middlegrund  
UK (56) 
9,858 km2 
Full reporting requirements not yet 
completed 
 
France (8) 
243 km2 
Réserve Naturelle Nationale de la  
     Baie de Somme 
Réserve Naturelle de l’Estuarie de la  
     Seine 
Réserve Naturelle Nationale du  
     Domaine de Beauguillot 
Réserve Naturelle de la Baie de  
     l’Aiguillon,  
Réserve Naturelle de la baie de Saint  
     Brieuc 
Archipel des Sept îles 
Réserve Naturelle de Moëze-Oléron 
Réserve Naturelle du Banc d’Arguin 
All are Natura 2000 
sites 
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Regarding regional approaches to marine conservation, it should be noted that 
OSPAR is a partner program62 of the UNEP Regional Seas Programme, a 
multilateral effort to manage coastal and ocean areas cooperatively in a regional 
framework.  The UNEP Regional Seas Programme was established in 1974, 
shortly after the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE, or 
‘Stockholm Conference’) and establishment of UNEP, and of the fourteen areas 
it has addressed, thirteen Regional Seas have adopted their own regional action 
plans, beginning with the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP)63 of 1975.64  The 
MAP is the most advanced regime in the Programme, comprising the Barcelona 
Convention65 and eight subsequent Protocols (seven of which address different 
types of pollution, while one focuses on biodiversity).  The UNEP Regional Seas 
Programme has continued working on marine conservation since, and is 
currently developing an Action Plan for the Upper South West Atlantic.   
 
As the UNEP Regional Seas Programme does not have a plan for the North-East 
Atlantic, consequently OSPAR is the only regional convention dealing directly 
with the region, however it does not directly address conservation issues 
resulting from fishing activities.  Rather, the main regional tools for 
implementing conservation measures that target fishing activities are within 
European legislation (outlined in section 2.4 below) and the North-East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission (NEAFC).   
 
2.3.4  North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), 1982 
The North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) is a voluntary Regional 
Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) established under the Convention 
                                                     
62
 Other partner programs exist in the Baltic, Arctic, Antarctic and Caspian Seas. 
63
 The 1975 Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) was replaced in 1995 by MAP Phase II. 
64
 UNEP Regional Seas Action Plans exist for the Mediterranean (1975/1995); Red Sea and Gulf 
of Aden (1982); ROPME Sea Area (Kuwait region, 1978); wider Caribbean (1981); East Asian 
Seas (1981); S.E. Pacific (1981); West and Central African (1982); South Pacific (1982); East 
Africa (1985); Black Sea (1996); N.W. Pacific (1994); South Asian Seas (1995); and the N.E. 
Pacific (2001). 
65
 The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the 
Mediterranean (Barcelona Convention) was originally adopted in 1976 and replaced in 1995 
with a new Convention under the same name, which entered into force in 2004.  Its Parties (as 
of 2004) are: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, the EC, 
France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. 
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on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North East Atlantic Fisheries, which 
entered into force on 17 March 1982.  The earliest widespread international 
agreement concerning rules of conduct in the North-East Atlantic was the 1882 
North Sea Fisheries Convention, which remained the only comprehensive 
regulation for North Sea fisheries for more than 50 years (Underdal, 1980:47).    
In the period between the World Wars, a number of conferences were held to 
address the rational exploitation of fish resources in the North-East Atlantic.  The 
recovery of several commercially-exploited fish stocks during World War I 
seems to have called more attention to the possibility of over-fishing and 
stimulated interest in conservation (Underdal, 1980:48).   
 
The first attempt at developing a comprehensive conservation scheme in the 
region was an International Convention for the Regulation of the Meshes of 
Fishing Nets and the Size Limits of Fish, signed in London in 1937.  This 
convention never entered into force, primarily because of World War II, but 
several of the parties unilaterally practiced the new regulations (Underdal, 
1980:49).  A new conference was called in 1943 at the initiative of the UK 
government, to consider questions of policing as well as conservation, resulting 
in a Convention Relating to the Policing of Fisheries and Measures for the 
Protection of Immature Fish.  Several countries feared its measures would not 
prove sufficient in peace time, however, and as a result the UK called for a new 
‘over fishing’ conference in 1945, which resulted in the 1946 Convention for the 
Regulation of Meshes and Fishing Nets and the Size Limits of Fish.  This 
convention established a permanent commission in 1953, the forerunner of 
NEAFC.  In 1959, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Convention was established, 
which succeeded the 1953 commission and served as a framework for most 
international fishery regulations in the area until the establishment of EEZs in 
1977. 
 
With the accession of the European Economic Community to the Convention in 
1980, a new NEAFC commission was established in 1982.  The modern NEAFC 
emerged following the withdrawal of EC member states as individual members 
of the 1959 Convention (which had operated from 1963) and the general 
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extension of national fishery limits to 200nm in the 1970s.  The contracting 
parties to NEAFC are currently the EC, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Denmark 
(on behalf of the Faeroe Islands and Greenland, and the only EC member state66 
that participates in the Commission).  A map of the Convention’s regulatory area 
is given in Figure 2.4.  NEAFC’s principal objective is ‘to promote the long-term 
conservation and optimum utilisation of the fishery resources of the North-East 
Atlantic area, and in doing so to safeguard the marine ecosystems in which the 
resources occur, and accordingly to encourage international cooperation and 
consultation with respect to these resources’.67   
 
Figure 2.4  NEAFC Regulatory Area 
 
(From the NEAFC website: www.neafc.org) 
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 Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland and Sweden all formerly participated in NEAFC but have withdrawn 
from the Convention.  Bulgaria and Sweden discontinued their membership in 1995, and 
Bulgaria and Poland in 2006, after they joined the EC. 
67
 Preamble to the Convention on the Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic 
Fisheries.  Available on the NEAFC website (www.neafc.org /about/docs/london-
declarlation_and_new_convention.pdf). 
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NEAFC recommends management measures to its parties concerning fisheries 
beyond the areas under their jurisdiction (or that of the CFP, for European 
parties).  It also recommends measures for areas under the jurisdiction of its 
parties, for those who request it.  There are presently four co-operating non-
contracting parties to NEAFC as well, i.e. states that have a fishing interest in the 
North-East Atlantic and who operate under NEAFC rules: Belize, Canada, Japan 
and New Zealand.  NEAFC works closely with other RFMOs in the North 
Atlantic, namely the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), and the 
International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC) as well as the scientific 
advisory body ICES (the International Council on the Exploration of the Sea).68  
Within NEAFC, there are two schemes currently operating with regard to 
controlling fishing activity in the area, the Scheme of Control and Enforcement 
(an electronic surveillance scheme to control the fishing activities of vessels in 
the regulatory area, outside the fishing zones of parties) and a non-Contracting 
Party Scheme to address the problem of fishing activity by non-parties.  
In November 2006, NEAFC closed the following areas to fishing from January 
2007 to December 2009: parts of the Hatton and Rockall Banks, the Logachev 
Mounds and the West-Rockall Mounds.  These and additional areas had been 
proposed by the EC in 2005, based on recommendations from ICES.  The 
closures, while a positive step forward for offshore marine conservation, were 
viewed as exemplifying the short-term fishing interests of some of the 
Convention’s parties by NGOs soon after they were designated.  The politics 
involved in the decision-making process within NEAFC given the fishing 
interests of its contracting parties is an issue explored later in more depth in the 
case studies examined in this thesis, as is the role of ICES scientific advice in the 
designation of closed areas.   
 
                                                     
68
 The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), based in Copenhagen, 
Denmark, was founded in 1902.  It provides advice on marine ecosystems and fisheries to 
governments and international regulatory bodies that manage the North Atlantic and adjacent 
seas.  Its 20 member countries are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Russia, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US.   
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2.3.5  Aarhus Convention, 1998 
The Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters was adopted 
on 25 June 1998 and entered into force on 30 October 2001.  It sets out a number 
of rights for the public with regard to the environment and is based on the 
premise that greater public awareness of and involvement in environmental 
matters will improve environmental protection.  While the 1993 Lugano 
Convention69 was the first international agreement to elaborate rules governing 
access to national courts to allow enforcement of environmental obligations in 
the public interest, the Aarhus Convention goes a great deal further, giving 
concrete effect to the requirements of Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, 
on access to environmental justice (Sands, 2003:177).  Indeed, it has been 
identified as the first comprehensive effort at the supra-national level at putting 
Principle 10 into operation (Morgera, 2005:138). 
 
Both the EC70 and the UK are Parties to this Convention, which was adopted 
under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE).  The NGO community was extensively involved in the negotiation 
and drafting of the Convention, consequently environmental NGOs are 
highlighted as ‘public concerned’ and ‘principal clients’ of the treaty, and are 
entitled to participate as observers at meetings of the Parties (Morgera, 
2005:139).  The Convention links elements from human rights instruments with 
elements from multilateral environmental agreements in a novel fashion, which 
also reflects the increasing concern of international law with issues once 
regarded as within the sovereignty of a State (Rodenhoff, 2002:343). 
 
With regard to public participation in decision-making, the Aarhus Convention 
calls for action in three areas worth highlighting: (i.) public participation in 
decisions on specific activities (Article 6); (ii.) public participation concerning 
                                                     
69
 The 1993 Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from 
Activities Dangerous to the Environment (Lugano Convention). 
70
 The EC’s implementation legislation is Regulation (EC) No. 1367/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies. 
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plans, programmes and policies (Article 7); and (iii.) public participation during 
the preparation of generally applicable legally binding normative instruments 
(Article 8).  These legally-binding requirements may have ramifications for 
Member States with regard to their obligations under the Habitats Directive.   
 
Considering the outcome of the Wadden Sea judgment discussed later in this 
chapter (section 2.4.5.1), whereby fishing activities can now be considered a 
‘plan or project’, the Aarhus Convention may allow for greater stakeholder 
involvement in fisheries decisions that affect SACs or potential conservation 
areas in the marine environment.  The role of the public in the supply end of 
fisheries matters is being taken increasingly into account; one has only to look at 
the proliferation of certification schemes for fish sold in UK supermarkets within 
the past few years.  With increased public awareness of the issues surrounding 
threats by fishing activities to offshore marine conservation, increased access and 
participation in environmental decision-making through Aarhus Convention may 
provide a means for NGOs and the public to affect the policy process.  
Consequently, the issue of stakeholder participation can be viewed as both a 
positive and negative force in the potential for offshore MPAs and is an area 
worth further exploration as the developing European Maritime Policy and the 
draft Marine Strategy Directive come into play (these initiatives are discussed 
below in section 2.4.4). 
 
2.4  EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 
On the European level, the EC’s Common Fisheries Policy and 1992 Habitats 
Directive are the key legal instruments for addressing marine conservation issues 
related to fisheries activities.  There is also legislation currently developing 
towards a European Maritime Policy and a Marine Strategy Directive.  The rest 
of this chapter examines European and UK legislation in more depth, focusing on 
the conventions that are most applicable to the designation of offshore MPAs. 
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2.4.1  Background on EC habitat and wildlife conservation 
European Community environmental law is set out in the EC Treaty as amended 
in 1986, 1992, 1997 and 2001.71  The 1957 Treaty of Rome did not refer 
expressly to environmental protection until the Single European Act (SEA) 
amendments of 1986.  Habitat and species protection was not a high priority in 
the early days of the EC, as its Member States considered nature conservation 
legislation to be within their exclusive competence.  However, beginning in the 
1970s, the development of the Community’s Environmental Action Programmes 
(EAPs) shows an evolution towards conservation.  The 1st EAP (1973-1976), 
although primarily focused on agricultural impacts on the environment, called for 
harmonization of the legislation and actions of Member States and international 
organizations to protect birds and certain other species.  The 2nd EAP (1977-
1981) initiated independent nature protection measures,72 and the 3rd EAP (1982-
1986) treated wildlife and nature protection as an issue independent of other 
Community concerns (Krämer, 1993).   
 
The Single European Act (SEA) was enacted a few months prior to the 4th EAP 
(1987-1992) and integrated the habitat protection objectives of environmental 
legislation with the protection of human health, while safeguarding the interests 
of Member States in controlling their own legislation with a subsidiarity clause73 
and a process for unanimous decision-making.  Article 25 of the SEA added a 
new Title VII on the Environment to the EC Treaty.74  This amendment 
established a firm legal basis for the development of environmental law, in effect 
bringing the EC’s economic activities within the potential scope of 
environmental law-making (Sands, 2003).   
 
As a result of the SEA’s impact, the 4th EAP addressed habitat protection and 
other environmental measures more broadly than had previous EAPs, including 
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 1986 Single European Act; 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union; 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty; 2001 Nice Treaty. 
72
 Its ‘Fauna and Flora Protection’ chapter emphasized the necessity to protect nature, specifically 
wild animals and plants.    
73
 The subsidiarity clause allows the EC to legislate only when it can do so more effectively than 
Member States (Krämer, 1993). 
74
 Title VII consisted of Articles 130r, 130s and 130t (now Articles 174-176). 
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an encouragement for Member States to implement and enforce EC nature 
protection measures.  In its discussion of such measures, the 4th EAP implied that 
national implementation of the 1979 Bern Convention on the Conservation of 
European Wildlife and Natural Habitats was inadequate (Krämer, 1993).  The EC 
is a member of several international conventions aimed at nature protection.  In 
many cases, however, it has not taken measures of secondary Community law to 
implement these conventions.  The environmental provisions introduced into the 
EC Treaty by the SEA were further amended by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union, which elevated environmental protection to one of the 
fundamental objectives of the EC and set the basis for further extension and 
development of environmental law and policy (Sands, 2003).  In the run-up to 
the new millennium, the 5th EAP (1993-1997) set long-term objectives and 
performance targets for the period up to the year 2000, an approach that was 
adopted in the Commission’s 1998 strategy for integrating the environment into 
EC policies.  The 6th EAP was approved in 2002 and continues to integrate 
environmental concerns into all aspects of the EC’s activities, as well as directly 
mentioning the protection and conservation of the marine environment as one of 
its seven thematic strategies.75  It has a more ambitious scope than previous 
Programmes, with the aim of achieving greater focus on questions of European 
importance and better integration of research via partnerships with international 
research communities, national authorities, end users and decision-makers (EC, 
2002). 
 
In October 2002, the European Commission published a Communication to the 
Council and the European Parliament ‘Towards a Strategy to Protect and 
Conserve the Marine Environment’.76  Its overall objective was, ‘as is indicated 
in the 6th EAP, [the Marine Strategy should] promote the sustainable use of the 
seas and conservation of marine ecosystems, including sea beds, estuarine and 
coastal areas, paying special attention to sites holding a high biodiversity value’.   
 
                                                     
75
 In 2003, the European Economic and Social Committee published a report on the marine 
approach of the 6th EAP, ‘Towards a Strategy to Protect and Conserve the Marine 
Environment’.  COM(2002) 539final. 
76
 COM (2002) 539 final, subsequently referred to as the EC’s ‘Marine Strategy’ document. 
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The development of the 6th EAP coincided with the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, and consequently the EC Marine 
Strategy document addresses a wide array of marine threats and issues.    
Currently there is some debate as to whether the Marine Strategy should take the 
form of a legally binding instrument, a view being put forward by the 
Commission.  Several countries, including the Netherlands and the UK, are 
opposed and would prefer a non-binding document.  This debate has important 
implications for the future jurisdiction of regional conventions such as OSPAR 
and HELCOM.   
 
The application and enforcement of international environmental conventions is a 
shared responsibility of the EC and its Member States.  In practice, however, if 
the Commission has not adopted a Regulation or Directive to implement an 
international convention, application and enforcement does not occur on a 
Community level.  Instead, the EC leaves it to Member States to apply the 
provisions of the convention (Krämer, 2003).  However, though 
recommendations and opinions are not legally binding, much of the secondary 
legislation (Regulations, Directives and Decisions) creates rights and obligations 
which can be relied upon before the courts of Member States, a phenomenon 
known as ‘direct effect’ (Sands 2003: 737).77  With regard to the Bern 
Convention and other relevant international treaties, therefore, the most effective 
means by which the EC can improve its implementation on the Member State 
level is by enacting a Directive on species and habitat protection.78  In requiring 
binding national legislation, the Habitats Directive is the most influential 
instrument affecting wildlife and habitat protection in the European Community.  
The Habitats Directive also established broad marine conservation aims and is 
discussed in more detail below.   
 
                                                     
77
 The recent ECJ Case C-213/03 Syndicat professional coordination des pecheurs de l’Etang de 
Berre et de la region v Electicité de France established a ‘direct effect’ regarding the Protocol 
for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-based Sources.  
Consequently, Member States are obliged to treat Conventions to which the EC is a Party as 
Community law (see section 2.4.5.2 below). 
78
 The Bonn Convention (1979), in providing networks for migratory species, is an example 
where nature conservation is not under the ‘exclusive competence’ of Member States. 
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2.4.2  EC Directive 92/43/EEC (1992 EC Habitats Directive) 
The origins of the EC Directive on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (1992 EC Habitats Directive79) lie in the EC’s 3rd and 4th 
Environmental Action Programmes as well as in its predecessor, the 1979 EC 
Wild Birds Directive80, which required the establishment of a network of Special 
Protected Areas (SPAs) throughout the EC.  The Habitats Directive follows this 
model, requiring Member States to prepare and propose national lists of Sites of 
Community Importance (SCIs) for submission to and evaluation by the EC.  
Approved SCIs are to be designated by Member States as Special Areas of 
Conservation (SACs) and combined with SPAs to form the Natura 2000 
network.  The Habitats Directive is the first international instrument to address 
the protection of all habitats, with regard to both geographical location and type 
(Sands, 2003).  It is worth mentioning that although the drafting of the Habitats 
Directive began several years before the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED, Rio de Janeiro 1992), it was 
negotiated in the same time frame as the 1992 CBD and can be viewed as a 
means of implementing the CBD in the EC, as well as the 1979 Bern Convention 
on the Conservation of European Wildlife and their Natural Habitats. 
 
2.4.2.1  Amendments 
The Habitats Directive was amended by a 1994 ‘Act on the accession of Norway, 
Austria, Finland and Sweden to the Community and related adjustments to the 
EC Treaty’.81  Council Directive 97/62/EC of 27 October 1997 replaced Annexes 
I and II of the Habitats Directive, ‘adapting certain natural habitat types and 
species to technical and scientific progress’.82 The Directive was further 
                                                     
79
 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of 
Wild Fauna and Flora, OJ L 206, 22.07.92, p.7. 
80
 Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the Conservation of Wild Birds, OJ L 103, 
25.04.79, p.1. 
81
 OJ C 241, 29.08.94, p. 9-404.  Although it is not a member of the EU, Norway has access to 
the EU internal market through the European Economic Area agreement.  This agreement 
commits Norway to implement all EU legislation related to the internal market as well as most 
of EU environmental legislation. 
82
 OJ L 305, 08.11.97, p. 42-65. 
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amended twice in 2003: first by an Act83 concerning the conditions of accession 
of new Member States in the EU (which affected the number of biogeographical 
regions covered and the Directive’s Annexes I and II), and secondly by an EC 
Regulation84 on the provisions relating to Committees (Articles 20 and 21 of the 
Directive). 
 
Following the Directive’s adoption, between 1992 and 1998 discussions focused 
primarily on the designation of areas for protection, in terms of size and location.  
It apparently took some time before the actors involved realized that the 
Directive was not only an important instrument for conserving biodiversity, but it 
also provided constraints of varying degrees on decision-making for projects that 
could harm biodiversity (Verschuuren, 2002).   
 
2.4.2.2  Implementation 
Member States were required to implement the Directive by May 199485 and to 
provide the Commission with a list of sites indicating the natural habitat types 
and species native to its territory listed in Annexes I and II by May 1995.  A 
Commission Decision concerning the information format for proposed Natura 
2000 sites was produced in 1996.86  According to Article 4 of the Habitats 
Directive, Member States were required to submit their national lists by June 
1995 and three years later (June 1998) the EC was to have adopted a list of Sites 
of Community Importance (SCIs) drawn from the Member States’ lists.  If the 
original schedule had been kept, SACs would have been designated by 2004.  
Although this process was delayed, following the adoption of the first list of 
                                                     
83
 Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the 
Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of 
Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the 
Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded – 
Annex II: List referred to in Article 20 of the Act of Accession – 16. Environment – C. Nature 
Protection, OJ L 236, 23.09.03, p. 667-670.  
84
 Number 1882/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 September 2003 
adapting to Council Decision 1999/468/EC, OJ L 284, 31.10.03, p. 1-53. 
85
 Transposition of Article 6 of the Directive into national legislation was required by June 1994, 
except for Austria, Sweden and Finland, who were required to transpose the Directive by 
January 1995. 
86
 Commission Decision 97/266/EC of 18 December 1996, OJ L 107, 24.04.97, p. 1-156.  
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SCIs for the Mediterranean in July 2006, there are now initial lists of SCIs for all 
six biogeographical regions87 for the original 15 EC Member States.   
 
In addition, Member States were advised to ensure that sites on their national 
lists of proposed SCIs were not allowed to deteriorate before the Community list 
of SCIs was adopted.  Where national lists remained incomplete, they were 
advised to also ensure the non-deterioration of sites that, according to scientific 
evidence based on the criteria of Annex II of the Directive, should be listed.  The 
EC guide on interpreting Article 6 of the Directive suggests using environmental 
impact assessment under Directive 85/337/EEC88 in relation to potentially 
damaging projects (EC, 2000).89  Directive 85/337/EEC requires the 
environmental assessment of ‘public and private projects which are likely to have 
significant effects90 on the environment’, excluding projects related to national 
defense or projects whose details are adopted by a specific act of national 
legislation, as these were expected to go through an appropriate assessment 
during the legislative process (Sands, 2003).  One problem with implementation 
of the Habitats Directive that has been discussed by Jans (2000) is territorial 
scope.  This is directly relevant to the designation of offshore MPAs as discussed 
in the Greenpeace judgment (see Chapter 5, section 5.3).   
 
In July 2003 the EC published a progress report (EC, 2003) on the 
implementation of the Directive among Member States, detailing the legislative 
and legal frameworks in place for site designation and current problems, but with 
no mention of mechanisms for the offshore area (beyond 12nm).  With regard to 
progress in protecting this zone, a study conducted by WWF in June 2003 
interviewed OSPAR members affiliated with WWF and its partner organizations.  
According to this study (Anderson et al., 2003) progress has been limited but 
recognizable.  National legislation for designating MPAs beyond territorial 
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 The six Natura 2000 biogeographical regions are: Atlantic, Mediterranean, Continental, Boreal, 
Alpine and Macaronesian. 
88
 Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1995 on the assessment of the effects of certain 
public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 175, 05.07.85, p. 40. 
89
 A recent case involving cockle fishermen in the Wadden Sea confirmed that fishing 
management plans constitute a ‘plan or project’ and are therefore relevant to Articles 6(3) and 
6(4) of the Habitats Directive.  See section 2.4.5.1 below. 
90
 ‘Significant effects on the environment’ are not defined in the Directive. 
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waters exists in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Iceland, Spain and 
Sweden.  In addition to the UK, Norway and the Netherlands are revising their 
existing legislation to cover the offshore maritime area.  Denmark designated 
Natura 2000 sites across and beyond its territorial sea from the beginning of the 
implementation process, but its early progress has been stalled by the 
conservative government’s decision to cut funds for nature conservation (WWF 
press release 16/3/2003).   
 
The UK, Germany and (partially) Ireland initiated their offshore conservation 
activities with a systematic scientific assessment of the EEZ under the criteria of 
the Habitats Directive.  The Netherlands and Sweden are considering the 
importance of designating marine protected areas in the offshore zone, but do not 
have a strategic system in place.  Norway has closed some of its cold water coral 
reefs to bottom trawling.91   
 
The Azores, an autonomous region of Portugal, has designated sites beyond 
12nm as Natura 2000 areas under the Habitats Directive and has sought legal 
protection for other deep sea and open ocean habitats from the Portuguese 
government and parliament.  In 2002 the Azores designated two hydrothermal 
vents (the Lucky Strike and Menez Gwen vents) within its EEZ as MPAs.  In 
2006 the process for designating these sites under Portuguese law was 
completed, and they will be nominated as Natura 2000 and/or OSPAR MPAs.  
As the initial designation occurred in 2002 (pre-dating the Darwin Mounds 
emergency closure by a year), these sites represent the first deep-sea offshore 
MPAs established in the OSPAR area (Anderson et al., 2003).  In 2005, the 
Azores also implemented a ban on deep-water trawling, discussed below in 
Chapter 3, section 3.3.1 on precaution and MPAs. 
  
                                                     
91
 Norway’s Sula Reef (978 km2) was the first cold-water coral area to be protected in European 
waters, in 1999.  As of 2005, Norway had protected five additional coral areas: in 2000, the 
Iverryggen Reef (offshore, 620 km2) and the Selligrunnen Reef (offshore, 0.6 km2); and in 
2003 the Røst Reef (offshore, 303 km2), the Tisler Reef (inshore, 1.8 km2) and the 
Fjellknausene Reef (inshore, 1.9 km2). 
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In May 2004, Germany nominated a set of ten offshore sites in its EEZs in the 
Baltic and North Seas to the European Commission to become part of the Natura 
2000 network.92  This represents 38% of Germany’s total marine area (including 
current nominations) or 31% of its EEZ.  These MPAs will also become parts of 
the MPA networks being established under OSPAR, HELCOM and the CBD.  
This development was due to an April 2002 amendment to the German Federal 
Nature Conservation Act, which established a statutory basis for the 
implementation of Natura 2000 in the German EEZ.  Under Article 38 of the 
Act, the German Federal Agency for Nature Conservation and the German 
Environment Ministry are now responsible for selecting, designating and 
managing offshore MPAs. 
 
In the UK, as of September 2007 the JNCC has proposed six offshore sites to 
DEFRA for consideration as potential Marine SACs (Johnston et al., 2004).93  In 
addition to (i) the Darwin Mounds, these include the (ii) Saturn Sabellaria 
spinulosa site (reef); (iii) Haig Fras (reef); (iv) Wyville Thomson Ridge (reef); 
(v) Dogger Bank (sandbanks slightly covered by sea water all the time); and (vi) 
Scanner Pockmark (submarine structure made by leaking gases).  Nine further 
sites of Annex I habitat under the Habitats Directive are also being assessed to be 
proposed as offshore Marine SACs in 2005 (see Table 2.3 below in section 2.7.2 
for a listing of the proposed Offshore Marine SACs). 
 
2.4.2.3  Development and limitations 
The development of the 1992 Habitats Directive began in July 1988 with the 
adoption of a preliminary ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on the protection of 
natural and semi-natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora’94 by the European 
Commission, which was subsequently transmitted to the European Council and 
European Parliament (Figure 2.3).  Following consultations of the Economic and 
Social Committee and the European Parliament, an amended proposal including 
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 Detailed maps of the German proposals are available online: 
  (www.habitatmarenatura2000.de). 
93
 Maps of these sites were not available at the time of writing. 
94
 COM/1988/381 OJ C 247, 21.09.88, p.3. 
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annexes95 was adopted on 15 February 1990. This version of the proposal96 was 
transmitted to the European Council and European Parliament and underwent 
another round of Economic and Social Committee opinion.97 The amended 
proposal98 was adopted on 8 February 1991, transmitted to the European Council 
on the same day, and soon afterwards to the European Parliament. Following a 
European Council agreement at the end of 1991, it was formally adopted on 18 
May 1992. 
 
The evolution of the Habitats Directive has not been previously described in 
detail in the literature, but is worth noting here in relation to offshore marine 
conservation.  In particular, Article 1 of the working documents mentioned above 
stated it would apply to the territory of Member States ‘including maritime areas 
under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Member States’, i.e., throughout their 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) or Exclusive Fishery Zones (EFZs), 200nm 
from shore.  This clause was subsequently dropped before the final version of the 
Directive was agreed, perhaps in order to maintain consistency with the earlier 
Birds Directive.   
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 Supplementary Annexes to the Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of Natural 
and Semi-natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora, COM/90/59 final, OJ C 195, 03.08.90, 
p.1. 
96
 Proposal for a Council Directive COM/88/381 final and COM/90/59 final, OJ C 324, 24.12.90, 
p.22.  See also the Legislative Resolution Embodying the Opinion of the European Parliament 
on the Proposal, OJ C 324, 24.12.90, p.71. 
97
 Opinion of the Social and Economic Committee on the proposal for a Council Directive on the 
protection of natural and semi-natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora and on the 
Supplementary Annexes, 18 October 1990, OJ C 31, 06.02.91, p.1. 
98
 Modified proposal for a Council Directive on the conservation of natural and semi-natural 
habitats and of wild fauna and flora, COM/91/27 final, OJ C 75, 20.03.91, p.12. 
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Figure 2.5  Development of EC Directive 92/43/EEC 
 
 
Preliminary Proposal adopted by European Commission  
(27 July 1988) 
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Economic and Social Committee Opinion 
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(From De Santo and Jones, 2007a:5) 
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Information on the negotiations is not readily available; however there appears to 
have been significant debate regarding the Commission’s powers of intervention, 
the number of Annexes and draft funding regulations (Bromley, 1997).  The 
early development of the Habitats Directive has been described as an indication 
of not only the way that the relationships between the Commission, the 
Parliament and the Council have developed, but also the opportunities that exist 
for Parliament and lobby groups to influence the process (Bromley, 1997).  
Presumably, it was during the negotiation process that the maritime areas 
provision was removed.  Following the outcome of the 1999 Greenpeace 
judgment, the Directive does now finally apply to the UK’s EFZ and other 
Member States are also preparing SCI proposals for their offshore waters.  
 
Prior to the conclusion of the Greenpeace judgment, in July 1999 the 
Commission released a Communication to the Council and European Parliament 
on ‘Fisheries Management and Nature Conservation in the Marine 
Environment’.99  In its discussion of the application of the Habitats Directive, the 
Commission clearly outlined the direct applicability of the Directive to the 
200nm EEZ boundary of European Member States as follows:  
 
‘The provisions of the Habitats Directive automatically apply to 
the marine habitats and marine species located in territorial waters 
(maximum 12 miles). However, if a Member State exerts its 
sovereign rights in an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical 
miles […] it thereby considers itself competent to enforce national 
laws in that area, and consequently the Commission considers in 
this case that the Habitats Directive also applies, in that 
Community legislation is an integral part of national legislation’ 
(paragraph 5.2.2). 
 
It can be argued that the Habitats Directive was drafted from a terrestrial 
perspective and is ill-suited to application in the offshore marine environment as 
only three habitats and seven species listed in its Annexes I and II are found in 
UK offshore waters.100  It is not unlikely that the Annexes will eventually be 
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 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Fisheries 
Conservation and Nature Conservation in the Marine Environment, COM(1999)363 final. 
100
 Habitats: Sandbanks which are slightly covered by sea water all the time; Reefs; Submarine 
structures made by leaking gas. Species: Harbour Porpoise (Phocoena phocoena); Grey Seal 
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updated to include more species and habitats now that not only the UK but other 
Member States are applying the Habitats Directive to their offshore waters.  
However, such revisions are likely to occur in the long rather than short term, 
given the severe delays that have already occurred with the Directive.101  
 
In addition to gaps in the species and habitats covered and delays in its 
implementation, another weakness of the Habitats Directive lies in its emphasis 
on habitats and species per se, which leaves little room for areas of functional 
importance such as spawning sites or other ecological processes that are difficult 
to define spatially.  This approach also overlooks areas that might be important 
as migratory routes and/or sanctuaries for marine species.  
 
Although the Habitats Directive does not call explicitly for an ‘ecosystem 
approach’ to conservation, which evolved as the primary framework for action 
under the CBD, it does provide for protection in parts.  The ecosystem approach, 
defined by the CBD as ‘a strategy for the integrated management of land, water 
and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an 
equitable way’, is an aim of not only the revised CFP and the UK’s emerging 
marine management framework, as evidenced in its 2004 Review of Marine 
Nature Conservation and currently developing Marine Bill, but also the 
aforementioned developing EC Marine Strategy Directive and the OSPAR 
network of MPAs, which aim to implement the approach in the North East 
Atlantic. 
 
2.4.2.4  Article 6 
Despite what can be perceived as flaws in its drafting and limitations in its 
coverage, the Habitats Directive does provide an important mechanism for the 
protection of species and habitats.  Article 6 contains three main sets of 
                                                                                                                                               
(Halichoerus grypus); Common Seal (Phoca vitulina); Sturgeon (Acipenser sturio); Shad 
(Alosa spp.); Lamprey (Petromyzon marinus); Loggerhead turtle (Caretta caretta).  
101
 Member States were required to implement the Directive into their national legislation by 
1995, though some still have not completely, and the final lists of SCIs for the Natura 2000 
network were to have been selected by Member States by 1998, but this process was still 
ongoing in 2007. 
Chapter 2:  Legal Framework 
 
84 
provisions.  Article 6(1) provides for the establishment of ‘necessary 
conservation measures’ and is focused on positive and proactive methods.  
Article 6(2) has a more preventative emphasis, providing for the avoidance of 
habitat deterioration and significant species disturbance.  Articles 6(3) and 6(4) 
set out a series of procedural and substantive safeguards governing plans and 
projects likely to have a significant effect on Natura 2000 sites and are the means 
by which Article 6(2) is achieved (EC, 2000).  
 
The interpretation of Article 6 has led to significant debate and some interesting 
cases in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), especially in relation to paragraph 
4, whereby ‘imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a 
social or economic nature’ can be cited to allow Member States to authorize 
plans or projects with a deleterious effect on a SAC.102  This is in contrast to 
what had been previously decided in the well-known Leybucht case,103 under the 
Birds Directive in 1991, where the Commission had stated that the destruction of 
a protected habitat was only acceptable ‘in the case of a threat to human life’.  
This overturn has been described as a slap in the face for the European Court 
(Scott, 1998).  In 1995, the Commission adopted two Opinions104 that to some 
extent clarify Article 6(4), i.e. the ‘exemption clause’.  These Opinions have also 
been referred to as being among the few authoritative decisions of EC 
institutions that elucidate how Community law aims to unite the objectives of 
habitat protection and infrastructure expansion (Nollkaemper, 1997).  They 
addressed a German A20 motorway project which intersected two Natura 2000 
sites, the Trebel and Recknitz Valley and the Peene River Valley.  Despite these 
areas’ having been protected under both the Birds and Habitats Directives, the 
Court concluded that a less damaging crossing of these valleys did not exist, and 
considering the high unemployment in the region, ‘imperative reasons of 
overriding public interest’ justified the project’s going ahead.  
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 On overriding public interest, see: Holder J. Overriding Public Interest in Planning and 
Conservation Law. Journal of Environmental Law 2004;16:377-407.  
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 Case C-57/89, Commission v. Germany [1991] ECR I-883. 
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 Opinion on the Trebel and Recknitz Valley (OJ C 178, 27.04.95, p.3) and Opinion on the 
Peene Valley (OJ L 6, 09.01.96, p.14).  
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Subsequent cases on this subject include two that focused on the site selection 
process under the Birds and Habitats Directives, the Lappel Bank case105 of 1996 
and the Severn Estuary case106 of 2000.  A year later, in 2001 Airbus Industrie 
gained permission to expand its A380 production factory in the Mühlenberger 
Loch area near Hamburg, the largest freshwater/tidal flat in the EC at the time 
and a critical habitat for migratory birds which had been designated a protected 
area under the Ramsar Convention as well as a priority site for the Natura 2000 
network.  The German Federal Constitutional Court declined to grant an 
injunction to stop the filling of 20% of the Loch.  A complete overview of the 
issue of overriding public interest is beyond the scope of this chapter; however 
the recent Wadden Sea judgment (see section 2.4.5.1 below) has some interesting 
implications that are relevant to implementation of the Habitats Directive in the 
marine realm.  
 
2.4.3  EC Common Fisheries Policy 
It is worth noting that unlike the Common Agricultural Policy, there is no 
specific mention of a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in the Treaty on European 
Union.107 This is not to say that the EU Treaty lacks provision for fisheries 
legislation however. Instead, fisheries were, and still are, grouped with 
agricultural products in the Agriculture Title, Articles 32-48 (formerly Articles 
38-46), which establishes guidelines for the establishment of a common market 
in agricultural products, including fisheries. A common policy towards fisheries 
in the EC began in 1970 with the establishment of the Structural Regulation 
2141/70108 defining rules on access to fishing grounds, markets and structures. At 
this time it was apparently envisaged that fishing would continue to be regulated 
                                                     
105
 Case 44/95, Regina v. Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte RSPB [1996] ECR I-
3805. 
106
 Case C-371/98, The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions, ex parte First Corporate Shipping Ltd. [2000] ECR I-9235.  
107
 European Community environmental law is set out in the EU Treaty as amended in 1986 
(Single European Act), 1992 (Maastricht Treaty on European Union), 1997 (Amsterdam 
Treaty) and 2001 (Treaty of Nice).  
108
 Regulation (EEC) No. 2141/70 of the Council of 20 October 1070 laying down a common 
structural policy for the fishing industry, OJ L 236, 27.10.70, p.1 (English special edition 
Series 1 Chapter 1970(III) p.703, no longer in force). 
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primarily by international fisheries commissions and Member States’ national 
authorities (Churchill, 1987) but this did not remain the case. 
 
2.4.3.1  Evolution of legislative jurisdiction  
The EC gained exclusive legislative jurisdiction109 to regulate fishing under the 
1972 Act of Accession of Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the UK110 as follows: 
‘From the sixth year after accession at the latest, the Council, acting on a 
proposal from the Commission, shall determine conditions for fishing with a 
view to ensuring protection of the fishing grounds and conservation of the 
biological resources of the sea’ (Article 102). 
 
However the EC’s full powers over fisheries management only took effect at the 
start of 1979; prior to this, Member States had some powers over fisheries in 
their waters.111  This shift can be viewed as occurring over three phases: (i) the 
time prior to the extension112 of Member States’ fishing limits to 200nm at the 
beginning of 1977, (ii) a transitional period from the start of 1977 to the end of 
1978 laid out in Article 102 of the Act of Accession, and (iii) the period since the 
EC gained full legislative jurisdiction at the start of 1979.  In the first phase, 
Member States were permitted to adopt national measures, a right that was 
confirmed by the ECJ with respect to the Netherlands in the 1976 Kramer 
cases.113 
 
During the second, transitional, phase, certain exceptions to the EC’s exclusivity 
were allowed in what can be viewed as a ‘grace period’ during which Member 
States were entitled to take unilateral conservation measures in cases where the 
Council had yet to adopt necessary conservation measures.  This occurred in 
                                                     
109
 The term ‘legislative jurisdiction’ is used in this context as the competence to enact legal 
rules, as opposed to enforcing them. 
110
 1972 Act of Accession of Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the UK to the EC, OJ L 73, 27.3.72, 
p.1. 
111
 A full history of the development of the CFP and the evolution of European fisheries 
management is beyond the scope of this chapter. For a definitive analysis, see Churchill 
(1987). 
112
 On 3 November 1976 the Council adopted the Hague Resolution extending Member States’ 
fishing limits to 200 nautical miles. 
113
 ‘Kramer’ joined cases 3,4 and 5/76 – Cornelius Kramer and others.  
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Ireland,114 France115 and twice in the UK.116  In addition, the van Dam cases117 
clarified that Member States had not only the right to enact independent 
conservation measures in this interim period, but also the ‘duty’ to do so.   
 
The second ECJ case involving the UK118 occurred at the start of the third phase 
and demonstrated the now complete shift of power over fishery conservation 
measures to the EC (albeit with some qualifications as the Council had not yet 
adopted the measures required of it under the 1972 Act of Accession).  This was 
soon followed by a Commission Declaration119 to the same end, which required 
that Member States adopt conservation measures based on Commission 
proposals.  Comprehensive fishery management measures for most EC waters 
were adopted by the Council at the beginning of 1983. 
 
A related issue is the equal access principle introduced with the 1972 Act of 
Accession which came into effect on 31 December 1982.  This contentious 
principle allowed Member States equal access to fisheries resources within the 
200nm zones established in 1977 by the Hague Resolution (although in practice 
all Member States claim six or twelve mile restricted zones off their coasts for 
vessels that traditionally fished in those waters, through a derogation allowed 
under the Act of Accession).  The equal access principle followed from the 
traditional view among Member States that fish do not belong to anyone until 
caught.  Consequently this principle has had the effect, along with EC fisheries 
legislation, of making marine fisheries resources a common property resource 
among Member States, a situation which has not occurred with other natural 
resources in the EC (Churchill, 1987). 
 
 
                                                     
114
 ‘Irish Fisheries’ case 61/77 – Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland. 
115
 ‘France v. the United Kingdom’ case 141/78. 
116
 ‘Commission v. UK’ case 32/79 and ‘Commission v. UK’ case 804/79. 
117
 ‘Van Dam’ joined cases 185-204/78 – Criminal proceedings against J. van Dam en Zonen and 
others. 
118
 Supra, note 116. 
119
 Declaration of the Commission, 27 July 1981, OJ C 224, 03.09.1981, p.1. 
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2.4.3.2  Reform of the CFP 
The principal instrument governing the use of fisheries resources from 1983 to 
1993 was Council Regulation 170/83 establishing a Community system for the 
conservation and management of fisheries resources,120 which included Total 
Allowable Catches and quotas, conservation measures and regulations on access 
to coastal waters.  The first review of the CFP took place in 1992, when it was 
evident that technical measures alone would not be sufficient to prevent over-
fishing, as there were simply too many vessels for the available resources. 
Between 1970 and 1985, the total number of European vessels had increased by 
75% and decommissioning efforts from 1985 onwards had only reduced the fleet 
by 7% (Boude et al., 2001).  Reforms to the CFP were undertaken and the 1983 
Regulation was replaced in 1992 by Council Regulation 3760/92 establishing a 
Community system for fisheries and aquaculture,121 designed to extend and 
consolidate the preceding legal regime.  Following the latest CFP reform process 
that began in 1998, this Regulation has now been replaced by Council Regulation 
2371/2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources 
under the CFP.122 
 
The EC has been operating under the revised CFP (Regulation 2371/2002 herein 
referred to as the Basic Regulation) as of January 2003.   The Basic Regulation 
encompasses four key changes to the CFP.  First, a long-term approach has been 
implemented, aimed at attaining and/or maintaining safe levels of adult fish in 
EU stocks (previously, measures concerning fishing opportunities and related 
measures had been taken on an annual basis).  Second, the overcapacity of the 
EU fleet was addressed by providing two sets of measures, (i) a simpler fleet 
policy placing responsibility for matching fishing capacity to fishing possibilities 
with the Member States, and (ii) phasing out public aid to private investors to 
help them renew or modernize fishing vessels.  The third improvement to the 
CFP involved developing cooperation among authorities vis-à-vis enforcement, 
strengthening the uniformity of control and sanctions throughout the EU and 
                                                     
120
 OJ L 24, 27.01.83, p.1 (no longer in force). 
121
 OJ L 389, 31.12.92, p.1 (no longer in force). 
122
 OJ L 358, 31.12.2002, p.59. 
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extending the powers of Commission inspectors.  And fourth, the involvement of 
stakeholders in the management process was prioritized by the introduction of 
Regional Advisory Councils (RACs).   
 
In addition, the Basic Regulation strengthened the CFP’s environmental aspect 
by introducing the precautionary approach.  Article 2(1) stipulates that ‘the 
Community shall apply the precautionary approach in taking measures designed 
to protect and conserve living aquatic resources, to provide for their sustainable 
exploitation and to minimize the impact of fishing activities on marine eco-
systems’ with the aim of ensuring ‘exploitation of living aquatic resources that 
provides sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions’.  The 
predecessor to the Basic Regulation, Regulation 3760/92, referred to ‘taking into 
account [fisheries exploitation activities] implications for the marine eco-system’ 
(Article 2(1)) however, the Basic Regulation goes a step further by providing an 
emergency closure mechanism for nature conservation, rather than just fish stock 
recovery. 
 
2.4.3.3  Emergency measures 
In addition to the precautionary approach outlined above, the Basic Regulation 
emphasizes that: ‘[The Community]… shall aim at a progressive implementation 
of an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management’ (Article 2 para. 1).  In 
order to implement these approaches, Chapter II of the Basic Regulation entitled 
‘Conservation and Sustainability’ outlines specific technical measures including 
recovery and management plans and the establishment of emergency closures.  
In particular, Article 7 allows for the Commission to apply emergency measures 
‘if there is evidence of a serious threat to the conservation of living aquatic 
resources, or to the marine ecosystem resulting from fishing activities and 
requiring immediate action’.  
 
Under the three subsequent Articles (8-10), some powers of legislative 
jurisdiction concerning fisheries conservation and management have been 
returned to Member States, namely in Articles 8 on Member State emergency 
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measures, Article 9 on Member State measures within the 12nm zone and Article 
10 on Member State measures applicable solely to fishing vessels flying their 
flag.  However these powers are limited, in that all measures under Article 8 and 
some under Article 9 are subject to a complicated EC consultation process 
(Owen, 2004).  It is also worth noting that unlike Articles 8 and 9, Article 10 
fails to refer to a power to adopt measures to minimize the effect of fishing on 
the conservation of marine ecosystems (Owen, 2004).  Nevertheless, the 
emergency measures mechanism for closing an area for nature, rather than fish 
stock, conservation objectives represents an important shift in the legislative 
approach to European marine environmental protection.  
 
2.4.4  EC legislation currently under development 
 
2.4.4.1  Maritime Green Paper Towards a Future Maritime Policy  
The European Commission’s Strategic Objectives for 2005-2009 focus on 
delivering prosperity, solidarity and security for all Europeans.  With regard to 
the marine environment, the Objectives state that ‘in view of the environmental 
and economic value of the oceans and seas, there is a particular need for an all-
embracing maritime policy aimed at developing a thriving maritime economy 
and the full potential of sea-based activity in an environmentally sustainable 
manner’.123  This commitment materialized in the development of a Maritime 
Green Paper Towards a Future Maritime Policy, which was released in June 
2006 (and was open to consultation until June 2007).  In line with the Lisbon 
Agenda,124 the Green Paper focuses on stimulating growth and jobs in the wider 
maritime sector in a sustainable manner, ensuring the protection of the marine 
environment.  This commitment to economic growth and jobs represents the first 
pillar on which the Commission envisages its new Maritime Policy will rest.  
The second, environmental pillar, is comprised of a European Marine Thematic 
                                                     
123
 Communication from the President in agreement with Vice-President Walström: Strategic 
Objectives 2005-2009 ‘Europe 2010: A Partnership for European Renewal.  Prosperity, 
Solidarity and Security’, Section 2.2.  Brussels, 26.1.2005, COM(2005)12 final. 
124
 The Lisbon Agenda was agreed in 2000, when European leaders set the European Union the 
goal of becoming ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world’ 
by 2010.  
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Strategy and related Marine Strategy Directive.  When the Green Paper 
consultation is completed in 2007, the Commission will present a 
Communication to the Council and Parliament summarizing the results. 
 
2.4.4.2  European Marine Thematic Strategy / Marine Strategy Directive 
The European Marine Thematic Strategy for the Protection and Conservation of 
the European Marine Environment is one of seven thematic strategies proposed 
by the European Commission in 2005-2006 to address various environmental 
issues.125  These strategies are intended to be the key mechanisms for delivering 
the objectives set out in the 6th Environmental Action Programme adopted by the 
Council and Parliament for the period from 2002-2012 (see section 2.3.1 above).  
The Marine Thematic Strategy was released on 24 October 2005126 as a package, 
including also a Proposal for a Marine Strategy Directive127 and an impact 
assessment.128  Figure 2.4 outlines the relationship between the Green Paper and 
the Marine Thematic Strategy and Directive with relation to the developing EU 
Maritime Policy. 
 
The development of the Marine Strategy package began in 2002 with the release 
of a Commission Communication entitled ‘Towards a strategy to protect and 
conserve the marine environment’ which was open to an extensive consultation 
process from 2002-2004.  The main objective of the draft Directive is to achieve 
‘Good Environmental Status’ of the marine environment by 2021.  The Directive 
establishes European Marine Regions129 as management units for 
implementation, within which Member States will be obliged to develop Marine 
Strategies and cooperate among each other (and with third countries where 
relevant).   
                                                     
125
 The other thematic strategies address: air quality; the sustainable use of resources; waste 
prevention and recycling; pesticides; soil quality; and the urban environment.  
126
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament “Thematic 
Strategy on the Protection and Conservation of the Marine Environment” COM(2005)504. 
127
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
Framework for Community Action in the field of Marine Environmental Policy (Marine 
Strategy Directive) COM(2005)505.  
128
 Impact Assessment SEC(2005)1290.  
129
 The draft Directive lists the following three regions: the Baltic Sea; the North East Atlantic 
Ocean; and the Mediterranean Sea, with the latter two further divided into sub-regions. 
Chapter 2:  Legal Framework 
 
92 
Figure 2.6  Current Development of EU Maritime Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the draft Directive’s release in October 2005, the UK held a 
consultation on the document until April 2006.  Three key issues were raised by 
this process, first that there was a lack of certainty regarding what ‘Good 
Environmental Status’ will imply, and a need for better understanding of likely 
requirements up-front.  The second concern focused on the need for integration 
between the proposed Directive and other EU legislation, particularly the Water 
Framework Directive130 and the Common Fisheries Policy.  Third, the 
consultation raised the issue of how the Directive will be implemented, including 
arrangements for coordination between Member States and the role of the 
Commission in approving strategies and programmes. 
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 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 
22.12.2000, p.1. 
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2.4.5  Recent ECJ cases 
The following three recent cases provide some insights and clarifications for the 
legislation and conventions discussed in this chapter, especially with regard to 
EC Member State obligations under international environmental conventions.  
As a result, these rulings may have interesting implications in the future when 
the OSPAR network of marine protected areas comes into effect in 2010.  
 
2.4.5.1  Wadden Sea judgment (Habitats Directive) 
Two issues relevant to the interpretation of the Habitats Directive were recently 
highlighted in a 2004 ECJ case131 involving mechanical fishing for cockles in the 
Wadden Sea SPA, in the Netherlands.  In this judgment, the Court went into 
detail explaining the meaning of Article 6, in particular what kinds of activities 
amount to ‘plans or projects’ under paragraph 3, concluding that fisheries 
activities undertaken under an annual license can be considered as falling in this 
category.  Consequently, if such activities are likely to have an effect on a Natura 
2000 site, they can only proceed after an ‘appropriate assessment’ of their 
impacts in keeping with Article 6 (Verschuuren, 2005).  This decision can be 
seen as a positive development in terms of linking the CFP and the Habitats 
Directive.  While it does not mean that a detrimental activity will be prevented 
for certain, given the overriding public interest ‘exemption clause’ mentioned 
earlier, it is debatable whether fishing would be considered of ‘overriding’ 
regional economic and strategic development importance. 
 
A second outcome of the Wadden Sea judgment of relevance to the 
implementation of the Habitats Directive in offshore waters involves the 
principle of ‘direct effect’, i.e. whether an individual can rely on a Directive to 
claim rights in a national court when the Directive has not been transposed (or 
has been improperly transposed) into national law.  For European Directives, 
such transposition is subject to an implementation deadline, and for the Habitats 
Directive this deadline expired in 1995.  In the Wadden Sea judgment, the Court 
                                                     
131
 Case C-127/02, Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee and Nederlandse 
Vereniging tot Bescherming van Volgels v. Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en 
Visserij, ECJ Grand Chamber [2005] Env LR 14.  
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focused its consideration of this principle on Article 6(3) on ‘plans or projects’, 
which the Netherlands had not transposed into national legislation, but it did not 
refer to the principle of direct effect by name.  It is debatable whether the Court 
was explicit enough (Verschuuren, 2005) or not (Lowther, 2004).  At the 
minimum, however, it can be agreed that the judgment clarified that Article 6(3) 
was indeed held to be directly effective, despite the Netherlands not having 
transposed it into national legislation (Stokes, 2005).  Given that the UK is still 
in the process of revising its Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) Regulations 
(1994) over its continental shelf, it can be inferred that Article 6(3) is applicable 
in the offshore, and ‘plans or projects’, including licensed fishing activities, 
should be subject to an ‘appropriate assessment’ by national authorities to assess 
whether they may affect the integrity of any potential Natura 2000 sites.  
 
2.4.5.2  de Berre case (Barcelona Convention) 
A 2004 ECJ case132 on the pollution of a French saltwater marsh connected to the 
Mediterranean Sea, is worth noting with regard to the ‘direct effect’ of 
international environmental agreements on European Member States.  In 
Syndicat professional coordination des pêcheurs de l’Étang de Berre et de la 
region v Électricité de France, the ECJ’s Second Chamber gave direct effect to 
two provisions of the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea 
against Pollution from Land-based Sources (Barcelona Convention).133  It can be 
inferred from this ruling that Member States are obliged to treat Conventions to 
which the EC is a Party as Community law.   
 
This case also highlights the ECJ’s apparent willingness both to ensure the 
enforcement of international environmental agreements, and to permit their 
enforcement at the domestic level (Cardwell and French, 2007).  A subsequent 
judgment134 by the European Court of First Instance (CFI) concerning France’s 
obligations under the Barcelona Convention reiterated that ‘In accordance with 
                                                     
132
 Case C-213/03, Syndicat professional coordination des pêcheurs de l’Étang de Berre et de la 
region v. Électricité de France. 
133
 See section 2.3.2, supra note 56. 
134
 Case C-239/03, Commission of the European Communities v. France. 
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case-law, mixed agreements concluded by the Community, its Member States 
and non-member countries have the same status in the Community legal order as 
purely Community agreements’ (paragraph 25) and consequently France had an 
obligation to comply with the Convention given it’s membership in the EC (in 
addition to its own obligation as a signatory to the Barcelona Convention).  
Consequently, under certain circumstances, a provision in an international 
agreement concluded by the EC may be directly applicable in the member state, 
and the provision of an international agreement can become part of the member 
state’s domestic law. 
 
2.4.5.3  MOX case (UNCLOS) 
In May 2006 the ECJ issued its judgment135 on a longstanding dispute between 
Ireland and the UK regarding a nuclear reprocessing plant in Sellafield.  This 
dispute began with the 1993 decision by the UK to authorize the construction of  
a Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) reprocessing plant situated on the east coast of the 
Irish Sea.136  The plant was made operational in 2001 following nearly a decade 
of studies on its environmental impacts, economic justifications for the plant, and 
an extensive public consultation (Scott, 2007).  Ireland alleged that the UK failed 
to respond adequately to its concerns and consequently was in breach of its 
obligations under OSPAR and UNCLOS.  In 2001 Ireland initiated dispute 
settlement proceedings under the auspices of both conventions, the OSPAR 
component of which was dismissed in a majority decision by the arbitral tribunal 
in 2003.137  The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
proceedings were more lengthy, and suspended between June and December 
2003 in order to seek further information on the potential impact of EC law on 
the dispute. 
 
In the meantime, the European Commission sent a letter of formal notice to 
Ireland in May 2003 complaining that by instituting proceedings against the UK 
                                                     
135
 Case C-459/03, Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland.. 
136
 For a detailed analysis of the ITLOS proceedings, see Scott (2007). 
137
 Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention, Ireland 
v. UK, Final Award (2 July 2003), 42 (2003) ILM 1118. 
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under the LOSC, Ireland had failed to comply with its obligations under the EC 
Treaty (Articles 10 and 192) and Euratom (Articles 192 and 193).  Ireland then 
requested ITLOS to suspend its hearing until the ECJ delivered judgment in the 
case brought by the Commission, and as of 2007 the proceedings remain 
suspended (Scott, 2007). 
 
The resulting ECJ judgment clarified that the whole of UNCLOS is EC law and 
forms ‘an integral part of the Community’s legal order’ (paragraph 82).  This 
clarification is especially important in a situation, such as this, where both the EC 
and its individual Member States are parties to the same convention.   
 
2.4.6  Flexibility in EC decision-making 
This section briefly outlines mechanisms relevant for understanding how 
legislation is implemented and enforced by European institutions.  This is of 
particular relevance with regard to the case studies examined in the empirical 
chapters below, as flexibility within the decision making process was evident in 
the designation of the area surrounding the Darwin Mounds that was protected 
from bottom-trawling.  
 
The European Commission represents one branch of the institutional triangle that  
manages and runs the EC (the other two being the Council and the Parliament 
(formerly known as the Assembly).  It members are appointed for five-year terms 
and since 2004, it has been made up of one Commissioner from each Member 
State.  The Commission is assisted by a civil service comprised of thirty-six 
Directorates, encompassing the executive arms of the EC.  The functions of the 
Commission include proposing environmental legislation and ensuring that the 
environmental and other provisions of the EC Treaty and secondary legislation 
are applied, including taking cases to the ECJ when necessary (Sands, 2003:736). 
 
Like the Commission, the Council is composed of one representative from each 
member state, however the particular minister attending from each state will vary 
depending on the subject matter being discussed and the decisions being made 
(Sands, 2003:736).  The Council’s powers vary with each Treaty but in effect it 
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‘expresses the political will of the members and exercises a legislative or 
regulatory function’ (Sands and Klein, 2001:180).  Environmental issues are 
generally addressed by the Environment Council, comprised of ministers 
responsible for environmental matters in each member state. 
 
The Parliament is comprised of 626 members elected by direct universal suffrage 
and represents the parliamentary organ for the Community.  Its powers are three-
fold: it exercises democratic control over all the Community institutions (in 
particular the Commission); it shares legislative power with the Council; and it 
plays a decisive role in the adoption of the budget (Sands, 2003:737). 
 
The  ECJ and CFI each have fifteen judges and, in the case of the ECJ, eight 
Advocates General.  The ECJ’s primary function is to ensure respect for the rule 
of law in the application and interpretation of the Treaties and of acts made by 
the EC institutions (Sands, 2003:737).  The ECJ may also decide matters brought 
by the Commission or a member state against a member state which is alleged to 
be failing to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty (see discussion on the issue of 
‘direct effect’ in section 2.4.2 above). 
 
The process for decision-making in the EC (focusing primarily on the Habitats 
Directive and the CFP) is outlined in Figure 2.5.  While the Commission takes 
decisions based on a simple majority, the Council of Ministers operates under 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), a system of weighted voting based on 
member state size and population (the Council also takes decisions under 
unanimity, but QMV is more common).  Decisions taken under QMV are also 
voted on by the Parliament, such that the Council and Parliament take a co-
decision procedure.   
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Figure 2.7  EC decision-making process  
  
  
Adapted from Coffey and Richartz (2003:2) 
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legislative/executive and advisory/consultative actions.  The Advisory 
Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA), the Scientific, Technical and 
Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF), and ICES all provide advice to DG 
Fisheries when drafting proposals for the Council, while DG Environment 
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In the case of the Darwin Mounds closure, described in more detail below in 
Chapter 5, the emergency closure that was put into place was operated under the 
CFP and hence was open to consultation by relevant Committees, as well as 
informal consultations directly between member states.  Other key bodies and 
instruments influencing and advising the European decision-making progress not 
included in the figure above include the European Environment Agency (EEA), 
NGOs, member states, national agencies, the epistemic community, the public 
and the media.  The influence of these outside interests is well-illustrated in the 
cases detailed below in the empirical chapters on the Darwin Mounds and the 
pair-trawl ban. 
   
2.5  UK NATIONAL COMMITMENTS 
 
2.5.1  UK legislation 
The UK ratified the Bern Convention in 1982, which was implemented into UK 
legislation via the Wildlife and Countryside Act (1981 and as amended).  This 
Act is considered to be the single most important instrument relating to the 
protection of wildlife in the UK, having created numerous offences relating to 
the killing and taking of birds, other animals and plants, but it has also been 
widely criticized as being weak (Reid, 2002).  A new system of Sites of Special 
Scientific Interest (SSSIs)138 was established, which has been judged a success in 
tackling the main threats that the Act was designed to address, however there has 
also dissatisfaction at their failure to prevent damage to protected sites (Reid, 
2002:201).  In addition, SSSIs only apply to the low-water mark, below which no 
property rights or land planning provisions exist (Jones, 1999) and hence 
enforcement policies necessary for conservation cannot be applied as they are on 
land.   
 
Weaknesses in the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act were addressed by the 
                                                     
138
 Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs) were first introduced in the 1949 National Parks 
and Access to the Countryside Act (NPACA, section 23) but the original provisions were 
weak, only requiring special consideration within the town and country planning system, i.e. 
the owners and occupiers of the land were not even informed of the designation (Reid, 
2002:200). 
Chapter 2:  Legal Framework 
 
100 
establishment in 2000 of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act (CRoW), 
intended to improve the protection of species and habitats in three ways.  Under 
the CRoW amendments, the Act now (i) includes as crimes actions taken 
recklessly as well as intentionally; (ii) increases the penalties for offences and 
(for the first time) enables custodial sentences to be imposed under the 
legislation implementing the Habitats Directive (the Conservation (Natural 
Habitats, etc.) Regulations) and CITES,139 and (iii) it enables the Secretary of 
State to designate ‘wildlife inspectors’ with the authority to enter and inspect 
premises (Reid, 2002).  CRoW also introduced fundamental changes to the 
system of SSSIs, imposing stricter controls, with the power to prohibit damaging 
operations and to adjust the scope of the controls over time (Reid, 2002:201).140   
 
2.5.2  Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) Regulations, 1994 
The Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) Regulations came into force on 30 
October 1994 and were amended in 1997 and (in England only) in 2000.141  The 
Regulations were drafted to implement parts of the Habitats Directive not already 
included in national legislation.  This move to create new legislation rather than 
integrating the Directive’s provisions with the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside 
Act removed any possibility of maintaining the key laws on species protection in 
a single instrument.  Although this approach allows for consistency and 
transparency from the perspective of Brussels, it also provides confusion in that 
two overlapping sets of rules exist in UK law with regard to species and habitat 
conservation with similar provisions (Reid, 2002).  The Conservation 
Regulations do differ from the 1981 Act in terms of scope of application, 
including non-intentional activities that destroy breeding habitats as offences.  
                                                     
139
 Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild 
fauna and flora by regulating trade therein, OJ L 61, 03.03.1997, p.1. 
140
 Subsequently, in 2006 the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act (NERC) came 
into effect, establishing Natural England.  This is the first time the responsibility for enhancing 
biodiversity and landscape in urban, rural and coastal (but not marine) areas have been unified 
with promoting access and recreation. 
141
 Statutory Instrument 1997 No. 3055 and Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 192.  The 
Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) Regulations (Northern Ireland) came into force 13 
November 1995 and replicate the provisions in force in the GB Regulations, applying them to 
the separate legal system existing in Northern Ireland.  Directive 92/43/EEC was transposed 
into the laws of Gibraltar on 25 August 1995 by the Nature Protection Ordinance (Amendment) 
Regulations 1995 (DEFRA, September 2001). 
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There are also differences in permissible exceptions and in the language of the 
two laws that complicate their interpretation. 
 
The Regulations are comprised of five Parts and four Schedules, providing for 
the designation and protection of ‘European sites’ and ‘European protected 
species’.  As it stands, the Regulations only apply to the territorial sea of the UK.  
However, as mentioned earlier, in 2003 the Regulations underwent a consultation 
(DEFRA, 2003a) and revision process to extend its applicability out to the UK 
Continental Shelf.142  A draft of the revised Regulations was opened to 
consultation in 2006, and came into effect in August 2007.   
 
Concurrent with this review, the UK Government commissioned the Joint Nature 
Conservation Committee (JNCC) to provide information enabling the 
designation of offshore SACs.  This project was conducted under a joint steering 
committee including representatives from the Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and 
other government departments and country conservation agencies.  The JNCC 
recommendations have been published as ‘Natura 2000 in UK Offshore Waters: 
Advice to support the implementation of the EC Habitats and Birds Directives in 
UK offshore waters’ (Johnston et al., 2001).  The first two offshore MSACs 
proposed by JNCC are the Darwin Mounds and Saturn Sabellaria Spinulosa site, 
followed recently by four additional areas, as mentioned earlier.  See Table 2.3 
for a listing of offshore MSACs proposed by JNCC to the UK Government as of 
November 2006 (including future proposals currently under research).  
 
                                                     
142
 Sovereignty over the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) sea bed and subsoil was established by 
the Continental Shelf Act of 15 April 1964 (followed by several amendments in the 1960s and 
1970s clarifying the extent of its jurisdiction).  
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Table 2.3  Offshore marine SAC sites proposed by JNCC to the government 
 
SITES PROPOSED HABITAT TYPE 
GENERAL 
LOCATION 
Darwin Mounds: ~1,500 
km2 
reef (Lophelia 
pertusa) 
Scottish Continental 
Shelf 
Saturn site: 16 km2 
 
reef (Sabellaria 
spinulosa) 
Southern North Sea 
 
Haig Fras: 757 km2 reef Celtic Sea 
Wyville Thomson ridge: 
1533 km2 
reef 
 
Scottish Continental 
Shelf 
Dogger Bank: 13,405 km2 subtidal sandbanks Southern North Sea 
Scanner pockmark: 7.25 
km2 
submarine structure 
made by leaking gases 
Northern North Sea 
 
  
 
     
SITES IN 
PREPARATION FOR 
PROPOSAL   
Braemar pockmarks 
 
submarine structure 
made by leaking gases 
Northern North Sea 
 
North Norfolk Sandbanks subtidal sandbanks Southern North Sea 
Haddock Bank subtidal sandbanks Southern North Sea 
Haisborough Tail, Hewett 
Ridges, Hammond Knoll & 
Smiths Knoll 
subtidal sandbanks 
 
Southern North Sea 
 
Median Deep reef English Channel 
Norh West Irish Sea 
mounds 
reef 
 
Irish Sea 
 
Blackstones Bank reef West Scotland/Minches 
Stanton Banks 
 
reef 
 
Scottish Continental 
Shelf 
West Hebrides Platform 
 
reef 
 
Scottish Continental 
Shelf 
As of September 2007 
 
2.5.3  Marine Nature Reserves / Marine SACs / Marine Natural Areas  
Though a basis for terrestrial conservation in the UK was established with the 
National Parks & Access to the Countryside Act of 1949, marine sites were not 
directly addressed until the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act, and even then 
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coverage was extremely limited, leading to the establishment of only three143 
statutory Marine Nature Reserves (MNRs) (Jones, 1999).  An ad hoc network of 
voluntary MNRs was subsequently developed, which promoted cooperation 
among users of the marine environment and allowed for participatory 
management, albeit in a cautious manner.  This network lacked a systematic 
approach, however, and sites were selected opportunistically with a bias towards 
rocky reef areas in south-west England.  In addition, as these reserves were based 
on a voluntary approach, there was no requirement for statutory support if and 
when needed (Jones, 1999).  The development and implementation of the 
Habitats Directive thus provided an opportunity for stricter enforcement and 
protection of the UK marine environment.  
 
There are inherent difficulties in applying the requirements of the Habitats 
Directive to the marine environment, both in identifying areas to be protected 
and determining the means of protection given the influence of external factors, 
such as land-based pollution, on inshore areas (Reid, 2002).  The challenges 
posed by the physical nature of the marine environment are discussed in more 
depth in Chapter 3.  If one considers the offshore marine environment, these 
characteristics are even more problematic than in waters closer to shore to which 
UK conservation policies have thus far been restricted (DETR, 2001).  
 
Regarding the implementation of the Habitats Directive in the (inshore) marine 
environment, the Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) Regulations require 
relevant authorities to work together to establish management schemes, but there 
is no overriding power or coordinating function designated to any particular 
authority (Jones and Burgess, 2005).  Consequently, the protection of marine 
sites depends upon cooperation among the relevant authorities, who are 
encouraged to form management groups to oversee the process (subject to a call-
in by the Secretary of State) while allowing for consultation from other groups 
such as riparian parties, marine users, industry and interest groups.  It will be 
interesting to follow how this scheme changes when applied to the offshore area 
                                                     
143
 The three MNRs designated to date are Lundy in England, Skomer in Wales and Strangford 
Lough in Northern Ireland. 
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once the revised Regulations have been published.  Given that inshore and 
offshore MPAs are to be selected and managed under different frameworks, 
coordinating them as a coherent network will pose significant challenges. 
 
Another scheme for marine protection in the UK is the English Nature Marine 
Natural Areas initiative.  This program covers six geographic areas: the (i) 
Western Approaches; (ii) South-western Peninsula; (iii) Eastern Channel; (iv) 
Southern North Sea; (v) Mid-North Sea; and (vi) the Irish Sea and is currently 
limited to English territory, with their outer extent set at the 200nm limit (see 
Figure 2.8).  These Marine Natural Areas have been designated and described by 
English Nature in cooperation with the JNCC and in consultation with other 
organizations and the program is designed to provide a more comprehensive, 
ecosystem-based approach in a similar manner to terrestrial Natural Areas.  As 
the remit for providing advice on nature conservation shifts from English Nature 
to the JNCC beyond the 12nm limit, the program identifies the need for these 
two bodies to work together on transboundary issues of common concern.  The 
Areas were identified according to oceanographic processes, bathymetry and 
biogeographic characteristics to define broad natural divisions, i.e. ecologically-
relevant boundaries, and emphasize the importance of natural processes, the 
interaction between these, geology and wildlife.  English Nature has designed 
this initiative to work in a complementary fashion with other programs, including 
the regional seas approach set out under DEFRA’s Review of Marine Nature 
Conservation (2004).  
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Figure 2.8  Marine Natural Areas around England 
 
 
(From Jones et al., 2004:7) 
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2.5.4  Marine Bill 
The development of a UK Marine Bill currently underway represents the 
culmination of several Government-commissioned reports released since the 
2002 First Marine Stewardship Report, ‘Safeguarding Our Seas’. These reviews 
examined various aspects of management of the UK’s seas and coasts and are 
listed in Table 2.4.  The UK Government’s commitment to a developing 
domestic legislation to specifically address its marine environment appeared in 
the Labour Party Manifesto in April 2005 as follows:  
 
‘Through a Marine Act, we will introduce a new framework for the 
seas, based on marine spatial planning, that balances conservation, 
energy and resource needs.  To obtain best value from different 
uses of our valuable marine resources, we must maintain and 
protect the ecosystems on which they depend’.  
 
The UK government is developing the Marine Bill around five themes: (i) 
managing marine fisheries; (ii) planning in the marine area; (iii) licensing marine 
activities; (iv) improving marine nature conservation and (v) the potential for a 
new Marine Management Organisation.  A consultation on the draft Marine Bill 
was held from March – June 2006, during which DEFRA received over 1200 
responses.  A large majority of respondents (94%) were in support of the 
development of a new mechanism for designating MPAs to be introduced in the 
Marine Bill, to replace legislation on MNRs (DEFRA, 2006).144  The creation of 
a new system of Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) has also received strong support 
in the consultation process to date.  There is also significant interest in 
developing a Marine Management Organisation (MMO), as there is a general 
consensus that no existing body in the UK government can undertake MSP 
responsibilities.  DEFRA released the responses to its consultation in October 
2006.   
 
 
                                                     
144
 It is worth recalling that the 2004 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution report 
mentioned earlier (Chapter 1, section 1.1.2) called for a network of NTMPAs to be established 
amounting to 30% of the UK’s EFZ.  In addition, English Nature’s 2005 Maritime Strategy 
(English Nature, 2005) included the objective of protecting 20-30% of each inshore marine 
habitat type, and the UK NGO community has been campaigning for a network of Highly 
Protected Marine Areas  in UK waters (Jones, 2006b).  
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Table 2.4  UK government initiatives towards a Marine Bill 
 
REVIEW SOURCE DATE 
Safeguarding Our Seas: A strategy for the 
conservation and sustainable development of 
our marine environment (First Marine 
Stewardship Report) 
DEFRA May 2002 
Seas of Change: The Government’s 
consultation paper to help deliver our vision 
for the marine environment 
DEFRA November 
2002 
Marine Nature Conservation and 
Sustainable Development: The Irish Sea Pilot  
JNCC January 
2004 
Government Response to its Seas of Change 
Consultation  
DEFRA March 
2004 
The Marine Environment: Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee, 
Sixth Report of Session 2003-2004 
EFRA March 
2004 
Review of Marine Fisheries and 
Environmental Enforcement  
DEFRA March 
2004 
Net Benefits: a sustainable and profitable 
future for UK Fishing 
Prime Minister’s 
Strategy Unit 
March 
2004 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the 
UK: A Stocktake 
DEFRA April 2004 
Marine Environment: Government’s reply to 
the Committee report.  Tenth Report of Session 
2003-2004 
EFRA June 2004 
Review of Marine Nature Conservation.  
Working Group report to Government 
DEFRA July 2004 
Turning the Tide: Addressing the impact of 
fisheries on the marine environment 
RCEP December 
2004 
Charting Progress: An integrated assessment 
of the state of UK seas 
DEFRA March 
2005 
The Future for UK Fishing: Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee 
Sixth Report of Session 2004-2005 
EFRA March 
2005 
Securing the Benefits. Government response 
to recommendations made in Net Benefits 
DEFRA June 2005 
Safeguarding Sea Life. Joint UK response to 
the Review of Marine Nature Conservation 
DEFRA December 
2005 
Marine Bill Consultation  DEFRA March – 
June 2006 
Government response to the RCEP’s Turning 
the Tide report 
DEFRA May 2006 
Responses to Marine Bill Consultation released DEFRA October 
2006 
Consultation on A Sea Change, a Marine Bill 
White Paper 
DEFRA March – 
June 2007 
As of September 2007 
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The development of the Marine Bill is ongoing, with further public consultation 
on a draft White Paper, released in March 2007, currently underway.145  There 
was a chance that the draft Bill might be brought before Parliament by 2006, but 
the process has been delayed by at least a year, if not two.  It seems likely that 
the Bill will not be presented to Parliament before Autumn 2008 (P. Jones, pers. 
comm.).   
 
There has already been a great deal of debate on what a Marine Bill should 
contain, and  how to reconcile and integrate conservation goals with the full 
range of demands currently placed on the marine area (Houghton, 2006:163).  
How the UK Marine Bill would interact with existing UK legislation relevant to 
the designation of offshore MPAs remains to be seen, as does the value of 
establishing a new MMO to replace existing authorities’ jurisdiction over these 
issues (i.e. rather than strengthening existing institutions).  It is also not clear 
whether the devolved administrations of the UK would want a UK MMO to 
perform functions on their behalf, or wish to create separate MMOs (Houghton, 
2006).  Potential functions of an MMO would be those not easily delivered by 
existing public bodies, and might include overseeing Marine Spatial Planning 
(MSP, discussed below in Chapter 3, section 3.4.2) and the delivery of an 
integrated licensing regime, if introduced. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has set out the legal framework relevant to the designation of 
offshore MPAs in the North-East Atlantic, from global commitments to regional 
and UK-level legislation.  While some of the Conventions discussed here are 
more directly applicable to offshore MPAs per se than others, this analysis has 
intended to provide an overview of the legal issues and context in which the 
Darwin Mounds closure occurred.  In the case of the UK, given the outcome of 
the de Berre case discussed above, it is now clear that all EC Member States are 
required to treat Conventions to which the EC is a Party as Community Law.    
                                                     
145
 The interviews conducted for this thesis occurred during 2005-2006, i.e. before the White 
Paper was released for consultation.  It is therefore not analyzed in detail in this thesis.  At the 
time this thesis was submitted (September 2007), the public consultation on “A Sea Change” 
was underway. 
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While the global CBD, CITES and UNCLOS Conventions provide international 
fora for discussing offshore conservation issues, they have not established any 
binding targets for implementing offshore marine conservation.  Rather it is the 
regional Conventions and Commissions that are leading the way in establishing 
offshore MPAs.  As mentioned earlier, NEAFC established four fishery closures; 
OSPAR is developing a network of sites that will include areas offshore; and the 
Darwin Mounds closure was implemented through the revised CFP rather than  
national legislation (though it will eventually be a SAC under the Habitats 
Directive).  
 
This chapter has also provided some detail on the process of EC environmental 
decision-making, which highlights the inherent bifurcation between nature 
conservation and fisheries management in the operation of the EC institutions.  
This bifurcation is an important issue affecting the development of offshore 
marine conservation initiatives in European waters, and is explored further 
within the context of the case studies examined later in the thesis.  The 
development of the European Marine Strategy Directive and Maritime Policy in 
tandem with the other regional and international initiatives for offshore MPAs 
presents a situation of potential institutional tension . 
 
Another issue of key relevance to the case studies examined later in the thesis is 
the UK political environment.  Within the UK, a key issue affecting the 
implementation of environmental legislation is the devolution settlement of 
1999.146  While fisheries have been devolved among the relevant Scottish, 
Welsh, English and Northern Irish authorities, nature conservation has not.  The 
devolution settlement further magnifies the tension inherent in the European split 
between nature conservation and fisheries management, and this is discussed 
later in the thesis within the context of the Darwin Mounds and UK ban on pair-
trawling for sea bass.   
 
                                                     
146
 The legislative framework for devolution is set out in the Scotland Act 1998, the Government 
of Wales Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998.  There is also a non-legislative 
framework of concordats, agreements between Government departments and the devolved 
institutions, under a Memorandum of Understanding (Leeke et al., 2003). 
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The next chapter addresses implications of this legal framework, namely the 
incorporation of the precautionary principle and an ecosystem approach in 
legislation addressing marine conservation.  It also addresses theoretical 
approaches to determining regime effectiveness and managing complex 
ecological systems, such as the marine environment.    
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3 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
  
 
"You won't achieve understanding of a person or an issue in a day. 
 Take your time, dig, go back” (Bob Woodward) 
 
OVERVIEW 
This chapter explores theoretical constructs for evaluating the regime currently 
developing for offshore marine protected areas and its potential to alleviate the 
issues it is being designed to address.  After setting out theoretical approaches to 
assessing regime effectiveness and interaction, this analysis examines the role of 
the precautionary principle in marine nature conservation, and related inherent 
difficulties/challenges posed by the marine environment’s ecological complexity.  
This analysis then explores the implementation of an ecosystem approach in 
European marine conservation, and the role of science in environmental 
decision-making.  Whereas the previous chapter set out the legal framework 
applicable for the designation and implementation of offshore conservation 
measures, this chapter provides a theoretical framework for assessing the 
potential of and challenges to offshore MPAs.  The theoretical material discussed 
here is derived from the common pool resource literature, political science, 
ecological theory, and international environmental law.  The issues raised by this 
theoretical analysis are further explored and examined in the subsequent 
empirical chapters in light of the data obtained from semi-structured interviews 
and participant observation at conferences and workshops related to offshore 
environmental management.    
 
3.1  DEFINING AND EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 
Regime analysis grew out of studies on globalism and interdependence in the 
1960s and 1970s, following a shift in focus from transnational corporations to 
transnational environmental issues of global concern (Stokke, 1997).  A 
complete history of the development of regime theory is beyond the scope of this 
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chapter1, thus the present analysis will focus on the application of governance 
and regime theory to understanding the complex system of policies and 
institutions currently evolving to address offshore marine conservation.   
 
In examining environmental regime effectiveness and institutional governance, it 
is useful to begin by clarifying the meanings of these terms themselves, as these 
have sometimes varied during the development of regime theory.  Young 
(2002a) attributes the difficulty in comparing and contrasting the results of 
studies on institutions to be due to a lack of uniform definitions of central 
concepts.  To maintain consistency, it therefore makes sense to outline 
appropriate definitions as follows.  Institutions are ‘sets of rules of the game or 
codes of conduct that serve to define social practices, assign roles to the 
participants in these practices and guide the interactions among occupants of 
these roles’ (Young, 1994:3).  International environmental regimes are a form of 
institution, i.e. ‘social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, 
rules, procedures, and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific 
issue areas’ (Levy et al., 1995:274).  This should not be confused with the 
function of organizations, which are instead ‘material entities possessing offices, 
personnel, budgets, equipment and, more often than not, legal personality’ 
(Young, 1994:4).  Organizations are therefore actors (i.e. participants2) in the 
political arena, and institutions affect their behavior by defining social practices 
and outlining appropriate codes of conduct.  With respect to environmental 
regimes, an example of an institution would be the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, as opposed to the organizations and actors that 
aim to implement its protocols.   
 
Examples of successful international regimes include the Antarctic treaty system 
created in the 1950s, which prevented the development of firm jurisdictional 
claims in the region, and the ozone regime that emerged in the 1980s, aimed at 
                                                     
1
 A review of the interdependence literature can be found in Keohane and Nye (1977) and Nau 
(1979) provides a comparison with integration theory.  Stokke (1997) goes into more depth on 
the development of regime analysis, its criticisms, and lessons that can be learned from it for 
global governance.  A recent PhD thesis (Fritz, 2000) provides a useful comparative analysis of 
current regime theory and earlier theories of international institutions. 
2
 The term ‘actors’ in the analysis of international environmental regimes refers to both state and 
non-state participants  (e.g. corporations, NGOs and individuals). 
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phasing out the production and consumption of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and 
other chemicals that destroy ozone in the upper atmosphere.  However, while 
initially successful, the ozone regime more recently has faced challenges related 
to its implementation in developing countries and with the development of black 
markets in some of the relevant chemicals (Young and Levy, 1999).  Regimes 
aimed at managing international fisheries have been far less successful, resulting 
repeatedly in the continued depletion of important fish stocks (Peterson, 1993; 
Young and Levy, 1999).   
 
How and why some environmental regimes succeed while others fail is a 
complex question that has generated substantial research.  Early studies in the 
first half of the 1990s delineated the stages of regime formation and related 
theoretical constructs (e.g., Underdal, 1992; Haas et al., 1993; Andresen and 
Wettestad 1995).  These were followed in the later 1990s by comprehensive 
international projects based on case studies examining the effectiveness of 
measures put in place, measuring both compliance with rules set out and the 
resultant effects of a regime on the environmental problem that led to its 
formation (e.g., Brown Weiss and Jacobsen, 1998; Victor et al., 1998; 
Hisschemöller and Gupta, 1999; Young, 1999; Miles et al., 2002).  Since then, 
analyses of regime effectiveness have tended to focus to a greater extent on 
methodological issues and on the linkages between regimes (e.g. Helm and 
Sprinz, 2000; Stokke, 2001a; Stokke 2001b; Young 2002a, 2002b, 2003; 
Andresen and Wettestad, 2004; Underdal and Young, 2004; Stokke et al., 2005; 
Oberthür and Gehring, 2006a).3   
 
3.1.1  Regime formation 
All social institutions can be seen as responses to collective-action problems or 
‘situations in which the pursuit of interests defined in purely individualistic terms 
regularly leads to socially undesirable outcomes’ (Young, 1989:84).   
 
                                                     
3
 A useful overview of the results of regime effectiveness analyses to date can be found in 
Andresen and Hey (2005).  This area of study is quite well developed and to examine it in 
depth is beyond the scope of this chapter.  
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Early studies of regime formation distinguished three potential processes of 
generation: spontaneous, negotiated and imposed (Young, 1983; Young 1989; 
Levy et al., 1995).  Self-generating or spontaneous regimes emerge through a 
process of converging expectations that does not require conscious efforts on the 
part of those who become participants.  Such regimes can be viewed as 
precluding the need for institutional design, and consequently they are favored 
by political conservatives and have been referred to as a means of producing 
order without law (Ellickson, 1991).  Negotiated regimes arise from a process of 
bargaining among parties, which often leads to a lengthy process of compromises 
and commitments.  Such regimes are the most common in the international 
environmental arena.  Imposed regimes, conversely, occur when a single 
powerful actor (or small coalition of powerful actors) succeed in convincing 
others to accede to its/their institutional preferences.  In practice, regime 
formation can exhibit elements of all three processes, with one or more 
exhibiting particular prominence.  As a result, analyses of environmental regime 
development benefit from taking these categorizations into account, as they may 
include elements of spontaneous generation, bargaining and even imposition of 
institutional design by one or more powerful parties. 
 
The development of an environmental regime can be divided into three 
conceptual phases as follows: (i.) agenda setting, (ii.) institutional choice, and 
(iii.) operationalization (Keohane et al., 1993, Levy et al., 1995).  Agenda setting 
involves the identification of problems requiring action and their emergence into 
the political agenda.  Institutional choice is the implementation of said agendas 
into policies.4  Operationalization is the transformation of policies into practice, 
whereby a regime’s member states implement its rules on various non-state 
actors operating within their jurisdiction.  The latter two stages can also be 
distinguished form one another vertically, with institutional choice representing 
international policy formation, while operationalization involves national policy 
responses.  Examining how a regime affects the political process during these 
three stages is one way of gaining a preliminary understanding of whether the 
regime is solving the problems it was designed to address. 
                                                     
4
 This phase often includes institutional bargaining, a concept intrinsic to the formation, 
implementation and effectiveness of regimes according to Young (1994). 
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3.1.2  Regime effectiveness and resilience 
Studies of regimes focus on their effectiveness and resilience.5  These combined 
factors can be used to characterize the significance and permanence of 
institutional arrangements.  Regime effectiveness refers to the ability of a regime 
to eliminate or substantially ameliorate the problem that led to its creation.  
Effectiveness is analyzed with respect to both compliance, the degree to which 
involved actors follow a regime’s prescriptions and whether this requires an 
alteration in their behavior, and results (i.e. outcomes), the degree to which the 
changes caused by a regime produce real environmental improvement.  Regime 
resilience, on the other hand, refers to the capacity of international arrangements, 
rules and expectations, whether formal or informal, to remain in force despite the 
existence of destabilizing forces.  Such forces can be endogenous or exogenous, 
the former being internal instability and the latter external.6  Destabilizing forces 
include both sudden crises, such as collapses in resource availability (e.g. fish 
stocks) and more gradual changes (e.g. rising sea level) and external market 
forces (e.g. rise in demand or collapse of markets for resources).  A regime that 
is well-designed to cope with gradual external pressures may be severely 
crippled by sudden shocks and vice-versa.  Coupling the resilience of a well-
designed institutional framework with the environmental issue being addressed is 
necessary for success (see the discussion on environmental resilience below, in 
section 3.3.1). 
 
Determining environmental regime effectiveness is not necessarily a 
straightforward process, as ‘effectiveness’ per se can have many meanings.  
Effectiveness can be interpreted in several ways: problem-solving, legal, 
economic, normative and political (Levy et al., 1995; Young and Levy, 1999).  A 
problem-solving approach centers on the degree to which a regime eliminates or 
alleviates the problem that prompted its formation.  This can be harder to 
measure than it may seem, given the complexity of social systems.  A legal 
                                                     
5
 Also referred to as regime robustness (e.g. by Young, 2002a). 
6
 Young (2002a) cites the following examples.  Endogenous: the fact that a democratic electoral 
system could lead to the election of antidemocratic leaders.  Exogenous: how revolutionary 
changes in political systems affect more specific arrangements governing human uses of 
renewable resources. 
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definition of effectiveness focuses on the degree to which contractual obligations 
drawn up under a regime are met.  This is easier to measure but it does not 
necessarily reflect whether the regime is accomplishing what it was designed to 
address.  Economic effectiveness incorporates efficiency with the legal 
definition, i.e. whether a regime generates the right outcome at the least cost.  
This approach is difficult to apply, given the difficulty of measuring efficiency.  
Normative parameters include values such as fairness or justice, stewardship and 
participation.  Analysts usually do not focus on normative constructs as a 
measure of regime effectiveness, as these are obviously extremely difficult 
parameters to measure.  A political approach views regimes as directed at 
particular international problems and examines behavioral changes in actors or 
policies and whether they are responsible for environmental improvements.    
 
In terms of measuring effectiveness empirically, a recent comprehensive analysis 
of case studies (Miles et al., 2002) determined factors necessary for success, 
classifying regimes into three categories: effective, mixed-performance, and 
ineffective.  Criteria related to success and failure according to this analysis are 
listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
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Table 3.1 Characteristics of effective regimes  
 
VARIABLE CONDITION 
Type of problem Predominantly benign or at least mixed 
State of knowledge: good  
Problem-solving 
capacity 
High, as indicated by: 
- Decisions rules providing for adoption of 
rules by (qualified) majority 
- An inter-governmental organization (IGO) 
with significant actor capacity serving the 
regime 
- A well-integrated epistemic community 
- Distribution of power in favor of pushers, or 
pushers and intermediaries 
- Instrumental leadership by one or a few 
parties or by individual delegates or coalitions 
of delegates 
Political context Favorable, as indicated by: 
- Linkages to other, benign problems 
- Ulterior motives or selective incentives for 
cooperation 
(From Miles et al., 2002:63) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Characteristics of ineffective regimes  
 
VARIABLE CONDITION 
Type of problem Predominantly malignant 
State of knowledge: poor 
Problem-solving 
capacity 
Low, as indicated by: 
- Decision rules requiring unanimity or 
consensus 
- Weak IGO serving the regime 
- No epistemic community present 
- Distribution of power in favor of laggards or 
laggards and bystanders (i.e.free-riders) 
- Scant instrumental leadership provided by 
delegates or coalitions of delegates 
Political context Unfavorable, as indicated by: 
- Linkages to other malign problems 
- No ulterior motives or selective incentives for 
cooperation 
(From Miles et al., 2002: 309) 
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Examples of effective regimes according to the case studies analyzed by Miles et 
al. (2002), using this comparative framework, include the North Sea Oslo 
Commission’s work on dumping, the reduction of low-level radioactive waste 
dumping from 1964-1982, the management of tuna fisheries in the West Central 
and Southwest Pacific, and the 1985 Vienna Convention on the protection of the 
ozone layer and subsequent Montreal Protocol.  Examples of ineffective regimes 
include the Mediterranean Action Plan, oil pollution from ships at sea, CITES, 
the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).  Environmental 
regimes falling in the intermediate ‘mixed’ category, according to this analysis, 
include land-based pollution control in the North Sea, the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP), and the management of high 
seas salmon in the North Pacific.  
 
3.1.3  Regime interactions  
Given the proliferation of environmental agreements and conventions addressing 
marine environmental problems in the past few decades, a discussion of the 
issues related to overlap and interaction between environmental regimes is 
necessary.  Environmental regimes do not operate in a vacuum; as mentioned 
above, both endogenous and exogenous forces can affect their resilience and, 
consequently, effectiveness.  In a similar way, institutions can influence one 
another, both positively and negatively, and the boundaries separating 
institutions can sometimes be hard to define.  As Young (2002b:266) states, the 
success of an environmental regime ‘is a function not only of the allocation of 
tasks between or among institutions operating at different levels of social 
organization but also of cross-scale interactions among distinct institutional 
arrangements’.  However, the conceptual development of regime interaction 
analysis is still at an early stage.  This chapter follows the example of Oberthür 
and Gehring (2006a) in using the term regime interactions to encompass various 
terms used by previous studies to express the idea of inter-institutional influence, 
such as interplay, linkage, interlinkage, overlap and interconnection.   
 
In examining environmental regimes in the marine environment, the interaction 
between different legal instruments must be taken into account, as this is a multi-
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use environment that has seen the establishment of various regimes aimed at 
different problems, such as pollution, fish stock management, and environmental 
protection.  Empirical work on regime interactions grew out of the effectiveness 
research touched upon above and, like these analyses, aimed to identify 
successes and failures of deliberate policymaking in order to draw lessons for 
global governance.  Oran Young has contributed several influential and 
important studies on categorizing regime interactions during the past decade 
(Young, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2003).  He initially proposed four 
types of interaction: embeddedness, nestedness, clustering and overlap (Young, 
1996).  Embeddedness refers to the relationship of a governance institution to 
broader principles and practices such as sovereignty.  Nestedness describes the 
relationship of a smaller institution to a functionally or geographically larger one.  
Clustering describes the deliberate grouping of different institutions.  Overlap 
describes the phenomenon when regimes that were formed for different purposes 
and largely without reference to one another intersect and impact one another in 
the process.  Young has subsequently distinguished between vertical and 
horizontal hierarchical interactions at different levels of social organization, from 
the local level to the international (Young 2002a, 2002b).   
 
Attempts to categorize regime interactions have also been undertaken recently by 
Olav Stokke (2001a, 2001b). He identifies four types of regime interaction: 
utilitarian, normative, ideational, and interplay management (Stoke, 2001b:10).  
Utilitarian interplay occurs when rules or programs undertaken by one regime 
alter the costs or benefits of behavioral options for another.  Normative interplay 
occurs when the rules upheld in one regime either conflict with or reinforce the 
operation of another.  Ideational7 interplay involves processes of learning, 
whereby one regime can support the effectiveness of another by drawing political 
attention to the problems addressed by the recipient regime.  Interplay 
management refers to the political management of influence between institutions, 
in order to prevent normative conflict or duplication of programmatic efforts.  
These four types of interaction can have a positive or negative effect on regime 
                                                     
7
 Also referred to as diffusive interplay (Stokke, 2001a).  
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effectiveness, depending on the situation and on whether the actors involved are 
aware of the interaction and seek to influence it.   
 
In their analysis of interactions between European and International 
environmental regimes, Oberthür and Gehring (2006a) examine 163 cases of 
institutional interaction in  eleven environmental (or environmentally-relevant) 
regimes and environmental EU Directives according to the variables listed in 
Table 3.3.   
 
Table 3.3  Variables of institutional interaction and relevant distinctions 
 
VARIABLE RELEVANT DISTINCTIONS 
Quality of effect (within the target 
institution) 
- Synergy 
- Disruption 
- Neutral or unclear 
Policy fields (of source and target 
institution) 
- Same policy field 
- Different policy fields 
Intentionality (of the triggering action 
of the source institution) 
- Intentional 
- Unintentional 
Key differences - Objectives of source and target 
- Memberships of source and 
target 
- Means of source and target 
Policy responses - Collective response 
- No collective response 
Potential for further improvement - Significant potential 
- No significant potential 
(From Gehring and Oberthür 2006b:309) 
 
Gehring and Oberthür identify four causal mechanisms of institutional 
interaction: cognitive interaction, interaction through commitment, behavioral 
interaction and impact-level interaction (2006a:8).  Cognitive interaction 
involves a transfer of knowledge between institutions, while interaction through 
commitment occurs when commitments agreed upon in one institution affect the 
interests and decision-making process of another.  Behavioral interaction 
describes a situation when an institution may induce behavioral changes in actors 
within its issue area that are relevant for the effectiveness of another institution 
within the same issue area.  Finally, Impact-level interaction describes a situation 
when an institution, as a direct result of its actions towards its target of 
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governance (i.e. issue area), affects another institution on the level of the issue 
being addressed.   
 
Looking at these definitions slightly more broadly, a source institution can 
directly influence the rule-making process of a target institution in two ways: by 
triggering a learning process that leads to voluntary adaptation (cognitive 
interaction),8 or by committing its members to an obligation that changes their 
preferences on matters negotiated in the target institution (interaction through 
commitment).9  Within a specific issue area, a source institution may affect the 
effectiveness of a target institution in two ways: by exerting influence on the 
behavior of states and nonstate actors that is relevant for the implementation of 
the target institution (behavioral interaction), or it may directly affect the 
ultimate goal of the target institution (impact-level interaction)10 (Oberthür and 
Gehring, 2006b:20).  As the work compiled by Oberthür and Gehring (2006a) is 
the most recent to emerge in the literature, and involved the participation of 
Stokke in its empirical analysis, these definitions are the most current and 
perhaps also the most comprehensive, as the authors based their derivation on 
theories of institutions, negotiation theory and also cooperation theory.   
 
The majority of interactions examined in this large analysis were classified as 
exhibiting synergy, with only one quarter of the interactions deemed as 
disruptive.  Disruptive interactions occurred more frequently at the international 
level, while synergy dominated at all levels, both in horizontal interactions 
between international institutions, in horizontal interactions between EC legal 
instruments and in vertical interactions between international and EC instruments 
(Gehring and Oberthür, 2006a:12).  This conclusion, which can be viewed as 
going against conventional wisdom, raises the question of whether or not 
institutional interaction is something negative which should be minimized.  In 
their findings, Gehring and Oberthür (2006a:12) state that institutional 
fragmentation in international and EC governance and issues of overlap do not 
                                                     
8
 Similar to Stokke’s (2001b) ‘ideational interplay’. 
9
 Similar to Stokke’s (2001b) ‘utilitarian interplay’.  
10
 Gehring and Oberthür’s analyses exclude impact-level interaction as it is ‘frequently based on 
complicated natural science links’ (2006a:11) and because they prioritized obvious cases of 
interaction with short causal chains over less obvious ones with longer causal chains. 
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predominantly result in conflict or duplication of work, rather these interactions 
may provide a ‘valuable asset for skillful policymaking to enhance 
environmental governance’.   
 
Indeed, with respect to addressing complex, diversely interacting systems, such 
as the marine environment, having a network of institutions interacting in a 
management framework may be a more resilient approach.  The complex nature 
of the marine environment is discussed in more detail below in section 3.3, as are 
concepts related to ecosystem resilience and adaptive management.  First, 
however, it is useful to examine the role of the precautionary principle in 
addressing the designation of MPAs, as this legal principle has been cited widely 
in environmental legislation during the past two decades.11 
 
3.2  THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
The precautionary principle is worded in a variety of subtly different ways in the 
different conventions and agreements into which it is integrated.  Principle 15 of 
the Rio Declaration, which attracts broad support, provides that ‘where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not 
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation’.12  For the purpose of this thesis, given its focus on 
marine conservation in the North East Atlantic, an appropriate definition is the 
one given by the 1992 OSPAR Convention, which links prevention and 
precaution (Sands, 2003:271) as preventative measures should be taken when 
there are ‘reasonable grounds for concern […] even when there is no conclusive 
evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and the effects’.13 
 
The 1991 Maastricht Treaty on European Union incorporated the precautionary 
principle as both a legal obligation and required objective for environmental 
                                                     
11
 International treaties and agreements incorporating the precautionary principle include the 
1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the third North Sea 
Conference of 1990, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1992 UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 
the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants.  For a detailed history of the development of the precautionary principle in 
the 20th century, see Harremoës et al. (2002). 
12
 WSSD Plan of Implementation, paragraphs 22 and 103. 
13
 OSPAR Convention, Article 2(2)(a). 
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policy14, and this was further amended by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and 
subsequent 2001 Treaty of Nice as follows:  
 
‘Community policy […] shall be based on the precautionary 
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be 
taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified 
at source and that the polluter should pay. Environmental 
protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of other Community policies’.15 
 
The first introduction of the precautionary principle into the global fisheries 
regulatory agenda was in Article 6 of UNCLOS (the 1995 Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement), and this together with other features of the 
Agreement can be viewed as the first introduction of a truly environmental 
dimension into international fisheries law (Freestone and Makuch, 1996 and 
Freestone, 1999). 
 
It is not entirely clear whether the precautionary principle should be considered a 
general principle of international law, with sufficient state practice to support the 
argument that it has emerged as a principle of customary international law.  On 
the one hand this may seem logical given its incorporation into several 
international environmental treaties and policy documents (Cameron, 2001; 
Cameron and Abouchar, 1996), though there is still no clear consensus on the 
principle’s exact meaning in the international arena (Sands, 2003:272).  In the 
1998 WTO Beef Hormone case16 the EC invoked the principle to justify 
prohibiting the import of beef with artificial hormones from the United States 
and Canada.  Although the EC argued that the principle was already ‘a general 
customary rule of international law or at least a general principle of law,’ the 
legal status of the precautionary principle was found to be uncertain (Birnie and 
Boyle, 2002:118) and while it has been accepted by Canada as an emerging 
principle of international law, the United States has denied that it has any legal 
status at all (Birnie and Boyle, 2002:118; Sands, 2003).   
 
                                                     
14
 1991 Maastricht Treaty, Article 130r(2). 
15
 2001 Treaty of Nice, Article 174(2). 
16
 WTO Appellate Body. Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products; 1998. 
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The European Commission released a Communication on the precautionary 
principle in 2000, which stated that it had been progressively consolidated in 
international environmental law and consequently has become a ‘full-fledged and 
general principle of international law’.17  However this raises an interesting 
question; while the principle can be seen as part of customary international law, 
why has it not been accepted as part of customary international environmental 
law?  Nevertheless, while the precautionary principle only applies explicitly with 
regard to EC environmental policy, the European courts have endorsed its 
application in relation to other policies, namely public health (Scott, 2004).18   
 
3.2.1  Precaution and MPAs 
No-Take Marine Protected Areas (NTMPAs) are considered a precautionary 
approach to fisheries management, providing insurance in the face of uncertainty 
(Guénette et al., 1998; Lauck, 1998; Jones, 2006a).  There have been a few 
instances in recent years where closures and bans have been implemented in 
European waters, integrating environmental concerns with fisheries management 
(Table 3.4).  Prior to the Darwin Mounds closure, an area extending 20,000 km2 
from North East Scotland to Northumberland was closed in 2000 to sand-eel 
fishing under the auspices of the Birds Directive, as a decline in sand-eel 
populations appeared to be affecting puffin and kittiwake populations, which 
depend on sand-eels for food during their breeding season. This area includes the 
‘Wee Bankie’ off the Firth of Forth and hence is popularly referred to under this 
name. Though it began as a seasonal closure, the timeline has been extended over 
the past five years and it is expected that a complete ban on sand-eel fishing may 
occur in the North Sea in the very near future as sand-eel stocks have 
plummeted. An analysis of ecosystem-based fisheries management in the North 
East Atlantic (Frid et al., 2005) refers to the management of this fishery as 
having an ecosystem objective (seabird population health), being precautionary 
(as the link is not yet proven) and using kittiwake breeding success as a 
biological indicator of the ecosystem effects of the fishery.  
                                                     
17
 European Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle, COM 2000 (1), 2 
February 2000, at page 10. Available on the Europa website: (europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0001en01.pdf). 
18
 For a detailed account of the precautionary principle before the European Courts, see Scott 
(2004). 
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Table 3.4  Recent examples of closures/bans where environmental concerns 
have been integrated into fisheries management 
 
CLOSURE/BAN (SPECIES) AREA AFFECTED YEAR 
‘Wee Bankie’ from NE Scotland to 
Northumberland (Sand-eel fishing) 
20,000 km2 of North Sea 2000 
EC Drift-net ban  
(cetaceans) 
EC waters (as of 2002), 
including Baltic Sea (to begin 
2007) 
2002 
ICCAT Driftnet ban  Mediterranean Sea 2003 
 
Darwin Mounds closure 
(Lophelia pertusa)  
1,380 km2 of NE Atlantic 2003 
FAO GFCM ban on Driftnets and 
demersal trawling below 1000m 
Mediterranean Sea 2005 
UK Sea Bass Pair Trawl Ban  
(cetaceans) 
UK territorial waters and 
European waters (UK fishermen 
only) 
2005 
Azores, Madeira, and Canary 
Islands trawling ban (seamounts, 
cold-water corals and hydrothermal 
vents) 
Waters 100-200 nm offshore, 
ban on use of nets and trawling 
gear below 200m 
2005 
(Adapted from De Santo and Jones, 2007a:10) 
 
Another precautionary set of measures was taken recently in European waters to 
address driftnet fishing. An EC drift net ban (Regulation 1239/9819) came into 
effect in 2002, ten years after the United Nations moratorium20 on large scale 
driftnets and covering all European waters except the Baltic Sea. A subsequent 
Regulation (No. 812/200421) extended the ban into the Baltic and is to take effect 
in 2007. However compliance has been problematic in the Mediterranean, and in 
2003 the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna 
(ICCAT) prohibited the use of driftnets for fisheries of large pelagics.22  This 
                                                     
19
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1239/98 of 8 June 1998 amending Regulation (EC) No 
894/97 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of fisheries resources, OJ L 
171, 17.06.1998, p.1. 
20
 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 44/225 (of 22 December 1989) and 46/215 (of 
20 December 1991) on Large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing and its impact on the living marine 
resources of the world’s oceans and seas. Available from the UNGA documents website: 
(www.un.org/documents/resga.htm). 
21
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 812/2004 of 26 April 2004 laying down measures concerning 
incidental catches of cetaceans in fisheries and amending Regulation (EC) No 88/98, OJ L 150, 
30.04.2004, p.12.  
22
 International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) Recommendation 
03-04 relating to Mediterranean swordfish.  
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was followed in 2005 by a recommendation23 from the FAO General Fisheries 
Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) that reiterated the ICCAT 
prohibition and went a step further, banning benthic trawling fishing methods at 
depths below 1000m.  
 
Despite these efforts, illegal driftnet fishing is still occurring in the area, 
according to NGOs who have been pressuring EC Fisheries Ministers to address 
loopholes in the Regulation that allow fishermen to modify driftnets (e.g. 
affixing anchors to the nets) and continue to use them. The driftnet ban is an 
interesting example, as it is an issue that garnered a lot of media attention in the 
1980s and 1990s, involves charismatic species such as cetaceans, and yet the EC 
Regulation alone has not been enough to control illegal fishing in the 
Mediterranean and regional fisheries organizations have stepped in to add further 
prohibitions. Traditionally, the ‘burden of proof’ has lain with those opposing an 
activity to prove that it does not cause environmental damage (Sands, 2003). A 
fuller incorporation of the precautionary principle into European fishing 
activities24 would shift the burden of evidence to those carrying out the activities 
to prove that such activities will not cause harm, in which case something like 
the UK’s proposal for a pair-trawl ban might be considered more positively. 
 
The waters around the Azores, Madeira and Canary Islands, known to possess 
several deep water habitats, were protected from trawling in 1995 by a special 
access regime defined in Council Regulation 2027/95.25  This Regulation was 
repealed in 2003 by Regulation 1954/200326  (also known as the Western Waters 
Regulation).  On 8 July 2004 the European Court of First Instance rejected the 
Azores’ request to suspend parts of the Western Waters Regulation, which would 
allow the EU fishing fleet access to Azorean waters between 100-200nm as of 1 
August 2004.  A campaign by two Azorean NGOs, WWF, Greenpeace and Seas 
                                                     
23
 FAO General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) Recommendation 
GFCM/2005/3 on the management of certain fisheries exploiting demersal and deepwater 
species.  
24
 As called for by, inter alia, Lauck et al. (1998), the RCEP (2004) and Jones (2006a). 
25
 Regulation (EC) No. 2027/95 of 15 June 1995 establishing a system for the management of 
fishing effort relating to certain Community fishing areas and resources, OJ L199 24.08.1995, 
p.1. 
26
 Council Regulation 1954/2003 of 4 November 2003 on the management of the fishing effort 
relating to certain Community fishing areas and resources, OJ L289 07.11.2003, p.1. 
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At Risk asked the Court to suspend the Council Regulation until its legality could 
be proved, a process that could have taken up to two years.  The Court rejected 
the request as it was not convinced of the urgency to take measures to protect the 
area.  In particular, the Court did not think the environmental concerns balanced 
the effect a suspension would have on EU fishermen.   
 
The Seas At Risk, WWF and Greenpeace campaign continued and on 16 August 
2004 the EC proposed temporary protective measures27 for deep-sea corals 
around the Azores, Madeira and the Canary islands until long-term rules could be 
established.  A long-term plan for a ban was tabled in February 2004,28 but its 
progress through the Council and European Parliament was delayed by the 
European Elections, thus temporary measures were put in place to protect the 
area from trawling gear in the interim.  In September 2005, the permanent ban29 
on the use of ‘any gillnet, entangling net or trammel net at depths greater than 
200 metres and any bottom trawl or similar towed nets operating in contact’ with 
the seabed around Madeira, the Azores and the Canary Islands came into effect.   
This closure represents the second cold-water coral closure in the EC, following 
the Darwin Mounds MPA discussed in detail in Chapter 4 (though it did not 
involve the same use of the revised CFP emergency closure provisions). 
 
Applying a precautionary approach to the marine environment is inherently 
difficult due to the physically complex and highly adaptive nature of the marine 
environment itself.  The next section goes into some detail on approaches to 
managing complex ecosystems. 
 
3.3  COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
As outlined by Jones (2001), compared with terrestrial systems, the marine 
environment has several attributes that pose challenges for designing protected 
                                                     
27
 Commission Proposal for protection of coral reefs around Azores, Madeira and Canary Islands 
and changes to North Sea Haddock rules, IP/04/1034, Brussels, 16 August 2004. 
28
 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending EC Regulation No 850/98 as regards the 
protection of deep-water coral reefs from the effects of trawling in certain areas of the Atlantic 
Ocean, COM(2004) 58 final, 03.02.2004. 
29
 Council Regulation (EC) No.  1568/2005 of 20 September 2005 amending Regulation (EC) 
No. 850/98 as regards the protection of deep-water coral reefs from the effects of fishing in 
certain areas of the Atlantic Ocean, OJ L252, 28.09.2005, p.2. 
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areas.  From an ecological perspective, marine ecosystems tend to encompass 
large spatial scales, with less definable boundaries than their terrestrial 
counterparts.  Areas that are spatially separated are often functionally inter-
connected due to the three-dimensional nature of the marine environment.  There 
is also a high degree of variability in marine systems, with non-linear population 
dynamics (e.g., unpredictable rises and crashes) occurring as a result of both 
natural and man-made causes.  From a management perspective, marine 
ecosystems are generally in a more ‘natural’ state than conserved terrestrial 
habitats, which are often the subject of positive intervention (i.e. the management 
of marine areas is more likely to involve avoiding intervention).  At the same 
time, however, the scientific knowledge base for establishing effective MPAs is 
poor compared with terrestrial areas, and the complex nature of the marine 
environment poses challenges to establishing the significance and causes of 
observed anthropogenic impacts.  Marine systems are also often subject to the 
effects of multiple users within a given area, again due to the three-dimensional 
nature of the marine environment.   
 
Recent studies in both the social and natural sciences have addressed the 
dynamic nature of ecosystems as complex adaptive systems (Wilson, 2006 and 
2002; Olsson et al., 2004; Hartvigsen et al., 1998; Levin 1998; Milne, 1998; 
Holling, 1987).  In complex adaptive systems (CASs), patterns at higher levels 
emerge from localized interactions and selection processes acting at lower scales, 
and these systems are characterized by having nonlinear relationships operating 
at diverse scales of space, time and organizational capacity (Levin, 2002 and 
1998).  CASs are also characterized by a capacity to self-organize or adapt 
without outside influence (Mahon et al., 2007).   
 
It can be argued that approaches to establishing governing institutions in the 
marine environment to date have incorporated ‘a very particular and 
inappropriate scientific conception of the ocean’ (Wilson, 2002:327) that 
assumes more control over natural processes than is feasible, resulting in the 
creation of dysfunctional management institutions.  A recent analysis of fisheries 
as CASs (Mahon et al., 2007) suggests that enabling adaptation in both 
governance and opportunity-taking is the approach most likely to result in 
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improved management of fisheries systems, especially in small-scale fisheries.  
Social and ecological systems behave in non-linear ways and act as strongly 
coupled, complex and evolving integrated systems, therefore management 
approaches that build resilience can sustain social-ecological systems in 
situations of surprise, unpredictability and complexity (Folke et al., 2002).   
 
3.3.1  Ecosystem resilience and adaptive co-management 
Resilience is a measure of the magnitude of disturbance an ecosystem can absorb 
without slowly degrading or unexpectedly flipping into alternate states (Hughes 
et al., 2005; Folke et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2004; Pimm, 1984; Holling, 1973).  
The more resilient a natural system, the better equipped it is to adapt to 
disturbances without losing its overall function.  Resilience in ecological systems 
is not easily observed, and there is some debate surrounding the relationship 
between the diversity of ecosystems and their resilience (Adger, 2000; Naemm et 
al., 1994; Pimm 1984).  Logically, resilience should be associated with high 
species diversity, which allows for adaptation and learning, i.e. a higher 
evolutionary capacity.  However, Costanza et al. (1995) argue that coastal and 
estuarine ecosystems, which exhibit low species diversity (due to their exposure 
to periodic physical changes and the high mobility of their organisms) are 
actually highly resilient due to the high levels of functional diversity found 
within these ecosystems.  For deep-sea species, however, certain life history 
characteristics set them apart from other marine systems, such as their extreme 
longevity, late age of maturity, slow growth and low fecundity.  Deep-sea species 
also tend to aggregate around fixed topographic features, such as seamounts or 
cold-water coral reefs, and are notably unproductive, highly vulnerable to over-
fishing and have potentially little resilience to over-exploitation (Koslow et al., 
2000). 
 
As both natural and social systems behave in nonlinear, complex ways, 
theoretical work on sustainable development has in recent years focused on the 
coupling of social-ecological systems and calls for adaptive capacity and 
collaborative management (or co-management) in social institutions to build 
resilience (Ostrom et al., 2002; Folke et al., 2002, 2004 and 2005; Carlsson and 
Berkes, 2005; Hughes et al., 2005; Koontz and Thomas, 2006).  Adger (2000) 
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argues that while the meaning and measurement of social resilience is debated, it 
is important to explore this debate as both an analogy of how societies work, 
drawing on the ecological concept, and as a means of exploring how social and 
ecological resilience are linked.   
 
Incorporating resilience in the design of social institutions has been termed 
adaptive co-management, i.e. management that builds resilience and sustains 
social-ecological systems in the face of surprise, unpredictability and complexity 
(Folke et al., 2002).  The more complex and fragile the ecosystem (for instance, 
the deep sea), the more difficult yet important it is to maintain its resilience, and 
to design governing institutions with ingrained flexibility and hierarchical levels 
of organization.  Active adaptive management was first introduced into fisheries 
by Walters and Hilborn (1978 and 1976), as a means for addressing uncertainty, 
i.e. implementing a precautionary approach.  Adaptive approaches are a means of 
improving management given uncertainties, as they incorporate active learning, 
planning, evaluation and judgment about the socio-economic-ecological 
environment and the effects of institutional decision-making (Grafton and 
Kompas, 2005).   
 
A good example of the complex decision-making required in the setting-up of 
marine reserves is given by Grafton and Kompas (2005) who provide six general 
steps for this process, illustrated in Figure 3.1 below.  This scheme incorporates a 
decision, learning and feedback loop for marine reserve design and provide for 
stakeholder involvement at each stage of the process.  The first step involves 
setting measurable objectives and goals for the development of a marine reserve.  
The second step is a socio-economic-ecological system appraisal, examining 
ecological drivers of the system, the key economic benefits derived from the 
system, the effectiveness of the current and past management scheme, and 
determining base-level indicators to judge the effectiveness of reserves in 
improving management goals.  The third step requires decision makers to consult 
with stakeholders in the selection of appropriate socio-economic-ecological 
criteria to be used to evaluate the objectives of the reserve, in preparation for the 
next step.  The fourth step concerns decision-making regarding the size, number, 
duration and location of marine reserves.  The fifth step involves a peer and 
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stakeholder review of the reserve design decisions taken in the previous steps.  
The sixth and final step requires that managers actively learn and experiment so 
as to have better designated reserves that meet the defined goals.   
 
While this framework does not guarantee that all management objectives are 
realized, it offers a systematic decision-making process to better design marine 
reserves in the face of uncertainties (Grafton and Kompas, 2005:476). 
 
Figure 3.1  Steps for active and adaptive management of marine reserves for 
fishery purposes 
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(Adapted from Grafton and Kompas, 2005:474) 
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There is a growing recognition that understanding the social, legal and economic 
aspects of resource management is insufficient for achieving sustainable 
outcomes unless coupled with a deep understanding of ecology (Hughes et al., 
2005).  With the adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, 
outlined in Chapter 2, section 2.2.3), managing the environment in an 
ecologically sustainable manner has shifter from being an option to a legal 
requirement.  The next section explores the idea of an ‘ecosystem approach’ to 
environmental management and its implication for the designation of offshore 
MPAs. 
 
3.4  TOWARDS AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH 
Although the word ‘ecosystem’ was first introduced by Sir Alfred George 
Tansley in 1935, concepts of the hierarchical organization of individuals, 
populations, communities and the functional connections between living 
organisms and the environment date back to the mid 19th century (Christensen et 
al., 1996:670).  Tansley (1935:299) defined an ecosystem as ‘a biotic assemblage 
and its associated physical environment in a specific space’.  The basic 
connotations of this definition have not changed significantly since as, for 
example, Article 2 of the CBD defines an ecosystem as ‘a dynamic complex of 
plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living environment 
interacting as a functional unit’. 
 
The ecosystem approach concept30 moves beyond a species-based approach to 
conservation, which assumes that the species in trouble are already identified.  
An ecosystem-based approach aims to address the conservation of all species in 
an ecosystem, including those not yet known (Walker, 1995).  It has also been 
defined as a comprehensive, science-based approach to the conservation and 
management of environmental resources (Wang, 2004:43).  The 5th Conference 
of Parties (COP) to the CBD interpreted the ecosystem approach as a strategy for 
the integrated management of natural resources that equitably promotes both 
conservation and utilization, focusing on ‘levels of biological organization which 
                                                     
30
 The term ‘ecosystem approach’ originated in the 1980s, but was first formally recognized 
during the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de 
Janiero, where it became a key pillar of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, 
discussed earlier in the thesis, at Chapter 2, section 2.2.3). 
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encompass the essential processes, functions and interactions among organisms 
and their environment’.  It recognizes that humans are an integral component of 
ecosystems, and also takes adaptive measures to deal with ecological complexity 
and adopts the precautionary principle (Wang, 2004:43). 
 
Incorporating an ecosystem-based approach to marine conservation and fisheries 
management has been espoused by most of the conventions and legislation 
dealing with marine nature conservation and fisheries management in the North 
East Atlantic set out in Chapter 2.  Laffoley et al. (2004) outline key elements of 
the ecosystem approach, including deliverables for its adoption in marine and 
coastal environments in the UK and Europe (i.e. improving environmental, 
economic, social, spatial, temporal, scientific and institutional coherence).  Some 
specific mechanisms have recently been put forward as means for ensuring an 
ecosystem approach to marine conservation in Europe.  These include the 
establishment of Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) under the revised CFP and 
a Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) framework within the developing UK Marine 
Bill.  These initiatives are briefly outlined below, and discussed further within 
the context of interviewee responses later in the thesis. 
 
3.4.1  Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) 
Following the reform of the CFP (described above in Chapter 2, section 2.4.3.2), 
six Regional Advisory Councils (RACs)31 were established in 2004 with the 
purpose of increasing stakeholder participation.  The RACs have been designed 
as a mechanism for more regionally sensitive management and for implementing 
an ecosystem approach, but it still too early to say whether the RACs will live up 
to the high expectations set upon them.   
 
Critics of RACs question their ability to make any real impact on the centralized 
decision-making of Brussels or to improve the quality of decision making.  
Opinions that come out of the RACs are not binding, thus there is  a risk that 
they may be perceived as nothing more than ‘talking shops’ without real 
influence.  The six RACs may not adequately represent European biodiversity 
                                                     
31
 The six RACs are divided among the following areas/issues: the Baltic, Mediterranean and 
North Seas, North-West Waters, South-West Waters and pelagic fish stocks.  As of April 2007, 
four of them are in place (North Sea, Pelagic, NW Waters and Baltic). 
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and given the large geographic regions covered by each RAC, gaining 
stakeholder cooperation on an international scale will likely prove difficult.  
Even though they were established to help identify ways for establishing 
sustainable fisheries, decisions on Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and quotas 
remain with the Council of Fisheries Ministers.   
 
3.4.2  Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) 
The concept of Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) has its roots in the 1999 
European Spatial Development Perspective, which sought to make planning 
more than the land use regulation of individual Member States (Slater, 2004).  A 
non-binding document approved by the Informal Council of European Ministers 
of Spatial Planning of the European Commission, the Perspective aimed to 
provide an integrated, multi-sectoral and indicative strategy for spatial 
development.32  Six key issues relevant to applying a spatial management 
approach to the marine environment include: (i) the type of activities to be 
regulated by the planning system; (ii) the format of the spatial plan; (iii) 
jurisdiction and areas of control by the planning authorities; (iv) the role and 
relationship of MSP with strategic environmental assessment; (v) the role for 
NGOs and members of the public; and (vi) enforcement (Slater, 2004). 
 
The MSP framework proposed in the draft UK Marine Bill is still developing 
(see Chapter 2, section 2.5.4).  DEFRA has commissioned a consortium of 
environmental consulting groups to research options for developing, 
implementing and managing MSP planning in the UK.33  Although it has not yet 
been finalized, the UK’s MSP framework is worth mentioning here within the 
context of an ecosystem approach to marine conservation, as it will aim to work 
across sectors and give a geographic context in which to make decisions about 
                                                     
32
 The European Spatial Development Perspective is available online: 
(//ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/som_en.htm). 
33
 The consultants working with DEFRA on MSP are ABPmer, Terence O’Rourke, Risk & 
Policy Analysts, Geotek, Hartley Anderson and Coastal Management for Sustainability.  
Further information on their preliminary work is available online: 
(//mspp.abpmer.co.uk/mspp/index.asp). 
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the use of resources, development, conservation and the management of 
activities in the marine environment.34   
 
The UK’s MSP framework will be made statutory and is intended to improve 
planning and management for industry and conservation, following the model 
currently used for land use planning under the 2004 Planning and Compulsory 
Purchase Act.  Given the UK’s commitment under international and regional 
conventions discussed earlier in the thesis and its obligation under the Habitats 
Directive to develop the Natura 2000 network out to 200nm, the developing MSP 
framework may help facilitate the development of a representative and 
ecologically coherent MPA network.  On the European level, the developing 
European Marine Thematic Strategy mentioned earlier in the thesis (Chapter 2, 
section 2.4.4.2) also aims to develop a cross-sectoral management framework, 
addressing the integration of nature protection measures and the various 
activities impacting on the marine environment, including spatial planning.   
 
The aforementioned consortium of environmental consulting groups assembled 
by DEFRA has undertaken a detailed analysis35 of international experiences with 
MSP, from Australia, New Zealand and Fiji, to the US and the Philippines.  One 
of the key findings of this review is that many of the initiatives are effectively 
still in the implementation phase and many of the practical issues associated with 
MSP are still being worked through.  In addition, the waters around the UK may 
be more intensively used by people than in some of the comparative studies, 
which will pose further challenges to implementing MSP effectively.  
Nevertheless, stakeholder engagement is considered a key part of plan 
production, acceptance and successful implementation.  The role of RACs and 
MSP in addressing an ecosystem approach (including stakeholder engagement) 
within the UK and European waters, as perceived by different perspectives 
incorporated in the interviews undertaken by this thesis, is explored later (see 
Chapter 7). 
 
                                                     
34
 WWF and the Wildlife Trusts Joint Marine Programme, Marine update 55 Newsletter, June 
2004. 
35
 Supra, note 33. 
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Wilson (2006:9) emphasizes that a successful transition to ecosystem-based 
management requires institutions in tune with feedback about the impact of 
human activities, something that is best achieved by having multi-scale 
institutions whose organization mirrors the complex nature of the ecosystem 
being addressed.  The institutional framework relevant to the implementation of 
offshore MPAs outlined in Chapter 2 did not evolve with an ecosystem-approach 
as a target; rather this priority has evolved as a subsequent objective.  That is not 
to say that applying an ecosystem approach in the marine environment is 
unattainable, however.  Rather, the role of science in policy-making provides a 
key vehicle for implementing the approach, where institutional capacity may 
seem limited. 
 
3.5  THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 
Environmental policy decisions ‘nearly always have to be made on the basis of 
imperfect information about the problem itself and/or the impact of alternative 
options’ (Underdal, 2000:4).  Studies of the relationship between science and 
politics generally focus along two paths of research: the ‘nature of the problem’ 
versus ‘problem-solving capacity’.  With regard to the nature of the problem 
being addressed, conventional wisdom would argue that some problems are less 
complicated or more politically benign than others, and hence easier to solve.  
Problem-solving capacity, in contrast, is an elusive and complex concept, posing 
both intellectual and political challenges.  Intellectually, the challenge is to 
identify and diagnose problems and come up with effective response measures.  
Politically, the challenge lies in mobilizing a group of states or other actors to 
undertake collective action in pursuit of an effective solution (Underdal, 2000:2).  
Consequently, transforming scientific knowledge into premises for policy 
decisions lies at the interface between these challenges. 
 
Utilizing a precautionary approach requires relying on tentative information at 
least as much as what is ‘known’, and the question becomes how much and what 
kind of knowledge is needed.  Table 3.5 outlines some key characteristics of 
scientific knowledge that affect its impact on environmental regimes.  Drawn 
from the varied success of several case studies, this table shows quite clearly that 
the role of scientific input in environmental decision making is affected by 
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consensus, the feasibility of a solution (or ‘cure’), the relative impact of the 
environmental issue in question (both time-wise and in the public and global 
sphere), the political climate, and the strength of the institutions designed to 
address the environmental threat.  An often-cited example of a successful regime 
that benefited from strong science is the Vienna Convention and Montreal 
Protocol on Ozone Layer Depletion (see section 3.1.2 above).  Not only was the 
science considered decisive, a solution was readily available, i.e. the 
development of alternatives to chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). 
 
Table 3.5  Conditions affecting the impact of scientific inputs 
Impact likely to be strong Impact likely to be weak 
Definite or at least consensual 
conclusion 
Tentative or contested hypothesis 
Feasible ‘cure’ available ‘Cure’ unclear or not feasible 
Effects close in time Effects remote 
Problem affecting social centre of 
society 
Problem affecting periphery only 
Problem developing rapidly and 
surprisingly 
Problem developing slowly and 
according to expectations 
Effects experienced by, or at least 
visible to, the public 
Effects not (yet) experienced by, or 
visible to, the public 
Political conflict: low Political conflict: high 
Issue linkage: none or on substantive 
merits only 
Tactical issue linkage: issue 
contamination 
Institutionalized setting, iterative 
decision-making 
Not yet institutionalized, ad hoc 
decision-making 
(From Underdal, 1989:259) 
 
With regard to marine fisheries, the challenge of gaining knowledge about a 
complex system is further complicated by communication difficulties.  The use 
of excessively technical language reduces the ability of scientists to convey to 
industry and managers a clear picture of the biological consequences of 
management proposals (Stokke and Coffey, 2004).  O’Riordan (2004:239) 
argues that few environmental scientists have a close enough perspective on the 
political process to be fully able to link the two, and there is a need for a more 
politicized science to emerge from the interlocking of science and the political 
context.  This move towards a ‘sustainability science’ aims to include relevant 
stakeholders into the adaptive implementation of environmental science, and 
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although several partnerships between user groups, industry and the public have 
emerged, it has not yet gained wide prominence (O’Riordan, 2004:239). 
 
As discussed later in the thesis, the Darwin Mounds and pair-trawl ban policy 
processes demonstrate that it is not just the quality of the science that matters to 
decision-makers, but also the origin of the knowledge itself, i.e. ‘whose science’.  
As Underdal (2000:6) observes, ‘decision makers typically have multiple and 
sometimes conflicting concerns and objectives, some of which can be quite 
remote from those enshrined in their official roles’.  As a result, they may turn to 
science in search of selective arguments for positions into which they are already 
deeply entrenched, rather than seeking the absolute truth. 
 
As outlined by Skodvin and Underdal (2000), the ideal relationship between 
science and policy is one where knowledge is communicated undistorted to 
decision-makers who then utilize it as factual premises for policy decisions.  In 
practice, however, this relationship can be jeopardized by two factors.  First, the 
mechanism by which it produces knowledge may be impaired (i.e. the objectivity 
of the scientific method may be compromised).  And second, when science is 
used by one side in a political conflict, the opposing side may try to undermine 
its validity and/or question the competence and integrity of the scientists 
involved (Skodvin and Underdal, 2000:29). 
 
In short, science and politics constitute quite separate entities.  Skodvin and 
Underdal (2000) argue that the transformation of research-based knowledge into 
premises for policy decisions must provide an enlightened, consensual and user-
relevant interpretation of the policy implications of the science, without 
distorting the knowledge itself or impairing the practices through which it is 
produced or maintained.   
 
The discussion earlier in this chapter on effective environmental regimes 
addresses the role of institutional design.  This is a key requirement for the 
proper utilization of science in policy-making, yet real-world practice shows that 
it is not necessarily enough to ensure a positive outcome.  External political 
factors and pressure on decision-makers must also be taken into account.  As will 
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become evident later in the thesis, legal approaches for marine conservation that 
work in some cases are less successful in others, a result not only of the different 
science and situations, but also the political process involved.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The theoretical framework outlined in this chapter has aimed to explore the key 
issues related to designating and implementing effective environmental 
conservation measures offshore.  While the extensive body of research that has 
addressed the design of effective regimes provides a useful frame of reference 
for evaluating the potential success of environmental initiatives, at the same time 
it is difficult to apply lessons learned between different cases.  This difficulty is 
due primarily to the role of players in the process, and the different challenges 
posed by environmental and social factors.   
 
The role of science in the political process is a key issue for implementing 
precautionary approaches towards the ‘ecosystem approach’ ingrained in 
legislation on marine nature conservation, and the Darwin Mounds closure and 
attempted pair-trawl ban illustrate some strengths and weaknesses that should be 
addressed in the regime management framework currently developing for 
offshore MPAs.  In exploring the subsequent case study chapters, there are 
several issues that should be kept in mind: (i) While the Darwin Mounds has 
been considered a successful example of offshore marine conservation, does it 
constitute a first step towards an effective regime?  (ii) Is offshore marine 
conservation following a precautionary approach, as required under European 
legislation?  (iii) What role did science play in the success/failure of the policy 
processes in each of these case studies?   
 
It is worth reiterating that the legislative bifurcation between nature conservation 
and fisheries management in Europe outlined in Chapter 2 plays an important 
role in understanding the different outcomes of the case studies examined in this 
analysis.  The next chapter details the methodology employed in the empirical 
analysis, and provides a brief introduction to the subsequent case study chapters. 
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4 
 
METHODOLOGY AND INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES 
 
  
 
“Let us take off the spectacles that show us the shadows of things  
instead of the things themselves” (Olaus Worm, 17th Century Naturalist) 
 
OVERVIEW 
This chapter sets out the methodology undertaken in the thesis.  An overview of 
its three-tiered interdisciplinary approach is provided, namely combining a 
detailed legal analysis with semi-structured interviews and participant 
observation at relevant workshops and conferences on European marine 
environmental issues.   
 
4.1  THEORETICAL RATIONALE 
This project was conducted within the Department of Geography from 2003 to 
2007, co-supervised by the Faculty of Laws.  This collaboration was decided 
from the start of the PhD, as the project aimed to explore not only the human 
element responsible for the designation of the UK’s first offshore MPA but also 
how this and future offshore designations would interact within the global, 
regional and UK legal environment.  As the thesis progressed, having a strong 
legal component in the PhD research proved to be a key element, as new ECJ 
judgments emerged that helped clarify the potential opportunities and challenges 
to offshore marine conservation. 
 
As my previous research background involved both the natural and social 
sciences, I decided to take an interdisciplinary approach when developing my 
theoretical framework and methodology.  As detailed in the previous chapter, the 
theoretical framework entailed exploring the environmental regime political 
science literature, as well as theories related to managing complex ecosystems, 
such as the marine environment, and policy implications of  the precautionary 
principle and ecosystem approach.  A theoretical analysis of the developing 
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regime for offshore MPAs leaves some unanswered questions, however.  In order 
to elucidate the reasons why the Darwin Mounds closure worked while the UK’s 
attempt to ban pair-trawling for sea bass was less successful, accessing personal 
histories and perspectives through a program of semi-structured interviews and 
participant observation opportunities proved to be the most viable method for 
ascertaining the opportunities and challenges to the developing regime. 
 
The methodological rationale of this study reflects the interdisciplinary nature of 
the issues examined.  This involved combining three methods: a detailed legal 
analysis, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation at regional and 
international conferences on marine conservation.  The preliminary legal analysis 
was conducted from October 2003 to January 2005, when the upgrade from 
MPhil to PhD candidacy was completed.  Semi-structured interviews with 
relevant stakeholders and players in the process in England and Scotland were 
conducted in person and over the phone from December 2004 to July 2006.  
Throughout the PhD, I participated in several Coastal Futures meetings 
organized by Coastal Management for Sustainability.  These conferences and 
workshops are the primary forums for discussing marine and coastal issues in the 
UK, and involve the participation of regulatory, user and NGO actors.  Table 4.1 
outlines the schedule of the PhD. 
 
Table 4.1  Schedule of PhD 
DATE ACTIONS/OUTPUTS 
Preliminary legal analysis, literature review Year I  
(2003 – 2004) Informational interviews 
Upgrade to PhD candidacy 
Continuation of interviews and legal analysis 
Year II  
(2004 – 2005) 
Participant observation opportunities 
Presented preliminary results at the 3rd International 
Symposium on Deep-Sea Corals, Miami, USA 
Continuation of interviews and transcription, analysis of data 
Continued participant observation and legal analysis 
Year III  
(2005 – 2006) 
Published two articles in academic journals 
Continued participant observation Year IV  
(2006 – 2007) Write-up of thesis (submitted September 2007) 
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The research methodology can be viewed schematically as a triangulation 
approach, illustrated below in Figure 4.1, where empirical results were evaluated 
in the context of both published and non-published literature.  Triangulation 
refers to the use of multiple techniques to test research questions (Jackson, 
1999).  Using a combination of sources of evidence in conjunction with 
interview material (i.e. triangulation) allows for the production of valid findings 
(Cochrane, 1998).  
 
Figure 4.1  Triangulation research methodology approach undertaken in the 
thesis 
 
 
 
The following section goes into some detail on each stage of the methodology, 
from the legal analysis and literature review to the interview process and 
empirical analysis, as well as concurrent participant observation opportunities.  
 
4.2  METHODOLOGY 
 
4.2.1  Legal analysis  
The legal analysis examined global, European and UK legislation most relevant 
to the development of offshore MPAs.  The results of this undertaking are given 
Empirical work 
(interviews, participant observation) 
Grey literature 
(institutional reports, 
conference papers, etc.) 
Published literature 
(articles, books, laws, 
published opinions, etc.) 
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in Chapter 2.  It is worth mentioning that a detailed examination of the 
development of the Habitats Directive with respect to offshore marine 
conservation was undertaken, as such an analysis had not been previously 
published in the relevant literature.  The results of the literature review of non-
legal sources, i.e. from the social and natural sciences, are outlined in Chapter 3, 
within the theoretical framework.  The initial literature and legal analysis helped 
frame the interview process by (i) identifying potentially desirable interviewees, 
and (ii) providing enough background to conduct ‘intelligent interviews’ and 
resulting in data, theory and facts as resources for problem and solution analysis 
(Weimer and Vining, 2005:321).   
 
Throughout the PhD, a concerted effort was made to keep up to date with 
relevant literature and legal developments.  Membership at the University of 
London Institute for Advanced Legal Studies (IALS) was obtained, and this 
library, in combination with the University College London (UCL) Science 
Library and its online resources, provided valuable information and access to 
international, European and UK legal materials (both in print and electronically).  
Several electronic journals were checked periodically for relevant articles on the 
issues examined by this thesis.  In addition, frequent searches were undertaken 
on legal databases to gain information relevant to the case law in question 
(primarily related to the Habitats Directive and the Common Fisheries Policy).  
These databases included Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw UK, as well as more general 
searches on the Web of Science database, which provided access to works in the 
social and natural sciences. 
 
4.2.2  Semi-structured interviews 
Unstructured or semi-structured interviews can be viewed as ‘conversations with 
a purpose’ (Valentine, 1997), designed to take a conversational, fluid form 
whereby each interview varies according to the interests, experiences and views 
of the interviewee.  The interviewer has a number of issues to be addressed to 
help uncover the interviewee’s views.  However, unlike more structured 
approaches such as questionnaires, semi-structured interviews allow further room 
for the interviewees to express themselves, and the interviewer has the 
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opportunity to ask the same questions in different ways in order to explore issues 
more fully.  This format also allows the interviewee to provide additional 
information that the interviewer may not have anticipated, and each interview is 
unique.  In contrast to structured interviews, which involve tight control over the 
format of the questions and answers, semi-structured interviews allow the 
interviewer to be more flexible in terms of the order in which topics are 
addressed, and they allow the interviewee to develop ideas and speak more 
widely on the issues being discussed (Denscombe, 1998).   
 
The researcher brings a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered, 
often referred to as an ‘interview guide’, but the interviewee has a great deal of 
leeway in how to reply (Bryman, 2001:314).  Questions may not follow in the 
exact order outlined in the researcher’s guide, and additional questions may also 
be added as the researcher picks up on things identified by the interviewee.  
Overall, however, an effort is made to use similar wording between interviews 
and to cover the same topics. 
 
For the purposes of this study, interviewing was the most appropriate means for 
gathering inside information about a policy process currently evolving and 
charting new territory.  As I already had a fairly clear focus on my topic, semi-
structured interviews were the most appropriate method to use ‘so that more 
specific issues’ could be addressed (Bryman 2001:315).  Effort was made not to 
bias interviewees’ responses, by allowing them to speak at length without too 
much prompting and without overtly forcing the direction of the conversation.  
The interview process was flexible, and allowed for the emphasis to be on how 
the interviewees framed and understood issues and events.   
 
Conversations were recorded with the interviewees’ permission, and transcribed 
soon after the meeting in order to create as accurate a record as possible.  
Transcription required approximately 4-5 hours of work per hour of recording 
and was completed as soon as possible after the interview.  Most interviews 
lasted approximately one hour.  In cases where interviewees were not 
comfortable with being recorded, only notes were taken and these were 
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transcribed, reviewed and added to (from memory) immediately following the 
interview.  In all cases, interviewees were reassured that their opinions would be 
kept anonymous.   
 
Interviews were conducted with 41 representatives from the following 
communities: Regulatory (i.e. government and agencies), Users (i.e. oil and gas 
industry and fishing associations), Epistemic (i.e. academics/experts), Legal 
experts and representatives from NGOs.  I first approached people based on their 
relevance to the Darwin Mounds closure (i.e. the key players in the process).  As 
time progressed, and my understanding of the issues grew, I approached more 
people based on recommendations from other interviewees, a process referred to 
as ‘snowballing’ (Valentine, 1997).  My list of contacts increased from both 
personal recommendations and my exploration of the relevant literature, and was 
maintained in an Excel spreadsheet, color coded according to interviewee ‘type’ 
and whether they had agreed to participate in the project.  In-person interviews 
were conducted at the interviewee’s place of work, with the exception of 
interviews conducted at international conferences, which occurred on the side of 
the meeting.   
 
Not every person contacted replied to my interview request or agreed to 
participate (out of 60 invitations made, 41 individuals participated).  One 
perspective that is not included in the thesis, as a result, is that of the Directorate 
General (DG) for Environment in the European Commission.  While I was able 
to speak with a representative from DG Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, my 
invitations to several representatives from DG Environment went unanswered.  
This seems likely to be due to the fact that DG Environment is arguably over-
worked and under-staffed in comparison with DG Fisheries, an issue that is 
discussed later in the thesis (see Chapter 6).   
 
A sample letter of introduction is given in Appendix I.  As the PhD addressed 
institutional and policy-making issues, I focused on interviewing representative 
authorities rather than individual stakeholders.  Thus, for example, I spoke with 
fishing industry representatives rather than approaching individual fishermen.   
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Quotations are provided in the thesis in order to illustrate perspectives.  As 
interviewees were assured of anonymity during the interview process, any 
relevant quotations used in this thesis refer to individuals in a random number 
order under the codes given in Table 4.2:   
 
Table 4.2  Interviewee codes within the thesis 
 
CODE FOR QUOTATIONS SECTOR 
RC Regulatory Community 
EC Epistemic Community 
UCF User Community, Fisheries 
UCI User Community, Industry (oil and gas) 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
LC Legal Community 
 
So, for example, a quotation from a member of the regulatory community is 
followed by the citation ‘[RC-01]’ in the text of the thesis.  In this way, 
interviewees are not individually identifiable and their anonymity is preserved.    
Within the thesis, direct quotations from interviewees are italicized, while 
quotations from literature and legal sources are not.  For interviewee quotations, 
shorter phrases are left within the text, while longer quotations are in 
subparagraphs and indented.  
 
Between December 2004 and July 2006, 42 interviews were conducted in person 
or over the telephone (one interviewee was interviewed twice).  Table 4.3 lists 
interviewees’ affiliations and the schedule of interviews is given in Table 4.4.  A 
progressive pattern was followed in the development of the interview schedule.  
Early interviews were more ‘informational’ and provided a broad background on 
the history of the Darwin Mounds’ discovery and closure, as well as the names of 
additional contacts and institutions to pursue.  Every effort was made to maintain 
the same level of integrity in interview technique from interviewee to 
interviewee, and between in-person and telephone interviews.  In all cases, 
interviews were conducted in a professional manner and interviewees were 
assured that their views would be kept confidential and any quotations used 
would be kept anonymous. 
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Table 4.3  Interviewee affiliations 
SECTOR INTERVIEWEES 
Regulatory 
Community 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA)  
 English Nature 
 
EC Directorate General for Fisheries and Maritime 
Affairs (DG Fisheries) 
 Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) 
 
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) 
 Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs 
Department (SEERAD) 
 Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency (SFPA) 
  
User Community - 
Fisheries 
National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations 
(NFFO) 
 
Scottish Fishermen’s Federation (SFF) 
  
User Community - 
Industry 
AFEN (Atlantic Frontier Environment Network) 
 DTI (Department for Trade and Industry) 
 UKOOA (UK Offshore Operators Association) 
  
Epistemic Community British Antarctic Survey (BAS) 
 Coastal Management for Sustainability (CMS) 
 
Fisheries Research Services (FRS) 
 Int’l Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) 
 IUCN (World Conservation Union) 
 London School of Economics and Political Science 
(LSE) 
 Marine Biological Association (MBA) 
 National Oceanography Centre, Southampton (NOCS) 
 Scottish Association for Marine Science (SAMS) 
 University College Cork 
 
University of Oslo 
 
University of Plymouth 
  
NGO Community British Ecological Society (BES) 
 Greenpeace 
 Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) 
 Oceana 
 Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) 
 WWF 
  
Legal Community 39 Essex 
 Fenners Chambers 
 University College London 
 University of Wales, Bangor 
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Table 4.4  Interview schedule 
 
LOCATION 
OF 
INTERVIEW 
DATE INSTITUTION TAPED TYPE 
Southampton 8/12/04 NOCS No In person 
London 24/3/05 MBA No In person 
Cambridge 9/5/05 BAS No In person 
Peterborough 17/5/05 JNCC Yes In person 
London 18/5/05 JNCC Yes In person 
London 20/5/05 IEEP Yes In person 
London 15/1/05 University of Plymouth Yes In person 
Cambridge 23/6/05 Fenners Chambers No In person 
London 6/7/05 DEFRA  Yes In person 
Aberdeen 15/8/05 SFF Yes In person 
Aberdeen 16/8/05 AFEN Yes In person 
Aberdeen 16/8/05 DTI Yes In person 
Aberdeen 16/8/05 JNCC Yes In person 
N/A 23/8/05 UKOOA Yes Telephone 
Edinburgh 25/8/05 SFPA Yes In person 
Edinburgh 25/8/05 SFPA Yes In person 
Edinburgh 25/8/05 SEERAD Yes In person 
N/A 26/8/05 SAMS Yes Telephone 
N/A 7/9/05 FRS Yes Telephone 
N/A 14/9/05 DEFRA Yes Telephone 
N/A 4/11/05 Consultant Yes Telephone 
London 15/11/05 SEERAD + NEAFC Yes In person 
N/A 18/11/05 CMS Yes Telephone 
Miami, USA 30/11/05 WWF No In person 
London 6/12/05 Matrix Chambers No In person 
N/A 8/2/06 EC DG Fisheries Yes Telephone 
N/A 6/3/06 U. College Cork Yes Telephone 
N/A 7/3/06 DTI (fmr AFEN) Yes Telephone 
N/A 9/3/06 University of Oslo Yes Telephone 
N/A 17/3/06 Greenpeace (fmr IEEP) Yes Telephone 
N/A 6/4/06 Oceana (fmr WWF) Yes Telephone 
London 12/4/06 39 Essex No In person 
N/A 21/4/06 ICES Yes Telephone 
London 27/4/06 Fenners Chambers  No In person 
Peterborough 23/5/06 English Nature, IUCN No In person 
N/A 30/5/06 RSPB Yes Telephone 
N/A 16/6/06 University of Wales No Telephone 
N/A 16/6/06 BES Yes Telephone 
N/A 26/6/06 IUCN Yes Telephone 
London 10/7/06 IEEP No In person 
Aylesbury 18/7/06 LSE No In person 
N/A 28/7/06 NFFO Yes Telephone 
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4.2.3  Interview question framework 
A general question framework was used as a template during interviews: not 
every question was asked of each interviewee.  Rather, the interviews were 
conducted as an open conversation and this framework served as a means by 
which the conversation was directed towards topics of particular interest to the 
research.  Particular attention was given to not ‘leading’ the interviewees towards 
particular responses, rather they were encouraged to express their own opinions 
as freely as possible with occasional ‘guidance’ from the question framework. 
 
Interviewees were given the opportunity to decline my request to record the 
interview.  They were also assured of  anonymity.  The purpose of the interview 
was read to them as follows:  
 
I hope to gain an understanding of the stories behind the sequence 
of events that led to the protection of the Darwin Mounds, the 
history, motives and issues underlying these events and their 
consequences (intended and otherwise). 
 
I would like to know your perspective on the story of the Darwin 
Mounds.  What, in your opinion, were the critical events or stages 
that led to its designation? What are the implications of this 
designation for future offshore marine nature conservation 
initiatives?  And what do you see as being the key challenges and 
prospects for the future? 
 
 
The interviews varied in approach and questions asked, depending on the 
expertise of the particular interviewee.  As the interviews took place over a long 
time scale, some questions were added and others deleted as the research process 
unfolded, and new issues emerged, such as the pair-trawl ban.   
 
Table 4.5 lists in detail the topics and issues addressed in the interview process:  
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Table 4.5  Interview question framework 
 
ISSUE AREA TOPIC QUESTIONS 
History of negotiations/development, 
territorial applicability offshore? 
Insights on backstage relations/issues 
during the Directive’s development? 
Are the marine habitats listed in the 
Directive adequate?  +/- 
Overlap/interaction with other 
legislation? +/- 
Habitats Directive 
Why has the revision of the UK’s 
implementing legislation been 
delayed? 
(If they were involved) Tell me your 
personal view on how it happened. 
What is your perspective on the 
outcome/implications? 
Greenpeace 
Judgment 
Your opinion on overriding public 
interest issues with respect to the 
marine environment? 
What lessons do you see has having 
been learned from the Darwin 
Mounds designation? 
Challenges to the 
designation of 
offshore MPAs 
What is happening with the designation 
of other (potentially impacted and/or 
pristine) sites? 
How will OSPAR MPAs overlap with 
SACs under the Habitats Directive, 
and any other designations? 
OSPAR, other MPA 
initiatives 
How does the UK’s situation differ 
from that of other EC Member States 
under the same legal obligations? 
What happened in the Commission? 
What does a unilateral UK ban mean for 
the long-term effectiveness of such a 
ban?  
I.  Legal Issues: 
Darwin Mounds 
versus Pair-Trawl 
Ban  
Your opinion on the reasons for this 
difference in outcomes? 
What is its distribution/condition in the 
North East Atlantic? 
Are there many pristine areas that 
should be focused on for 
conservation value? 
II.  Scientific 
Knowledge: 
Lophelia pertusa 
How ‘unique’ were the Darwin 
Mounds? 
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Other deep-sea 
habitats 
Are habitats that are not included in the 
Habitats Directive to be included in 
OSPAR or other initiatives?  What 
habitats should be focused on? 
What is your opinion on the role of 
science in policy-making?  +/- 
 
General issues 
What is your opinion of the ecosystem 
approach, and how is it being 
implemented in offshore marine 
conservation? 
How is the overlap between the 
CFP/HD and EC/OSPAR being 
addressed with regard to designating, 
monitoring and enforcing MPAs? 
How can a coherent network of 
inshore/offshore MPAs be achieved? 
III.  Institutional 
Tensions: 
Jurisdictional issues 
between regulatory 
bodies 
Where/what are the tensions within the 
EC, between DG Fisheries and DG 
Environment? 
Who was fishing out there?  How many 
boats, which countries, which target 
species?   
Have there been infringements? 
When will the area be surveyed again? 
How does the VMS surveillance work 
in practice?   
Darwin Mounds 
Is VMS the only option? 
How are the RACs developing? 
What role is played by the relevant 
actors and what are their 
perspectives? 
Actors/stakeholders 
How will the designation of offshore 
MPAs affect stakeholder interests? 
IV.  
Enforcement: 
Responsibility Who should be responsible for 
enforcing MPAs in the offshore 
zone? 
 
 
While not all of these questions were addressed in every interview, the 
interviewee was given the opportunity to offer opinions on areas in which they 
were not ‘expert’, if they chose (most declined to do so, it should be noted).  
There was also ample room for interviewees to express their personal opinions 
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on the issues involved in offshore marine conservation and any lessons learned 
for the future implementation of MPAs in this region.   
 
At the end of the interview, participants were asked to offer any additional 
relevant information that they felt I had not addressed, and they were also asked 
for the names of additional contacts I could pursue, where applicable. 
 
4.2.4  Interview analysis 
The analysis of interview data was conducted by hand.  In the first pass, I went 
through the transcripts on paper, making notes in the margins identifying key 
themes.  This process is referred to as ‘memoing’, and is a preliminary stage of 
coding, though not as concise.  The coding process involved filtering the memos 
into more concrete themes.  Codes can be broken into two categories, ‘etic’ and 
‘emic’, according to their origin (Silverman, 2001).  While etic codes are derived 
from the researcher’s focus, questions and priorities, emic codes emerge during 
the interview process and are more a function of the interviewee’s perspective.  
Table 4.6 lists the key codes used in the interview analysis. 
 
Table 4.6  Key interview codes used in the analysis 
 
ETIC EMIC 
Darwin Mounds closure, Greenpeace Judgment UK as a ‘leader’ versus others 
Pair-trawl ban Role of science in policy-making 
OSPAR, NEAFC, ICES, European initiatives 
(Marine Strategy Directive, Maritime Policy) 
Russia 
Ecosystem Approach Marine Spatial Planning (MSP)  
Precautionary Principle ‘Uniqueness’ of Darwin Mounds 
Habitats Directive, Common Fisheries Policy, 
Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) 
Devolution 
Tension/synergy (institutional overlap) DG Fish and DG Environment 
Enforcement  Policy process 
Science, Lophelia pertusa AFEN 
 
After the printed interviews had been reviewed by hand, I returned to the 
electronic versions and combined all of the interviews into one large Microsoft 
Word document.  This facilitated my analysis as I was able to search the large 
document for key words and phrases I had identified as part of my coding 
Chapter 4:  Methodology and Introduction to the Case Studies 
 153 
process, using the Microsoft Word ‘find/replace’ function.  The relevant sections 
of the document were highlighted using the Microsoft Word ‘highlight’ function, 
and colored according to topic/general theme/chapter, to facilitate locating them 
during the writing-up of the thesis.  I developed this method as an alternative to 
using an automatic coding program, as it facilitated a more qualitative, first-
hand, contextual approach.  If I had interviewed a larger number of people, it 
may have been necessary to use a coding program, but in the case of this project, 
using the methods outlined above proved ideal.   
 
4.2.5  Participant observation 
Throughout the PhD, I participated in regional and international meetings on 
marine environmental issues, to observe how different stakeholders interact.  
These meetings also provided an opportunity to keep up-to-date on European and 
UK legislation currently under development, as they were also organized as 
consultation forums.   
 
These meetings also provided an opportunity to make contacts with potential 
interviewees and also to meet in person some of those I had only been able to 
interview by telephone.  I used these experiences as a ‘barometer’ for assessing 
different perspectives on issues related to marine conservation, and the results 
run throughout the thesis.  In cases where I have drawn insights based on my 
observation of a particular stakeholder group’s perspective on an issue, such a 
conclusion is cited as a ‘personal observation’ and the relevant meeting is 
referenced in a footnote.  One of the meetings organized by Coastal Futures, on 
the Ecosystem Approach, produced a summary of questionnaire responses after 
the meeting, in which participants were asked about their perspectives on the 
issue.  I examined this conference output, and refer to it in the discussion on 
implementing an ecosystem approach (see Chapter 7), again citing the meeting in 
a footnote. 
 
Table 4.7 lists the conferences attended during the course of the PhD. 
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Table 4.7  Conferences attended/participant observation opportunities 
 
DATE MEETING/LOCATION 
May 2007 Coastal Futures Conference ‘Implementing the Ecosystem 
Approach’, London, UK 
January 2007 Coastal Futures Annual Conference, London, UK 
November 
2006 
Second Royal Institute for International Affairs Workshop on 
Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing, London, 
UK 
November 
2006 
Coastal Futures Conference ‘Climate Change and the Marine 
Environment’, London, UK 
October 2006 Coastal Futures Conference ‘Towards a European Maritime 
Policy’, London, UK 
July 2006 30th Virginia Law of the Sea Conference ‘Law, Science and 
Ocean Management’, Dublin, Ireland 
June 2006 Coastal Futures Conference ‘The Marine Bill: Options, 
Opportunities and Building Networks’, London, UK 
May 2006 First Royal Institute for International Affairs Workshop on 
Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing, London, 
UK 
January 2006 Coastal Futures Annual Conference, London, UK 
October 2005 Coastal Futures Conference ‘The Marine Bill: Realising the 
Opportunity’, London, UK 
November 
2005 
Presented preliminary research at 3rd International Symposium 
on Deep-Sea Corals, University of Miami, Florida, USA 
November 
2004 
8th International Wildlife Law Conference, New Orleans, 
Louisiana, USA 
 
 
4.3  INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES 
 
At the start of the PhD, in October 2003, the Darwin Mounds emergency closure 
had occurred just two months beforehand, and the original aim of the thesis was 
to elucidate the policy process behind the closure.  As the PhD progressed, the 
UK attempt to ban pair-trawling for sea bass unfolded and this issue came up 
repeatedly during the interview process.  Given that the UK attempted to ban pair 
trawling using the same legal mechanism that had worked for the Darwin 
Mounds, but with a less successful result, it was decided that the policy process 
for this ban would be included in the thesis and explored as a comparative study 
in order to understand the challenges to implementing offshore MPAs.  The next 
two chapters detail these two case studies and related issues from the legal 
analysis and theoretical framework. 
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5 
 
THE DARWIN MOUNDS 
 
  
 
“There are places where the seabed went from looking rich in sea-life 
 to a World War One battlefield, you could see almost nothing there –  
a few scavengers and so on” [UCI-02] 
 
OVERVIEW 
This chapter details the background and policy process for the UK’s first 
offshore MPA, the Darwin Mounds area of cold-water coral off the coast of 
Scotland.  The consequences of the Greenpeace judgment and the mechanism 
whereby the area became protected from deep-sea trawling are outlined in detail, 
based on information gathered from a detailed legal analysis and interviews with 
participants in the policy process.  Lessons learned from the closure and future 
challenges for offshore marine nature conservation are also explored. 
 
5.1  BACKGROUND ON LOPHELIA PERTUSA 
Cold-water corals have been known to scientists and fishermen for hundreds of 
years.  Their scale and abundance has only become evident over the past couple 
of decades, as fisheries and oil exploration activities have expanded into deeper 
waters, with an associated development of increasingly sophisticated survey 
techniques and access to submersibles (Roberts et al., 2006).  Although they 
share many characteristics with their counterparts found in warmer waters, such 
as reef-building in some species, cold-water corals lack zooxanthellae1, preying 
instead upon zooplankton drifting past on currents.  This characteristic allows 
cold-water corals to exist at great depths where sunlight cannot penetrate.  Cold-
water corals are limited to oceanic waters and temperatures between 4°-12°C, 
conditions found in relatively shallow waters (~50-1000m) at high latitudes and 
                                                 
1
 Symbiotic dinoflagellate algae that photosynthesize light to produce energy and valuable 
metaboliotes for their coral hosts. 
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much deeper (up to 4000m) beneath warm water masses at low latitudes (Roberts 
et al., 2006).   
 
Lophelia pertusa (Linnaeus, 1758) is the best studied cold-water reef-forming 
coral species to date (Rogers, 2004). Lophelia is a stony cold-water coral 
(Scleratinia, family Caryophylliidae) found throughout the world’s oceans except 
in polar regions (Fosså, 2002).  The rich concentration of biodiversity associated 
with coral reefs and the slow growth of these ecosystems is well-known (Rogers, 
1999; Husebø et al., 2002; Roberts et al., 2003; Roberts et al., 2006). 
Traditionally deep-water reefs were considered good sites for net and long-line 
fishing. With the advent of bottom-trawling, however, substantial damage to 
Lophelia reefs has been documented (Fosså et al., 2002; Hall-Spencer et al., 
2002; Wheeler et al., 2005) increasing with the development of larger vessels, 
more powerful trawls and gear specially adapted to reaching areas that were 
previously inaccessible. A recent study on Lophelia in Norwegian waters 
determined that between 30-50% of their reefs had been damaged or impacted by 
trawling, with an associated decline in fishing success according to local 
fishermen (Fosså et al., 2002).   
 
5.1.1  Deep-sea fisheries 
In the late 1980s, as traditional stocks of continental-shelf dwelling fish species 
declined and quotas were tightened, large-scale fishing operations began to 
expand along the North-East Atlantic continental shelf break, and markets 
developed for deep-water non-quota species such as roundnose grenadier 
(Coryphaenoides rupestris), orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus), black 
scabbard fish (Aphanopus carbo), deep-sea sharks (leafscale gulper shark 
(Centrophorus swamosus) and Portuguese dogfish (Centroscymnus coelolepis)) 
(Gordon, 2001; Hall-Spencer et al., 2002).  The biology and life history of deep-
sea fish species is poorly understood, but in general they are slow-growing, late 
maturing and low in reproductive capacity.  Consequently, fisheries targeted at 
deep-sea species have a serious effect on populations, which take decades to 
recover or are entirely wiped out after only a few years of exploitation.   
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A member of the oil and gas industry commented on how powered trawling has 
changed the way humans impact the seabed, given the rapid technological 
developments of the twentieth century: 
 
“[Deep-sea] fishing has changed from a man or two, a boat going 
out from small harbors and basically a heritage artisanal activity 
to a true industry.  The vessels cost several million, they have all 
the electronic and fish finding and positioning kit that you could 
ask for and so to consider their management in the same light as 
you would one man and a boat and a couple of crab pots is no 
longer appropriate” [UCI-02]. 
 
Deep-sea fisheries were unregulated in EC waters until the European Council 
adopted total allowable catch quotas (TACs) for deep-water species in 2002 for 
the period 2003-2004.  TACs were allocated according to Member States’ past 
history of deep-sea fishing.  For the UK, this resulted in what the fishing industry 
would consider a disproportionately low allocation in fishing quotas, compared 
with other Member States, as they had a shorter history of partaking in deep-sea 
fishing activities.  As a member of the fishing industry commented:   
 
“Scottish boats had been urged to go there as an alternative new 
fishery at the end of the 80s early 90s so we had active fishing 
there for 3, 4, maybe 5 years whereas the other people had it for a 
longer period”  [UCF-02]. 
 
 
A member of the regulatory community agreed that the UK got the short end of 
the stick when the deep-sea TACs were decided, commenting:  
 
“…we’d also just been completely screwed by the Commission in 
adopting TACs in deep-water stock based on track records, and of 
course that meant the French got everything and we got 5% I 
think” [RC-09]. 
 
This perceived short-changing for UK deep-sea fishing rights compared with 
other European Member States established an underlying feeling of support from 
both the regulatory and fishing communities for the Darwin Mounds closure 
described below, especially given the low level of UK fishing occurring in the 
region.  
 
Chapter 5:  The Darwin Mounds  
 158 
5.2  DISCOVERY OF THE DARWIN MOUNDS 
Prior to the discovery of the Darwin Mounds area, an interviewee who worked 
for oil and gas industry in the late 1980s on surveys near the Magnus field in the 
North Sea described how they took the opportunity to do some deeper water 
sampling west of the Shetland Islands and found that “one of the trawls came up 
completely filled with Lophelia as in live stuff, all sorts of interesting things 
living on it” [UCI-02].  Thus there was some knowledge in the oil and gas 
industry that coral existed in the UK’s offshore waters by the time exploration 
activities commenced to the west of Scotland. 
 
5.2.1  Atlantic Frontier Environment Network (AFEN) 
The Darwin Mounds2 area of Lophelia was first discovered in May 1998 during a 
seabed survey conducted by Southampton Oceanography Centre (SOC3) 
scientists on behalf of the Atlantic Frontier Environment Network (AFEN), a 
partnership between the oil and gas industry and UK government agencies 
including the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Joint Nature 
Conservation Committee (JNCC) and the Scottish Office Agriculture and 
Fisheries Department4 (AFEN, 2000; Bett, 2001).   
 
The AFEN partnership originated soon after the increase in survey activity north 
and west of Scotland that followed the discovery of the Foinaven and 
Schiehallion oil fields in the early 1990s.  In 1994, eight operators established an 
association known as the West of Shetland Group to address environmental 
issues facing industry in the Atlantic Margin.  By 1995, membership had 
expanded to 14 members, the group was renamed AFEN, and it became one of 
the networks within the Atlantic Margin Joint Industry Group (AMJIG).  The 
research commissioned under AFEN was designed with the objective of gaining 
an environmental baseline for the areas being licensed, with a multidisciplinary 
                                                 
2
 The Darwin Mounds were named for the SOC research vessel that undertook the survey, the 
RRS Charles Darwin. 
3
 The Southampton Oceanography Centre (SOC) has since changed its name to the National 
Oceanography Centre, Southampton (NOCS).  It is a research centre jointly owned by the 
Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) and the University of Southampton. 
4
 This department is now known as the Fisheries Research Services (FRS) agency of the Scottish 
Executive. 
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research program that included analyses of the seabed, the benthos, the water 
column, distributions of marine mammals and seabirds, and coastal protection 
plans.  As an interviewee from the regulatory community put it: “this was the 
first time we actually got government advisers and industry all working together 
on a series of coordinated projects in one area” [RC-09].   
 
AFEN’s membership fluctuated over time, with companies’ merging or being 
taken over, and with some losing interest in exploration in the area.  A number of 
similar collaborative groups were established under AMJIG, which have since 
been incorporated into UKOOA (The United Kingdom Offshore Operators 
Association) technical committees (AFEN, 2000).   
 
5.2.2  ‘Scotland’s barrier reef’  
The first AFEN seabed survey west of Scotland took place in 1996, during which 
no signs of Lophelia were found.  The next seabed survey occurred in 1998, on 
areas that had just been licensed for drilling, and “it was during that second 
survey that the particular sidescan sonar system that was being used picked up 
these exotic reflections which when they were investigated turned out to be what 
we now call the Darwin Mounds” [UCI-02]. 
 
The 1998 AFEN-sponsored survey that initially discovered the Darwin Mounds 
was followed in 1999 by a DTI-sponsored survey, again conducted by SOC 
scientists, during which the eastern field of mounds was discovered.  The Darwin 
Mounds were further investigated twice during the summer of 2000, when 
evidence of damage from trawling was visible over half of the eastern fields 
(Bett, 2001; Wheeler et al., 2005).  See Figure 5.1 for a map showing their 
geographical location and distribution. 
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Figure 5.1 Location of the Darwin Mounds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(From: JNCC Report 02 P10, June 2002. Figures courtesy of Brian Bett, 
National Oceanography Centre, Southampton) 
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The Darwin Mounds lie approximately 185 kilometers (100nm) to the northwest 
of Scotland at a depth between 900-1060 meters, scattered across approximately 
1500 square kilometers and supporting significant amounts of Lophelia and 
associated biodiversity, including sessile or hemi-sessile invertebrates and giant 
protozoan xenophyophores (Syringammina fragilissima) (Bett, 2001). The 
hundreds of mounds present in the area are ovoid in shape, measuring up to 75 
meters across, and have a maximum topographic height of 5 meters (Wheeler et 
al., 2005).   
 
At the time of their discovery, the Darwin Mounds were a ‘unique’ example of 
Lophelia growing on sandy mounds (rather than a hard substrate) with a 
distinctive ‘tail’ structure not seen elsewhere, and illustrated in Figure 5.2.  This 
‘uniqueness’ played an important role in moving the policy process for 
protection forward, however more recently, similar Lophelia-topped mounds 
have been found in the Porcupine Seabight to the west of Ireland.  When asked to 
describe the uniqueness of the Mounds, a member of the epistemic community 
commented that:  
 
“They were fairly unique at that time but now we’ve collected 
more data, I think we can say there are other examples, some of 
which have been trawled, some haven’t.  [The Darwin Mounds 
are] only unique in the sense that all of the mounds are different in 
the way people are different, they’re not all identical they do have 
slightly different fauna and flora, they express themselves 
differently, but [they’re] not radically unique” [EC-14]. 
 
 
However, a representative of the fishing industry remarked that from their 
perspective at the time of the closure, “there was no sense of whether this was a 
unique feature or not and [the closure] seemed imposed on the UK fishing 
industry by the government” [UCF-01].  Nevertheless, the perceived 
‘uniqueness’ of the Mounds played an important role in the policy process that 
led to their protection from fishing activities, as discussed later. 
 
 
Chapter 5:  The Darwin Mounds  
 162 
Figure 5.2 Detailed interpretation of the west Darwin Mounds, showing tails 
 
 
 
(From: Masson et al., 2003:164) 
 
 
The damage caused by bottom trawling observed in 2000 appeared to have 
concentrated on the eastern field of mounds, with evidence of multiple trawling 
events (Wheeler et al., 2005).  Where coral areas had been trawled, presumably 
by otter trawls based on the nature of the marks in the sediment, broken coral 
rubble and dead coral were obvious.  Figure 5.3 shows some of the damage to the 
Darwin Mounds area observed by Wheeler et al. (2005) during their 2000 
research cruise, captured by sidescan sonar.  It is impossible to know whether the 
reefs were damaged before or after their discovery, as the first survey used a 
lower-resolution method.  As a scientist involved in the research cruise put it: 
 
“Exactly when those trawling impacts occurred, we don’t know 
and they may well have been there on the earlier data or they may 
have occurred after it but you wouldn’t have detected them 
anyway” [EC-14]. 
 
The damage to the mounds visible in 2000 was unmistakable, however: 
 
“What we […] saw were these trawl marks, and some of them just 
missed the mounds, some of them went straight over the top of the 
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mounds, and you could physically see the impact of that, you could 
see where the trawl mark went over a mound, the impression of the 
mound was much fainter.  There was less upstanding coral 
colonies, it was harder to detect with the side-scan, and sediment 
drift was starting to encroach on the mounds.  And they had been 
reduced to rubble, they were no longer growing and they were 
being slowly covered by mobile sand.  And that was a very graphic 
image, a very obvious image.  A couple of these pictures became 
then […] pictures you put on politicians’ desks and say ‘look this 
is what’s happening, these are very healthy mounds, these are ones 
that have been trawled’ – it was obvious to a lay person what was 
happening and what the impact was” [EC-14].  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Damage to the Darwin Mounds visible in 2000 
 
 
 
(From: Wheeler et al., 2005:811) 
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Photographic evidence of damage to cold-water corals caused by trawling is even 
more dramatic, as illustrated by Figures 5.4 and 5.5.  As a scientist present on the 
2000 research cruise commented: 
 
“I guess from a conservation perspective, when we did that high 
resolution survey that was when we started to see significant 
trawling impacts for the first time.  And great images were taken 
which then became quite pivotal in protecting the mounds, we 
supplied ammunition to the people who were raising awareness 
and wanted to get them protected” [EC-14]. 
 
Even in areas where trawling does not completely destroy corals, it still has an 
impact on coral longevity.  As one scientist noted, based on their analysis of 
samples from the Darwin Mounds and other areas of Lophelia pertusa, 
 
“The lowest genetic diversity we found was around the Darwin 
Mounds.  When we looked at corals form that area we couldn’t 
find any that were reproducing.  It’s almost as though the trawling 
is basically mowing the corals and keeping them at a size where 
they can’t reproduce.  So it’s like a sub-lethal effect, if you like, of 
trawling” [EC-13]. 
 
As most of the corals examined in the Darwin Mounds area appeared to be ‘self-
recruiting’, i.e. they do not have access to genetic material from other reefs for 
reproduction, thus their recovery will “be pretty slow […] recruiting from the 
outside would take tens of hundreds of years” [EC-13]. 
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Figure 5.4  Untrawled Lophelia interspersed with Mycale sponges at 
Nordleska, West Norway, May 1999 (depth 200m) 
 
 
(From Hall-Spencer et al., 2002:510) 
 
Figure 5.5 Trawled Lophelia in the Iverryggen area, West Norway, May 1999 
(depth 200m).  The arrow indicates a trench from towed fishing gear. 
 
 
(From: Hall-Spencer et al., 2002:510)  
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5.2.3  Greenpeace Atlantic Frontier Campaign 
The aforementioned Foinaven and Schiehallion oil fields came on line for 
production in 1997 and 1998, respectively.  At roughly the same time, 
Greenpeace launched an Atlantic Frontier climate change campaign aimed at 
halting further oil exploitation and beginning a phase-out of fossil fuels.  
Whereas previous climate change campaigns had been aimed at impacts and 
were “negative and overwhelming” [LC-04], the Greenpeace Atlantic Frontier 
campaign aimed at the other end, i.e. the production and use of fossil fuels.  A 
member of the oil and gas community commented: 
 
“Greenpeace were running a campaign at the time, ‘no new oil to 
the west of Shetland’, saying we should stop and have renewable 
energy and the government said yes we should try renewable 
energy but we can’t just stop because we’re running out of oil and 
gas and the alternative is to import it from places like Russia or 
Azerbaijan or places where the impact on the environment of the 
production of oil and gas might be much more severe” [UCI-03]. 
 
Greenpeace first targeted the 17th Round of licensing5 on the UK Continental 
Shelf (for the period 1996-1997), charging the UK Government with not taking 
the Habitats Directive into account when taking decisions about the areas to be 
licensed.  This first effort was unsuccessful as their application was delayed6 and 
came too late in the licensing round, and it was overturned in a House of Lords 
plenary case.  Their second attempt, aimed at the 19th Round (for 2000-2001), 
went in earlier and was successful.  This ruling7 is commonly referred to as the 
Greenpeace judgment.  As a member of the oil and gas industry observed: 
 
“It was quite ironic really that it was the oil industry and the 
AFEN group that was leading the investigations as to whether or 
not Lophelia was present in areas of licensed activity or not and 
then Greenpeace – the irony is amazing in that in 1996 nothing 
had been found but they still brought a court case and then 
subsequently 1998 the Darwin Mounds were found” [UCI-02]. 
                                                 
5
 Licensing of the UK offshore environment for oil and gas development began during the North 
Sea boom in the 1960s.  For further information, see the DTI website: 
(www.og.dti.gov.uk/upstream/licensing). 
6
 The delay involved a three-day hearing to decide whether Greenpeace had leave to apply for 
judicial review (i.e. to determine whether their case was arguable and worthy of taking further). 
7
 R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Greenpeace (No. 2) [2000] 2 CMLR 
94.  
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Another representative from the oil industry emphasized that “Greenpeace’s case 
really wasn’t anything to do with the Habitats Directive, it was to do with 
opposition to the oil and gas industry, period” [NGO-04]. 
 
A member of the legal community pointed out that Greenpeace acts differently 
from other NGOs, as “it takes direct action, it’s not warm and cuddly” [LC-04] 
and it has a role to play in European environmental policy, “coming out with 
challenging action and litigation” [LC-04].  This interviewee went on to say that 
it was their impression that “other NGOs never thought Greenpeace would win 
the judgment, and didn’t even consider going to court” [LC-04].  While other 
NGOs “have a more open relationship with the government, negotiating and 
working things through, Greenpeace is willing to take more risks” [LC-04].  It 
also “has leverage: it raises a case and then walks off” [LC-04] leaving other 
NGOs to continue the campaign, as did the WWF in the case of the Darwin 
Mounds.  A member of the epistemic community expressed the same sentiment, 
commenting that “Greenpeace thought the job was done at the end of the case 
and it was sort of left up to WWF to continue that work” [EC-13]. 
 
5.3  GREENPEACE JUDGMENT 
In the Greenpeace judgment of November 1999, the English High Court ruled 
that the European territory to which the Habitats Directive applies includes areas 
over which Member States exercise sovereign rights beyond territorial waters 
(i.e. beyond 12nm). As a result of this judgment, the UK is required to apply the 
Habitats Directive to the 200 nm limit of its Exclusive Fishing Zone (EFZ)8 
including the water column and seabed, and other Member States are following 
suit, designating protected areas (SACs) under the Habitats Directive in their 
offshore waters. In addition to its EFZ, the UK also claims jurisdiction over its 
                                                 
8
 The UK has a 200nm Exclusive Fishing Zone (EFZ) rather than EEZ, pursuant to section 1(1) 
of the Fishery Limits Act 1976.   
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Continental Shelf,9 extending up to 340 nm from the baseline, but covering only 
the seabed.   
 
Following the outcome of the Greenpeace judgment (discussed in more detail 
below), the Offshore Petroleum Activities (Conservation of Habitats) 
Regulations10 were released in 2001, governing industry activity in the UK EFZ.  
The UK Government has since been revising its existing national legislation, the 
1994 Conservation (Natural Habitats etc.) Regulations, in order to transpose the 
Habitats Directive and its predecessor, the 1979 Birds Directive, into UK law in 
its offshore waters.  This extension will encompass not only the UK’s EFZ, as 
stipulated in the Greenpeace judgment, but the entire UK Continental Shelf (CS).  
This process has been prolonged but the new Regulations are due to come into 
effect in 2007 (DEFRA, pers. comm.).  Given the total land area of the UK is 
244,101 km2 and that of its territorial sea is approximately 161,200 km2, this 
extension over the UK Continental Shelf would add an additional 706,200 km2, 
resulting in a total extent of UK area (territorial and offshore waters, and land 
area) subject to protection of 1,111,501 km2 or a 2.74 fold increase in area 
protected by the UK implementation of the Habitats Directive.  
 
5.3.1  Territorial scope of the Habitats Directive 
In July 1999, prior to the conclusion of the judgment and in response to a request 
for clarification from Greenpeace, the European Commission published a 
Communication to the Council and European Parliament on ‘Fisheries 
Management and Nature Conservation in the Marine Environment’11 in response 
to a request from Greenpeace.  In its discussion of application of the Habitats 
Directive, the Commission observed that: 
 
“The provisions of the Habitats Directive automatically apply to 
the marine habitats and marine species located in territorial waters 
(maximum 12 miles).  However, if a Member State exerts its 
                                                 
9
 Section 1(1) of the Continental Shelf Act, 1964: any rights exercisable outside territorial waters 
with respect to the seabed and subsoil and their natural resources (except in relation to coal) are 
vested in the Crown.  
10
 Statutory Instrument 2001 Number 1754. 
11
 COM (1999) 363 final. 
Chapter 5:  The Darwin Mounds  
 169 
sovereign rights in an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical 
miles [...] it thereby considers itself competent to enforce national 
laws in that area, and consequently the Commission considers in 
this case that the Habitats Directive also applies, in that 
Community legislation is an integral part of national legislation”.12  
 
A member of the legal community interviewed commented on the Commission’s 
perspective: 
 
“[The Commission] had nothing to lose by extending the 
jurisdiction of the HD out to 200nm, it extends their power base.  
The drafters of the Birds Directive were thinking of the wider 
European context, it wasn’t limited” [LC-04]. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the 1999 Greenpeace judgment extended the applicability 
of the EC Habitats Directive to the 200nm EFZ boundary of the UK.  Unlike 
other legal proceedings addressing the Directive, which had focused on the 
exclusion of particular areas from designation as SACs, this case focused on the 
inclusion of the Darwin Mounds area of Lophelia as a SAC.  The judgment 
involved a critical issue for implementation of the Directive, namely the territory 
to which the Directive applies.  As the judgment’s section on geographical scope 
states, ‘A Directive which includes in its aims the protection of, inter alia, 
Lophelia and cetaceans will only achieve those aims, on a purposive 
construction, if it extends beyond territorial waters’.13  The EC Treaty only deals 
with the issue of territory on a very general level.  Article 299 of the amended 
EC Treaty of 1992 (Maastricht Treaty) states ‘This Treaty shall apply to…’ 
followed by the names of all fifteen Member States.  According to general 
principles of international law, this indicates that the Treaty binds the Member 
States with respect to their entire sovereign territory (Jans, 2000).  As Article 299 
does not contain any reference to the territory of the Member States, it cannot be 
regarded as limiting the territorial scope of the Treaty.   
 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., section 5.2.2.  
13
 R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Greenpeace (supra, note 7), section 
[38]. 
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In addition, during the Greenpeace judgment, Lord Justice Kay cited the 
discrepancy in early versions of the Habitats Directive, namely that it was 
originally drafted as applying to Member States’ EEZs and this qualifier was 
later dropped (see Chapter 2, section 2.5.3).  This omission is significant in that 
the Secretary of State and the Oil Companies were able to argue that the 
European Council had intended to limit the Habitats Directive to land and the 
territorial sea.  Greenpeace countered, however, that this drafting was due to a 
desire to bring the Habitats Directive in line with its predecessor, the Birds 
Directive. 
 
In determining the geographical extent of the Habitats Directive, the Greenpeace 
judgment proceeded along a line of reasoning touching on several issues 
summarized as follows.  The first point of discussion involved the concept of 
maintaining consistency with the object and purpose of the Habitats Directive, 
i.e. to promote the maintenance of biodiversity.  This purpose was viewed as 
being most achievable through the extension of the Directive’s geographic scope 
to the continental shelf and its superajacent waters, given that cetaceans only 
spend a limited amount of time in territorial waters and Lophelia is generally 
found beyond the 12nm limit.  Cetaceans are listed in the Directive’s Annex IV 
(a), and although Lophelia is not listed specifically, reef habitats are and it was 
determined that the purpose of the Directive in relation to protecting the species 
listed in its Annexes would be best achieved by extending its scope.  
 
The judgment then explored the ‘nature of things’ line of argumentation, i.e. to 
the extent that a Member State has competence in relation to the continental 
shelf, so does the Community.  This concept was developed by the ECJ in the 
1976 Kramer case,14 concluding that the rule-making authority of the 
Community extended to fishing on the high seas.  This decision was upheld by a 
                                                 
14
 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Kramer [1976] ECR 1279:  ‘It follows […] from the very nature of 
things that the rule-making authority of the Community ratione materiae also extends – in so 
far as the Member States have similar authority under public international law – to fishing on 
the high seas’. 
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subsequent judgment, the 1993 Drift-Net case (Jans, 2000).15  In his analysis of 
the Greenpeace judgment, Jans (2000) regards these two preceding cases as 
having come to the following conclusion: in so far as Member States are 
competent under international law to protect the environment outside their own 
territories, the Community must also be regarded as being competent to take such 
measures.   
 
The next issue discussed in the judgment involved practice under Community 
law as applied by the UK.  Greenpeace noted that the EC had applied many of its 
laws to activities carried out in areas beyond territorial waters (including laws 
relating to oil exploration and pollution control etc.), and the UK had 
subsequently transposed these into national legislation.  International 
conventions were also discussed, including the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) and UNCLOS, and the interrelated nature of these Conventions 
and the Habitats Directive was pointed out, furthering the necessity for all of 
them to apply to the same geographic area, i.e. beyond territorial waters.  UK 
legislation extending beyond the 12nm mark was cited, including the 1985 Food 
and Environmental Protection Act, the 1990 Environmental Protection Act and 
the 1998 Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Cooperation Convention) Regulations.  The view of the Commission was also 
examined, namely the Communication cited at the beginning of this section, 
which recommends the transposition of the Habitats Directive into national 
legislation in such a way that it applies to a Member State’s EEZ/EFZ as well.  
International treaty obligations were mentioned again at this point, emphasizing 
the CBD, UNCLOS, CMS, ASCOBANS and OSPAR, all of which apply beyond 
territorial waters. 
 
The judgment then explored a few issues brought up by the Secretary of State, 
who emphasized the land-based nature of the Habitats Directive and the 
discrepancy in the early drafts of the Directive with its final version, as discussed 
earlier.  Some of the language in the Directive can be viewed as being land-
                                                 
15
 Case C-405/92 Etablissements Armand Mondiet v. Société Armement Islais [1993] ECR I-
6133.   
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based, using terminology such as ‘landscape’ and ‘land-use planning’, therefore 
the Secretary of State argued that the term ‘territory’ should have a more narrow 
definition.  However, Lord Justice Kay agreed with Greenpeace that the term 
‘territory’ is plainly used in Community law as extending beyond territorial 
waters.   
 
The Secretary of State also submitted that substantial legal difficulties would be 
caused by extending the Habitats Directive, in two ways in particular.  First, it 
was noted that the CFP seriously circumscribes the ability of Member States to 
adopt measures to deal with the problems caused by fishing, however the most 
relevant Regulation (3760/9216) which so limits the powers of Member States 
post-dated the Habitats Directive by eight months.  Second, the Secretary of 
State cited UNCLOS Article 78.2, which states that the exercise of the rights of 
the coastal state over the continental shelf ‘must not infringe or result in any 
unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other 
states as provided for in this Convention’.  The Secretary of State pointed to this 
as an indicator towards a narrower geographical scope of the Habitats Directive.  
However, Lord Justice Kay stated that this submission was difficult in that there 
is no hierarchy of norms or interests recognized by the law, and it is virtually 
inevitable that tensions will arise between different international regimes of 
protection and entitlement (such tensions are one of the key issues this thesis is 
exploring, see Chapter 6).  The Greenpeace judgment concluded with Lord 
Justice Kay agreeing that the Habitats Directive applied to the UK CS and to the 
superajacent waters up to a limit of 200nm, and stating he decided not to refer 
any of the issues raised in the judgment to the European Court of Justice.   
 
A related issue raised by the High Court during the Greenpeace judgment 
involved the question of whether or not there is a legal duty not to affect the 
natural habitats of Community interest. The Lophelia site under question in this 
case was not specifically listed in the Habitats Directive (i.e. the species is not 
mentioned in the Annexes although ‘reefs’ are) nor had the location yet been 
                                                 
16
 Council Regulation 3760/92 of 20 December 1992 establishing a Community system for 
fisheries and aquaculture [1992], OJ L 389, p.1. 
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proposed as a SCI or SAC.  With regard to case law relating to the Birds 
Directive, in particular the Santoña Marshes case,17 a Member State cannot 
escape its duty to protect a site which, according to relevant scientific criteria, 
deserves protection.  However it is not clear whether this principle can be applied 
to the Habitats Directive as well, though the Commission argues that it is 
possible in its publication on ‘Managing Natura 2000 Sites’ (European 
Commission, 2000).  Jans (2000:386) observes, ‘[The fact] that the drafting 
history of the Directive provides a serious argument for a more limited territorial 
scope, did not seem to play a very important role in the High Court’s judgment 
and it shows once again, the ‘power’ of purposive interpretation of EC law in 
general and environmental law in particular’. 
 
5.4  DARWIN MOUNDS CLOSURE 
The sequence of events that led to the closure of the Darwin Mounds area to 
bottom-trawling is outlined in Table 5.1. Following their discovery and the 
outcome of the Greenpeace judgment, in 2001 Margaret Beckett (then Secretary 
of State for the Environment and Rural Affairs) made a commitment to protect 
the Darwin Mounds as a SAC under the Habitats Directive. From 1999 to 2001, 
the UK’s Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) undertook a two-year 
research project to identify offshore marine sites for protection under the 
Habitats and Birds Directives, resulting in the completion of a comprehensive 
report on implementing the Directives in UK offshore waters (Johnston et al., 
2001).  
 
Another report was produced by WWF18 and released in May 2002, suggesting a 
management framework for the Darwin Mounds as the UK’s first offshore SAC 
(Gubbay et al., 2002).  The WWF campaign picked up where Greenpeace had 
                                                 
17
 Case C-355/90 Commission v. Spain [1993] ECR I-4221. 
18
 WWF produced several documents advocating a closure of the Darwin Mounds area, including 
a June 2001 report to OSPAR entitled ‘The Darwin Mounds – A Potential MPA’ 
(www.ngo.grida.no/wwfneap/Publication/briefings/DarwinMounds.pdf), a September 2001 
report entitled ‘The Darwin Mounds: Out of Sight and Still Under Threat’ 
(www.wwf.org.uk/filelibrary/pdf/darwin_mounds.pdf) and an October 2001 Factsheet on Coral 
Reefs Threatened off Britain 
(www.ngo.grida.no/wwfneap/Projects/Reports/Darwin_Mounds_Facts.pdf).  
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left off following the outcome of the Greenpeace judgment: assuring that the 
commitment made by the UK would be taken through and the Darwin Mounds 
would be protected under UK law from bottom-trawling fisheries.  By April 
2003, WWF spoke out in the media19 calling specifically on the Secretary of 
State to uphold the commitments she had made 18 months earlier. 
 
                                                 
19
 “Government’s Failure Trashes Scotland’s Barrier Reef” 23 April 2003, WWF Scotland 
website (www.wwf.org.uk/news/scotland/n_0000000871.asp); “Scottish Barrier Reef Under 
Threat” 23 April 2003, BBC News website (//news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/2968435.stm). 
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Table 5.1 Timeline of Darwin Mounds MPA Designation  
DATE ACTION OUTCOME 
1998 
MAY 
Discovery of Darwin Mounds by 
AFEN survey 
 
1999 and 2000 Darwin Mounds revisited, damage 
visible 
 
1999  
NOVEMBER 
Greenpeace judgment UK required to 
extend Habitats 
Directive offshore 
1999 – 2001 JNCC process established by DEFRA 
to identify offshore Natura 2000 sites 
JNCC Report 325: 
Implementing 
Natura 2000 in UK 
Offshore Waters  
2000 
JULY 
European Commission requested 
ICES to provide advice on cold-water 
corals 
Reports in 2001, 
2002 and 2003 on 
Lophelia in ICES 
waters 
2001 
OCTOBER 
Secretary of State Beckett commits to 
protecting area as an SAC 
Publicity 
2002 
MAY 
WWF-UK Report on Darwin Mounds 
SAC 
 
2002  
OCTOBER 
UK first approached European 
Commission regarding protecting area 
Positive indications 
from Commission  
2002 
DECEMBER 
Commission agreed on TACs for 
deep-sea species in 2003 and 2004 
 
2003  
JANUARY 
Revised CFP Regulation 2371/2002 
came into effect 
Provided 
mechanism for 
emergency closure 
2003  
MARCH 
UK held informal discussions with 
European Commission and other 
Member States 
Compromise on 
degree and extent 
of closure 
2003  
JUNE 
UK made formal approach (in writing) 
to European Commission for action 
under CFP Regulation 2371/2002 
Positive response 
from Commission 
2003  
JULY 
UK made formal request for closure of 
Darwin Mounds area 
Accepted 
2003  
AUGUST 
Emergency closure (Regulation 
1475/2003) 
 
2003 
SEPTEMBER 
Proposal for permanent Regulation 
submitted 
 
2004 
FEBRUARY 
Emergency closure extended a further 
six months (Regulation 263/2004) 
 
2004  
MARCH 
Closure made permanent (Regulation 
602/2004) 
 
(From De Santo and Jones, 2007:8) 
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In addition to the draft Regulations mentioned earlier, in the late summer of 
2003, the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
released a consultation document proposing the Darwin Mounds as a candidate 
Special Area of Conservation under the Habitats Directive (DEFRA, 2003b). 
DEFRA subsequently informed the European Commission that the site would 
become the UK’s first offshore SAC under the Habitats Directive. 
 
5.4.1  CFP emergency closure 
While the Habitats Directive provides an important framework for protecting 
habitats and species in Europe, the primary mechanism currently available for 
enforcing areas closed to fishing in the marine environment (beyond 6nm) lies in 
the revised Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), referred to as the Basic Regulation.  
A review of the process that went into the revision of the CFP is given earlier in 
the thesis as well as an explanation of its emergency closure provisions (Chapter 
2, section 2.4.3). It is worth reiterating that Article 7 of the Basic Regulation 
allows for the Commission to apply emergency measures ‘if there is evidence of 
a serious threat to the conservation of living aquatic resources, or to the marine 
eco-system resulting from fishing activities and requiring immediate action’.  It 
was this mechanism that allowed for the initial protection of the Darwin Mounds 
area. 
 
5.4.2  Evolution of the UK’s first offshore MPA 
While at first glance the closure of the Darwin Mounds area may appear to have 
been a somewhat quick and straightforward process, taking a relatively short 
period of time to move from a temporary to permanent ban on bottom-trawling in 
the area (i.e. seven months), it required a careful, step-wise approach on the 
UK’s part with a certain degree of compromise.  In October 2002 the UK made 
its first approach to the European Commission, alerting them to the site and 
indicating a need for action to be taken, although no mechanism yet existed for 
implementing a protected area in offshore waters.   
 
“Looking back at that letter, it leaves slightly open what we 
wanted them to do exactly.  And I think that in turn reflected the 
fact we weren’t clear what the instruments were to implement the 
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closure.  That stemmed in part from the fact that we haven’t 
implemented our regulations offshore in any case.  And also there 
weren’t very clear powers under the CFP as it was, it was the old 
CFP Regulation 3760/92” [RC-03]. 
 
With the advent of the reformed CFP in 2003, however, a mechanism became 
available and the UK began informal discussions with the Commission about 
whether and how to use the emergency closure provisions.   
 
“It was clearer that the remit of the CFP also involved protection 
of the marine environment from the impact of fishing, that was 
made much more specific… What was definitely more explicit was 
the fact that you could use the Regulation to request emergency 
measures to protect the environment as opposed to just protecting 
fisheries or fishing grounds, or however it was phrased before.  So 
we started to think that was probably the best approach and I 
would say around that stage the baton passed to us in Fisheries to 
get this moving because the [UK’s] offshore regulations has still 
not got anywhere so it was obvious that wasn’t going to provide 
any solution” [RC-03]. 
 
As this would be the first use of the mechanism, and as it was the first closure 
proposed for nature conservation objectives, there was care taken by both the UK 
and the European Commission in order to ensure that the proposal was properly 
assessed and that no poor precedents would be set, with the UK wanting to be 
certain the Commission was on board.  Consequently it aimed to provide the 
most solid case possible for closure based on the best evidence available and 
recommendations from the JNCC and the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES) Advisory Committee on Ecosystems (ACE).  As a 
member of the regulatory community involved in negotiating the closure 
commented: 
 
“I think there was a slight hesitancy because this would be the first 
use of the emergency measures provision and I think… they didn’t 
want the first use of this to fail, they actually wanted it to succeed.   
So in some ways, there was almost a sort of working together to 
make sure we put to them the best case we possibly could and 
covered all the areas of concern that they could see other Member 
States would raise.  The other part of the reason for doing that is 
you’ve seen the timing of all this, you put it in and Member States 
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have only got five days, now if they’re unsure about it they’re more 
likely to say no than anything” [RC-03].  
 
The ICES advisory process had begun a bit earlier, in July 2000, when the 
European Commission made a request for urgent advice ‘to identify areas where 
cold-water corals may be affected by fishing’ (ICES, 2001).  Subsequently ICES 
established a Study Group on Mapping the Occurrence of Cold Water Corals 
(SGCOR) which compiled maps identifying cold-water coral areas in the North-
East Atlantic.  These maps were then circulated to ACE and a selection of 
working group chairs for comment, in order to enable ICES (through ACE) to 
provide advice to the European Community (ICES 2001, 2002 and 2003). 
 
Concurrent with its aforementioned dialogue with the European Commission in 
2003, the UK also pursued informal discussions with other Member States, 
targeting those with fishing interests in the area (primarily France and Spain) and 
others supportive of a closure in the area (Ireland and the Netherlands).  As a 
member of the UK regulatory community described it:   
 
“[We then took] negotiating tactics – who do we need to talk to, 
who do we need to get on board, as well as the Commission.   I 
mean there’s no point for the Commission bringing out a proposal 
which the Member States are going to just shout down, it needs to 
be a process of awareness-raising about the environment and the 
impact of fishing on it, who’s fishing there, just the general process 
of getting support for something the UK sees as a priority. […]  
We didn’t think there was that much concern about the area being 
closed because other Member States could see the case for closing 
it, and we also felt that quotas could be met by fishing outside that 
area anyway so you wouldn’t damage the fishing prospects” [RC-
03]. 
 
The UK continued its step-wise approach to the Commission in subsequent 
months, with a formal letter expressing their intention to pursue an emergency 
closure in June 2003 before actually making the formal request on 24 July 2003.  
No objections were received from other Member States during the five-day 
comment period, and a six-month emergency closure went forward, under 
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Regulation 1475/200320 of 27 August 2003.  However it is worth noting that as 
this was the first use of the emergency closure mechanism, the Commission may 
not have “allowed themselves enough time to clear all their formal procedures 
properly” [RC-03] in having such a short comment period, especially as it was 
also “the summer, when the Commission shuts down” [RC-03].  France did not 
object to the emergency closure, which “may have been just [due to] the sheer 
speed: they only had five days and it was the summer” [RC-03].   
 
This temporary closure was extended for a further six months under Regulation 
263/200421 of 14 February 2004, during which the UK prepared a proposal for a 
permanent closure of the area, which involved amending Regulation 850/9822 of 
30 March 1998 on the conservation of fishery resources through technical 
measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms.  The preparation of 
the permanent closure regulation began as early as September 2003, only a 
month after the emergency closure had taken effect.  As a member of the 
regulatory community noted, this quick response indicated the Commission was 
on board: 
 
“We had a proposal for a permanent regulation in September 
2003, which was quite swift for the Commission given it was 
summer and they only sort of get back into business in September.  
So I mean that showed that they were serious about taking this 
forward” [RC-03]. 
 
The permanent ban on bottom-trawling in the Darwin Mounds area came into 
effect as Regulation 602/200423 on 22 March 2004, adding the geographical 
location of the Darwin Mounds area to Article 30 of Regulation 850/98 in its 
section on restrictions on the uses of demersal towed gears. 
 
                                                 
20
 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1475/2003 on the protection of deep-water coral reefs from 
the effects of trawling in an area north west of Scotland. OJ L 211, 21.8.2003, p.14. 
21
 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 263/2004 of 15 February 2004 extending for six months the 
application of Regulation (EC) No. 1475/2003, OJ L 46, 17.2.2004, p.11. 
22
 Council Regulation 850/98 of 30 March 1998 for the conservation of fishery resources through 
technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms. OJ L 125, 24.7.98, p.1. 
23
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 602/2004 of 22 March 2004 amending Regulation (EC) No. 
850/98 as regards the protection of deepwater coral reefs from the effects of trawling in an area 
north west of Scotland. OJ L 97, 1.4.2004, p.30. 
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In the drafting of the permanent regulation, more formal negotiations with other 
Member States came into play, as “there were concerns from France and Spain 
about the closure” [RC-03].  While Spain pressed for pelagic fishing to still be 
allowed in the Darwin Mounds area, France disputed the boundaries of the 
closure area recommended by ICES.  Spanish concern focused on making sure 
“that the measures stayed targeted at what had been demonstrated to be 
damaging activities in the area” [RC-03].  The ICES advice had primarily 
focused on bottom trawling, and although there was some discussion during the 
drafting of the closure regarding the impact from long-lining and gill-netting, 
“there wasn’t enough information to justify targeting those other types of 
fishing” [RC-03].  However, as a member of the regulatory community 
commented, there was little to no pelagic fishing occurring in the area in any 
case, and this compromise was more symbolic than necessary to the Spanish: 
 
“Unfortunately pelagic fishermen are of course very vocal 
lobbying, they don’t catch any fish in the area of the Darwin 
Mounds but they made a case that was accepted that they had to be 
able to fish there!  They don’t catch anything – I must admit we 
were a but shocked at the government’s acceptance that pelagic 
trawling had to be permitted because it doesn’t happen” [RC-07]. 
 
Nevertheless, the Spanish pushed for pelagic fishing to continue in the area, and, 
as one of the UK negotiators described it: 
 
“We […] made a calculation that let’s restrict this to the most 
damaging form of fishing, we’re more likely to get agreement to 
permanent regulation.  If we started to extend it on the basis ‘well 
there’s a possibility [of] long-lining or gill-netting…’ we’d have 
got a sort of alliance of France and Spain [who] could possibly 
[gain] enough support amongst other Member States to see it off 
because it all ends up as qualified majority voting” [RC-03]. 
 
The second compromise, on the extent of the area closed, resulted from pressure 
by the French: 
 
“French industry itself started to cast doubt on the ICES advice 
and query it, peeling apart things like they’ve got a reference 
slightly wrong in the report.  I think it was an attempt to just 
discredit it. […] It was a smokescreen really, but they were 
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obviously very concerned about the impact on their fishing 
opportunities” [RC-03]. 
 
The borders of the original square-shaped ICES ACE recommendation for a 
closed area around the Darwin Mounds were altered, with the North East and 
North West corners removed, resulting in a hexagon-shape.  Figure 5.6 shows the 
original ICES proposal for a closure, which was modified to what is shown in 
Figure 5.7, the final area surrounding the Darwin Mounds permanently closed to 
bottom-trawling.  The UK was sympathetic to French concerns, as: 
 
“The ICES report jumped on a square and said most fisheries 
closures are squares, it’s easier to enforce, it should be this area.  
Now we felt France actually had a point when they started to 
concentrate on this […] as a key issue because we’ve got all sorts 
of closures under the CFP which are all sorts of strange shapes, so 
there isn’t any need for it to be a basic square to enforce correctly.  
And we could see, I mean the discussions were becoming quite 
protracted, it was just going round and round, we wanted to make 
sure we got the most effective protection in.  […] We agreed to 
consider a French suggestion.  […] So we accepted the principle 
that we could still enforce an area shaped like that. […] That 
seemed to be sufficient to get the French on board and that was it” 
[RC-03]. 
 
The closed area is slightly larger than the extent of the feature to allow for a 
‘buffer zone’ such that trawls cannot accidentally cross the Mounds at the end of 
their 1.5 – 2km long trawl warps.    
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Figure 5.6  Darwin Mounds Closure as recommended by the ICES Advisory 
Committee on Ecosystems 
 
 
 
(Reproduced with permission from the 2003 ICES Report of the Study Group on 
Cold Water Corals, CM 2003/ACE:02, Copenhagen) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7  Permanent Darwin Mounds Closure 
 
 
(Reproduced with permission from the JNCC) 
 
Chapter 5:  The Darwin Mounds  
 183 
 
5.5  WHY A SUCCESS?  CAUTION AND COMPROMISE 
In addition to the stepwise approach made by the UK and the compromise made 
on the degree and extent of the closure during the negotiation process, other 
external factors provided incentives for the closure to succeed.  It should be 
reiterated that from a legal standpoint, a bifurcation between nature conservation 
and fisheries management exists in the European Union.  While the former 
remains the remit of Member States, the European Commission retains exclusive 
legislative jurisdiction over fisheries.  Consequently, when a Member State is 
faced with a nature conservation issue that results from fishing activity, before 
the provisions of the Basic Regulation came into effect there was no mechanism 
available to handle such a situation.  As the first use of the revised CFP’s 
emergency closure mechanism, there was an incentive for the Commission to 
make certain that the Darwin Mounds closure went through.  For the UK’s part, 
it was imperative that the most robust case for closure possible be made, and the 
role played by the JNCC report and ICES ACE recommendations to the 
European Commission during the negotiations process should not be overlooked.  
This irrefutability is of particular importance given that Article 7 of the Basic 
Regulation requires ‘evidence of a serious threat to the conservation of living 
aquatic resources’ for the Commission to act.  The fact that these corals had been 
revisited and damage from trawling had been clearly visible made a strong case 
for an immediate closure.  
 
An important factor in their protection was the ‘uniqueness’ of the Darwin 
Mounds, with their ‘tail-like’ shapes, associated fauna and the fact that the corals 
had colonized sandy rather than hard substrate. At the time of their discovery, the 
Darwin Mounds were the only example of these characteristics, however since 
then, similar (though not identical) situations have been found for Lophelia in 
other areas.  A member of the epistemic community commented that “if you go 
back to the literature at that time, they were ‘unique’.  Ten years later, not even, 
they are not all that unique. […] Biologists have the strong tendency when they 
find something, they think its unique, but when you look a bit closer…” [EC-10]. 
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In addition, the area under question was relatively small, covering less than 1500 
km2, and lacked the intensive fishing history of other nearby areas containing 
Lophelia, such as the Rockall Bank.  Nevertheless, there was concern on the UK 
side that fishing in the area could increase in the summer of 2003 following the 
first allotment of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) quotas for deep-sea fish species 
released in 2002 (Council Regulation 2340/2002).  As a member of the 
regulatory community involved in the policy process commented: 
 
“We weren’t happy they were selling TACs for these species, we 
didn’t think there was enough information to do that, we voted 
against it.  So I think the Commission were amenable to do 
something to address our concerns on that deep-water settlement 
in any case and they had left open with us the suggestion that we 
came back to them and put forward some areas for possible 
closure to address our concerns. So they were probably more 
amenable to sorting something out on the Darwin Mounds because 
of that as well” [RC-03]. 
 
This threat added further impetus to the UK’s efforts to secure a closure as 
quickly as possible.  In addition, momentum was maintained at both the national 
and European level by the environmental NGO community, notably the WWF 
with its aforementioned 2002 report on the Darwin Mounds as a potential SAC 
(Gubbay et al., 2002). 
 
From the fishing industry’s perspective, there was a mixed reaction to the 
Darwin Mounds closure, as to whether it was “good or bad, necessary or 
unnecessary” [UCF-02].  As stakeholder involvement in fishery decision-making 
has increased with the establishment of Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) 
under the revised CFP, members of the fishing industry commented that the 
Darwin Mounds closure would not easily be repeated.  Interestingly, while 
members of the regulatory community and scientific experts felt strongly that the 
certainty of the information presented showing evidence of damage to the 
Mounds had played a pivotal role in the establishment of the closure, fishing 
industry representatives commented on the lack of information they were party to 
during the process, and how their increased participation in the policy process 
might have resulted in a different outcome.  As one industry representative put it: 
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“I suspect in my experience since [the Darwin Mounds closure], 
that a lot of the opinions would have been made on pretty 
insufficient information.  I think we have a much better 
relationship […] with government and NGOs and the agencies and 
all the other relevant people, so I think if the same thing were to 
happen again, we would be part of the process from a much earlier 
stage and have access to accurate information to feed back to our 
members. So it would not necessarily change the opinions, but at 
least it would be more informed opinions” [UCF-02]. 
 
Another fishing industry representative commented that with the development of 
the RACs and greater stakeholder participation in European marine policy, the  
“consultation process is more effective nowadays on certain aspects because 
we’re working a lot closer with the scientific community and parts of the 
government” [UCF-01].   
 
Members of the regulatory community involved in enforcement were also 
positive about their communication with policy-makers, yet expressed concern 
that “we’re not seeing, […] this interaction to at least alert ministers to potential 
difficulties that might occur, to fisheries ministers in particular” [RC-02].  
Fisheries Protection Officers are the frontline when dealing with infringements in 
protected areas, and take risks.  Regulatory authorities involved in enforcement 
are understandably concerned about putting their Officers in a dangerous 
situation, and make every effort to maintain a dialogue with policy-makers, as 
one authority commented: 
 
“We always want to ask the fisheries department in particular to 
keep us posted of activities that may have an impact at the end of 
the day on what our guys are doing on the front line.  [Especially] 
if somebody’s going to get shot at in the harbor because 
somebody’s upset about something that’s happened” [RC-02]. 
 
Consequently, while opportunities for consultation have improved between the 
fishing industry and UK government, there is some concern in the enforcement 
community that the implications of conservation-driven legislation “which will 
exclude people who currently do things at sea from doing that and having a 
major impact on their potential for earning a living” [RC-02] need to be taken 
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more fully into account.  This concern is understandable, given the fact that MPA 
enforcers occupy a sometimes precarious position in between the users and 
policy-makers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Although the closure of the Darwin Mounds area can be viewed as a political 
success, there are several outstanding issues that need to be addressed.  The 
current method of enforcement relies on Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS), 
satellite transmitters that relay a fishing vessel’s location back to shore via a 
Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite network.  While theoretically an 
efficient means of tracking fishing activity, it is only recently that UK fishermen 
have been required to use VMS boxes without ‘off’ switches, and this 
requirement is not extended throughout the EU’s fishing fleets.  Spain and 
Portugal have something similar, but the UK’s technology is “state of the art” 
[RC-02] in comparison.  French fishing boats however “still have VMS you can 
turn off, so [enforcement agencies] need to be quite acute about watching what 
they’re doing” [RC-07].  In addition, the current system relies on data sent every 
two hours, a rate that may not be sufficient to detect bottom-trawling activity on 
the edge of a closed area.  A representative of the UK fishing industry remarked 
that fishermen felt they bore the financial burden of VMS, as “there was 
European funding […] but the [UK] government took the money and built a 
control centre and got the industry to buy the equipment themselves” [UCF-01]. 
 
A member of  the regulatory community involved in enforcement described the 
UK’s vessel monitoring technology as being capable of evading tampering, as: 
 
“We designed a completely bespoke system of VMS boxes that was 
built by a private contractor and is approved as a technical 
standard in the EU now.  So if you have a UK-registered vessel, we 
insist that you have one of our boxes and there is no off-on switch 
on it, and there’s a battery inside it – if you cut the power to it, pull 
a fuse or something, it will send a message to us to say this guy’s 
just pulled my fuse, I’ll keep speaking to you as long as I can” 
[RC-07]. 
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For the Darwin Mounds, VMS data is supplemented with aerial surveys by the 
Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency (SFPA) and enforced by SFPA patrol 
vessels.  From an enforcement point of view, however, the most easily and 
efficiently protected area is one that is closed to all forms of fishing (Guénette et 
al., 1998).  Given that the closure only applies to bottom trawling, the SFPA 
have to prove ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that fishing vessels, whether observed 
by VMS or by air patrols, were actually trawling the seabed, given that pelagic 
trawling is permitted.  The burden of evidence in this respect can be problematic, 
making successful prosecutions very difficult.  Boarding by a fisheries patrol 
vessel may be the only way to secure successful prosecutions, and this is 
expensive, dangerous and logistically challenging.  This also calls into question 
the assumption that VMS will provide for the enforcement of offshore fisheries 
closures.  The enforcement of such protected areas is thus likely to continue to 
pose major challenges (Jones, 2006a).  As a member of the regulatory 
community responsible for enforcement commented, the fact that the Darwin 
Mounds is still open to pelagic fishing is not a problem, in this case, as: 
 
“There’s no fish there.  There’s no herring, mackerel – and that 
would be a major issue for the pelagic industry if the closure had 
an impact on them but they don’t go there.  From an enforcement 
point of view it’s an interesting point – the cheapest way to enforce 
a closed area is from the air.  You can’t enforce it by VMS because 
it doesn’t actually tell you anything.  It might tell you that a 
vessel’s there but you can’t charge a vessel” [RC-02].   
 
That is to say, “you have to charge an individual or owner/master of the boat” 
[RC-07] and under Scottish law, “every pertinent fact has to be spoken to from 
two separate sources” [RC-07], consequently an infraction cannot be proved by 
just one observation.   In practice, this means that: 
 
“In a Scottish court […] you can’t prove what someone’s doing 
just by looking at it, you’d have to get on board and see the gear 
being hauled and say yes this type of gear is a bottom trawl” [RC-
07], “which does make us unique in terms of the UK and indeed is 
an issue for our friends in Europe who – most Member States don’t 
have that, and the European Commission views it as some kind of 
flaw” [RC-02]. 
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With Member States designating further offshore MPAs in coming years, the 
question of enforcement must be taken into careful consideration as resources are 
stretched to meet the difficult requirement of policing areas that are spread over 
wide areas far from shore.  The OSPAR network of MPAs currently being 
designated will include sites already classified as SACs under the Habitats 
Directive, and will also incorporate marine habitats and species not listed in the 
Annexes to the Directive.  The JNCC released a report (JNCC, 2004) on this 
initiative, exploring the concept of an ‘ecologically coherent network’ of MPAs, 
as this concept is not formally defined, and providing several recommendations 
regarding the design of such a network.  From a jurisdictional perspective, the 
overlap between the OSPAR network and that of Natura 2000 in offshore waters 
may pose some tensions with regard to enforcement, as Member States will be 
required to monitor those areas comprising Natura 2000 under their obligations 
stemming from the Habitats Directive, while the European Community will be 
responsible for OSPAR areas under its commitment to the OSPAR Convention. 
From my research on this area of institutional overlap, it does not yet seem clear 
how the latter goal will be achieved.  Nevertheless, the Marine Strategy Directive 
and European Maritime Policy currently in development may harmonize matters 
– this remains to be seen.  As a member of the regulatory community involved in 
enforcement commented: 
 
“My understanding is there’s a raft of things in the Habitats 
Directive, there’s OSPAR, these other groups have got an interest 
in all of this, and not necessarily all of them have got a 
coordinated banner to indicate that some organization knows the 
totality of the position, I don’t think we see that happening, from 
our perspective” [RC-02].   
 
Another key issue raised by the case of the Darwin Mounds is the role of the 
precautionary principle in the CFP.  Whereas this principle, in its simplest form, 
calls for actions to be taken in the face of uncertainty, the Basic Regulation 
articles on emergency closures require a degree of scientific certainty that may 
not be available in all situations.  With regard to the Darwin Mounds, irrefutable 
proof of damage from bottom-trawling was a cornerstone in the argument to 
close the area to fishing.  This may not be the case for other areas in need of 
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protection, and one can also argue that such an approach is counter-productive; if 
evidence of damage to an area of deep-water coral is required to close it to 
fishing, then what method is available for protecting pristine areas that are at risk 
of being damaged?  
 
Although the closure of the Darwin Mounds is a success in many respects, it also 
highlights the division between marine nature conservation and fisheries 
management in the European Community, a legal and political issue that will 
require resolution in the near future.  The next chapter explores the UK’s attempt 
to ban pair-trawling for sea bass in the English Channel under the revised CFP, 
which resulted in a different outcome and highlights limitations in addressing 
fisheries activity impacts on marine nature conservation.   
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6 
 
 THE PAIR-TRAWL BAN 
 
  
 
“To me it’s all a  bit piecemeal and reactive.  You know whoever shouts  
the loudest [...] gets the biggest response” [NGO-04] 
 
“When you protect a dolphin by banning drift nets, is that a fisheries measure or 
nature conservation?  You have these dialogues everywhere” [NGO-03] 
 
OVERVIEW 
Drawing on a policy analysis and interviews with key players in the policy 
process, this chapter outlines the UK’s attempt to ban pair-trawling for sea bass. 
This process occurred after the Darwin Mounds closure and used a similar legal 
approach, but without the same level of success.  Although it was not the primary 
focus of this thesis (as it occurred within the 12nm territorial sea) the sea bass 
pair-trawl ban is worth exploring as it highlights some key issues necessary for 
achieving better synergy between nature conservation and fisheries management 
in the marine environment.   
 
6.1  BACKGROUND ON THE PAIR-TRAWL FISHERY 
Pair-trawling for sea bass involves towing a large net between two vessels 
through the water column, which can result in the bycatch1 of cetaceans.  An 
illustration of this fishing method is given in Figure 6.1.  Compared with bottom 
trawling, pelagic (or mid-water) trawling has a higher potential to capture 
cetaceans as the nets can be towed at faster speeds, and perhaps also because 
cetaceans seek prey fish within the net.  This may be true for fisheries targeting 
species that cetaceans are known to pursue, such as sardines, but sea bass is not 
known to be a prey species for cetaceans.2  Approaches to reducing cetacean 
bycatch include modifying gear and/or using acoustic devices (i.e. ‘pingers’) to 
                                                     
1
 The term ‘bycatch’ refers to the incidental catch of non-target species (such as mammals, birds, 
fish and other marine fauna) by commercial fishing activities.   
2
 For common dolphins in particular (the species most frequently caught in the pair trawl fishery), 
an analysis  of the stomach contents of stranded and incidentally caught animals off the 
Portuguese coast found that they feed primarily on sardines and squid (Silva, 1999).   
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deter cetaceans from entering the net.  Alternatively, this issue can be addressed 
by restricting the fishery itself.  The area known as the Western Approaches of 
the English Channel is the site of intensive pair-trawl fishing activity during the 
winter months, from October to May.  From 2002-2003 alone, 250 dead 
cetaceans (mostly common dolphins) washed up on the shores of Devon and 
Cornwall3 exhibiting external damage consistent with death caused by the type of 
netting used in pelagic trawls (WDCS, 2004).   
 
Figure 6.1  Illustration of pair-trawling 
 
(From WDCS, 2004:7, citing Northridge, 2003) 
 
In the Western Approaches to the English Channel, the primary countries fishing 
for sea bass are the UK and France.  For the 2003/2004 season, seven pairs of 
UK boats were engaged in the fishery, with a far higher French presence (French 
participation in the fishery may have been seven times that of the UK, i.e. 49 
pairs of vessels).  However, during the policy process outlined below, DEFRA 
maintained that the majority of the French fleet did not enter the UK’s 12nm 
territorial waters (Lowther, 2006:52). 
 
6.1.1  Legal context 
The Habitats Directive requires EC Member States to protect cetaceans, ‘all 
species’ of which are listed under Annex IV.  Article 12 requires that such 
species are strictly protected throughout their natural range (paragraph 1), 
                                                     
3
 “Dolphin Carnage Continues” BBC News Website, 8 February 2004, available online: 
(//news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/cornwall/3469135.stm). 
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including ensuring that incidental capture and killing does not have a negative 
impact on such species (paragraph 4).   
 
At the sixth Conference of Parties (COP) to the Convention on Migratory 
Species (CMS) in 1999, Resolution 6.2 urging stronger measures against bycatch 
was drafted by the UK and adopted by consensus.4  As a signatory to the 
Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas 
(ASCOBANS)5, concluded under the CMS (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.1) the UK 
is obliged to address problems affecting small cetaceans related to bycatch.  At 
present, the ASCOBANS agreement covers the Baltic and North Seas, including 
the English Channel.  At the fourth Meeting of Parties, held in Esbjerg, Denmark 
in August 2003, a resolution on extending the ASCOBANS area into the Eastern 
North Atlantic was passed, which should come into effect by the end of 2007.  
This extension will incorporate waters adjacent to Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
into the Agreement area, and closes the gap between ASCOBANS and the 
Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black and Mediterranean 
Seas and the contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS).   
 
At the third meeting of parties to ASCOBANS in 2000, a resolution6 was passed 
calling for a reduction in bycatch to below 1.7% of the best estimate of 
abundance, with a precautionary objective of reducing bycatch to less than 1% of 
the best available population estimate.  These targets were subsequently adopted 
in the 2002 Ministerial Declaration7 of the Fifth North Sea Conference held in 
Bergen, and ‘minimising bycatch of species which are not the intended object of 
commercial fishing’ was included in a Statement on the Ecosystem Approach to 
the Management of Human Activities at the aforementioned 2003 joint OSPAR-
                                                     
4
 Recommendation 7.2 on the implementation of Resolution 6.2 was adopted at the seventh COP 
in 2002. 
5
 The ASCOBANS Agreement was concluded in 1991 under the auspices of the Convention on 
Migratory Species and entered into force in 1994.  As of 2007, its Parties include Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the UK.  
6
 Resolution No.3 on the Incidental Take of Small Cetaceans, Third Meeting of Parties to 
ASCOBANS, Bristol, UK, 26-28 July 2000. 
7
 The 2002 Bergen Declaration, available on the Norwegian Ministry of the Environment 
website: (www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/md/rap/2002/0002/ddd/pdfv/156076-engelsk.pdf) 
Chapter 6:  The Pair-Trawl Ban 
 193 
HELCOM Ministerial Meeting in Bremen (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3).  Figure 
6.2 gives a map of the ASCOBANS area and its parties and range states. 
 
Figure 6.2  ASCOBANS area 
 
 
(From the ASCOBANS website, www.ascobans.org) 
 
In April 2004, Council Regulation (EC) No 812/20048 entered into force, 
addressing measures concerning incidental catches of cetaceans in fisheries.  In 
particular, it calls for the use of ‘pinger’ deterrence mechanisms, observer 
schemes and a phased reduction in the use of driftnets.  However, at the time of 
its release, this regulation was criticized by the Whale and Dolphin Conservation 
Society (WDCS) for the following exclusions: (i) gill netting vessels under 12 
                                                     
8
 Council Regulation (EC) No 812/2004 of 26 April 2004, laying down measures concerning 
incidental catches of cetaceans in fisheries and amending Regulation (EC) No 88/98, OJ L 50, 
30.4.2004, p.12.  The use of pingers has subsequently also been included in (i) Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 356/2005 of 1 March 2005 laying down detailed rules for the marking and 
identification of passive fishing gear and beam trawls, OJ L 56, 2.3.2005, p.8; and (ii) 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1805/2005 of 3 November 2005 amending Regulation 
356/2005, OJ L 290, 4.11.2005, p.12.  
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meters in length are not required to use pingers, and (ii) vessels using pingers and 
also vessels less than 15 meters long are not required to carry observers.9   
 
The use of pingers is a contentious issue with the fishing industry, who claim that 
they not only attract dolphins, but are also expensive, difficult to use and break 
easily or even explode, endangering their crews.10  This issue is recognized not 
only by UK fishermen, but across the EC, as fishing industry representatives 
from several Member States approached the Commission in April 2006 to 
express their concern and desire that the regulations requiring pingers would be 
reconsidered or even revoked in the future.11  Scientific studies of the 
effectiveness of pingers on reducing cetacean bycatch have shown mixed 
success, depending on the species.12   
 
6.2  POLICY PROCESS 
It is worth bearing in mind that while the run up to the policy process described 
below overlapped somewhat with the designation of the Darwin Mounds closure, 
the later phases (i.e. rejections of UK emergency closure requests by the 
Commission) occurred after the Darwin Mounds had been permanently closed to 
bottom-trawling.   
 
6.2.1  Emergency closure attempt  
Prior to the release of the aforementioned EC Regulation 812/2004 on cetacean 
bycatch, the UK released a consultation paper13 in 2003 outlining its strategy on 
the issue, which emphasized that the most effective method of bycatch reduction 
is closure of the offending fishery without displacing fishing effort elsewhere.  It 
                                                     
9
 WDCS website, news page on cetacean bycatch issues: 
(www.wdcs.org/dan/publishing.nsf/allweb/E4C35E6A87FFF8CC80256E1B003F3678) 
10
 ‘Pingers put dolphins and fishermen at risk’ article by Phil Lockley, 17 February 2006 in The 
Fishing News, available online (www.thefishingnews.co.uk). 
11
 ‘Brussels “summit” on pingers fiasco’ article by Tim Oliver, 28 April 2006 in The Fishing 
News, available online (www.thefishingnews.co.uk). 
12
 The Cetacean Bycatch Resource Center has summarized the results of several studies on its 
website, according to species, fishery and region.  Available at: 
(www.cetaceanbycatch.org/pingers_effectiveness.cfm). 
13
 UK Small Cetacean Bycatch Response Strategy (March 2003) A consultation paper outlining 
the proposed strategy by DEFRA, Scottish Executive, Welsh Assembly, Dept. Agriculture & 
Rural Development, Ireland to reduce the incidental capture of small cetaceans in UK fisheries.  
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was noted that if displacement did occur, the closure might not be of any use at 
all (Lowther, 2006).  The consultation paper recommended that the UK adopt a 
small cetacean bycatch strategy, which would coordinate an effective range of 
measures, and that further research was needed (Lowther, 2006).  In the summer 
of 2004, the UK Sea Mammal Research Unit (SMRU) was commissioned by 
DEFRA to provide observations of bycatch in the 2003/2004 pair-trawling 
season.14 The results of this study showed a substantial bycatch of dolphins, 
exceeding the 1.7% limit set by ASCOBANS.15   
 
In July 2004 DEFRA made a request to the European Commission to close the 
Western Channel pair trawl fishery throughout ICES Area VIIe (see Figure 6.3 
for a map of ICES areas) under Article 7 of the CFP Basic Regulation, on 
emergency measures.16  This request was rejected17, as the Commission did not 
find that the legal requirements justifying an emergency procedure were fulfilled, 
i.e. a need for immediate action was not apparent as the request was made in the 
summer when the sea bass fishery is most active in winter months.18  It was also 
not apparent, in the Commission’s view, that the background information on 
bycatch accompanying the UK’s request provided radically new evidence on the 
level of threat to the conservation of cetaceans by the fishery.  Rather, the 
Commission suggested that a ban in ICES Area VIIe might result in a 
redistribution of fishing effort, either into other fisheries in the same area or into 
adjacent areas, without necessarily reducing the bycatch of cetaceans.  It is also 
worth questioning whether, given the recent adoption of EC Regulation 
812/2004, further agreed measures from the Commission level were unlikely to 
go through.   
 
                                                     
14
 Report to DEFRA on dolphin bycatch mitigation work in the bass pair trawl fishery, SMRU 
September 2004. 
15
 The SMRU study observed 400 bycatches for the UK element of the fishery in the 2003-2004 
season.  On the assumption that the bycatch rate was the same in the larger French element of 
the fishery (and on the basis of population estimates between 75,000 and 120,000) it was 
estimated that bycatch of common dolphins could be 2% or higher.  
16
 A copy of this letter is given in Appendix II. 
17
 Commission decision of 24 August 2004 on the request presented by the United Kingdom 
pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EC) 2371/2002 – C(2004) 3229. 
18
 A copy of the Commission’s response can be found in Appendix III. 
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Figure 6.3  ICES fishing areas 
 
 
(From the Catch, Effort and Discard Monitoring, Sixth  
Framework Programme website: ceder.jrc.cec.eu.int) 
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Monitoring highly mobile cetacean populations in the dynamic marine 
environment is an inherently uncertain exercise.  Efforts to estimate abundance 
involve a variety of approaches depending upon the target species and the 
resources available (Evans and Hammond, 2004).  In the case of the 
ASCOBANS area, a survey entitled SCANS (Small Cetacean Abundance in the 
North Sea and adjacent waters) was conducted under the Agreement in 1994, and 
provided the first robust estimates for cetacean abundance in the North Sea and 
adjacent waters (Hammond et al., 2002).  The second SCANS survey did not 
occur until 2005, and results of the analysis have only been released in 2006.  As 
a result, population estimates and changes that may have arisen from the survey 
were not yet available when the UK approached the Commission on the pair-
trawling issue. 
 
Rather, the UK relied upon the aforementioned SMRU research, which was 
finalized and released in September 2004 and showed a three-fold increase in the 
numbers of stranded carcasses of common dolphins and harbour porpoises on 
beaches in South West England since the 1990s.  This analysis indicated that the 
bycatch rate in the 2003-2004 season was 12 times higher than in 2001-2002 and 
more than twice the amount reported for 2000-2001.  Overall, between 2001-
2003, the SMRU reported that a higher proportion of cetacean bycatch occurred 
between 6-12nm than 12-18nm or 18-24nm from shore.  They also observed a 
shift in bycatch occurrence toward inshore waters for the 2003-2004 season: 
whereas in previous years bycatch rates had been highest in waters 24-30nm 
from shore, for 2003-2004, bycatches were seen much more frequently between 
12-18nm.  However, the SMRU was unable to say with any certainty whether the 
high rate and geographical shift of bycatch during the 2003-2004 was an 
anomaly or would be repeated.  In other words, the high amount of bycatch may 
have been an artefact of the survey effort itself (i.e. if you look for something, 
you will find it).  Interestingly, a member of the regulatory community involved 
in the policy process commented on the SMRU data, that “it’s quite clear that 
the pair trawling in the Channel doesn’t reach the [1.7%] threshold [set by 
ASCOBANS]. [...] And you can manipulate and massage the data in a way that 
you can just cross the threshold if you want to” [RC-08]. 
Chapter 6:  The Pair-Trawl Ban 
 198 
 
6.2.2  Unilateral Order and second emergency closure attempt 
In September 2004, Ben Bradshaw (then Minister for Nature Conservation and 
Fisheries) announced that measures were being drawn up to address cetacean 
bycatch caused by pair-trawling fisheries in the South West of England, 
including a ban on pair-trawling for sea bass within the 12nm territorial sea, and 
the introduction of a licensing system for UK vessels operating within 12-
200nm.   
 
The UK subsequently established a unilateral Order19 under domestic legislation 
on 22 December 2004, prohibiting British fishing vessels from pair-trawling both 
within UK territorial waters (i.e. within 12nm of the coast) and anywhere else 
they operate, i.e. in EC waters.  In January 2005, the UK approached the 
Commission again20, requesting an emergency closure under Article 9 of the 
Basic Regulation on measures within 12nm, to prohibit other Member States 
from pair-trawling within UK territorial waters, but this request was also 
rejected.21  The Commission’s decision built on its previous rejection, adding 
that no new scientific information had been made available that could justify a 
change in their analysis.  While the UK proposals had relied on data from the 
SMRU, the Commission looked to  ICES for advice,22 which concluded that (i) 
other fisheries were also responsible for bycatches, and (ii) that a prohibition on 
pair-trawling in UK territorial waters would result in displacement of fishing 
effort into adjacent areas without necessarily reducing incidental bycatches of 
dolphins. 
 
As a result, while UK fishermen are prohibited from using pair trawling methods 
in UK and EC waters, this ban has no effect on other Member States, including 
                                                     
19
 The South-west Territorial Waters (Prohibition of Pair Trawling) Order 2004 under the Sea 
Fish (Conservation) Act (1967).  Statutory Instrument 2004 #3397, available online: 
(www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2004/20043397.htm). 
20
 A copy of the UK request is given in Appendix IV. 
21
 Commission Decision of 26 February 2005 on the request presented by the United Kingdom 
pursuant to Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 on the conservation and 
sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy, OJ L 104, 
23.4.2005, p.37. 
22
 ICES Reports of the Advisory Committee on Ecosystems (ACE) 2002 and 2003. 
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those that participate in pair-trawling within UK territorial waters.  Table 6.1 
outlines the events leading to the unilateral ban on pair-trawling for UK vessels. 
 
Table 6.1  Timeline of UK ban on pair-trawling for sea-bass 
DATE ACTION 
2003 MAR UK published a consultation paper outlining its strategy to 
reduce small cetacean bycatch in UK fisheries 
2004 APRIL EC Regulation 812/2004 on small cetacean bycatch in force 
2004 JULY UK approached Commission requesting emergency measures 
under Article 7 of Regulation 2371/2002 to close fishery in the 
Western Channel (ICES area VIIe) 
2004 AUG Commission decision to reject request 
2004 SEPT Fisheries Minister Ben Bradshaw announced intention to ban 
fishery unilaterally 
2004 DEC UK Order closing the fishery within 12nm of English Coast for 
UK fishermen (whether in UK or EC waters) 
2005 JAN UK approached Commission requesting extension of domestic 
ban to vessels of other Member states, under Article 9 of 
Regulation 2371/2002 
2005 FEB Commission decision to reject request 
2005 OCT 10 Rejection of Greenpeace-initiated judicial review by the High 
Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division 
2005 OCT 31 Rejection of Greenpeace- initiated appeal by the Supreme Court 
of Judicature in the Court of Appeal (civil division) 
(From De Santo and Jones, 2007:8) 
 
6.2.3  Greenpeace judicial review and appeal 
After the UK Order came into effect, Greenpeace pursued a judicial review to 
overturn the closure, arguing that it would not only be ineffective but also have a 
negative effect, displacing fishing effort beyond 12nm from shore and 
consequently increasing cetacean bycatch.  However Greenpeace’s efforts were 
unsuccessful and their claim was dismissed by the High Court.23  In the 
proceedings of the judgment, Greenpeace argued that the motive for the Order 
was improperly ‘political’, designed to give a ‘false impression’ that the 
Government was taking action to save dolphins.  Justice Stanley Bunton, who 
presided over the judgment, dismissed this argument by pointing out that the 
Order was only ‘political’ in that it would assist the UK in pressing for EC 
                                                     
23
 Case C0/865/2005, Greenpeace Ltd. v the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs, 10 October 2005, High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division. 
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action, which, ‘given the restrictions on unilateral action imposed by the CFP, is 
the only really effective action that can be taken’ (paragraph 66).  Given the data 
provided by the SMRU showed a higher bycatch rate within the 12nm zone from 
2001-2003, Justice Bunton concluded that there would be an increase in bycatch 
as a result of the Order only if vessels moved their fishing beyond 24nm.  Indeed, 
from Justice Bunton’s perspective, there was ‘no real difference between the 
motivation of Greenpeace and DEFRA’, rather ‘the dispute between them is as to 
mean rather than ends’ (paragraph 3).  The judgment also noted that the number 
of UK vessels operating in the pair-trawl fishery operating outside of 12nm had 
decreased from seven in 2003-2004 to two in 2004-2005, and at the time of the 
appeal, preliminary results indicated that the bycatch rate in the latest season 
(2004-2005) was half that of the previous season and common dolphin strandings 
had decreased from 93 in the first quarter of 2004 to 43 in the first quarter of 
2005 (paragraph 60).  Greenpeace subsequently attempted to appeal24 the 
judgment but it was dismissed. 
 
6.3  IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE MANAGEMENT SCENARIOS  
There are several reasons why the pair-trawl ban did not meet the same positive 
response afforded the Darwin Mounds closure by the Commission.  A member of 
the regulatory community involved in the attempted pair-trawl ban summarized 
its failure to be a result of two factors, “no support in Council” and: 
 
“I think the Darwin Mounds thing was on the stocks for quite a 
while before it happened, the bass pair trawl ban I think we 
seemed to be pressurized into a bit more by concerns from 
environmentalists so we weren’t really ever in control of that 
process in the same way” [RC-05]. 
 
With the sea-bass fishery in the English Channel, not only is it very much 
dominated by French fishermen, who maintain a powerful lobby, but also the 
accepted scientific advice available argued that the ban would be an arbitrary 
measure, and unlikely to achieve the desired goal of reducing cetacean bycatch.  
                                                     
24
 Case C1/2005/2282, Greenpeace Ltd. v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs, 31 October 2005, in the Supreme Court of Judicature, in the Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division). 
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As mentioned above, the ICES advice relied upon by the Commission indicated 
that other fisheries in the area also resulted in bycatch and that there was a need 
for comprehensive monitoring of the numerous trawl fisheries active in the 
region before ICES could be precise about mitigation requirements.   
 
In addition, the second attempt at a ban was targeted at fishing occurring within 
the UK’s territorial waters, i.e. 12nm from shore, but it can be argued that with 
the fishery operating outside this boundary as well, cetaceans would still be at 
risk of being caught and drowned in pair-trawl nets.  At the same time however, 
the UK government pursued a ban within 12nm presumably because it knew it 
would not be politically feasible to extend a ban throughout the English Channel, 
given the failure of its first attempt under Article 7 of the Basic Regulation.  As a 
result, when faced with the second Commission rejection, the UK was left with 
maintaining its unilateral stance, prohibiting pair-trawling only for its own 
fishermen.  A member of the regulatory community involved in the policy 
process summarized the outcome of a unilateral pair-trawl ban as “meaningless, 
really” given the proportion of UK trawlers versus French boats operating in the 
area, i.e.: “unless you do something against the French who are the vast – by far 
the biggest, I mean when they claim they’re 95% of the fishery, they might be 
right” [RC-08].   
 
When asked about why the ban did not go forward, this interviewee commented 
that “there was never any hope for it [to succeed], not really” and that: 
 
“It was political cover.  It just wasn’t going to happen.  And 
actually why should it?  There’s legislation about – I mean it’s fair 
enough – if you want no catches of dolphins at all then it should 
have worked but you’ve got an international agreement that says 
‘up to’  I think it’s 3% of the population, 3.4%, something like that, 
that’s not called a legitimate bycatch but an acceptable rate” [RC-
08]. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the ASCOBANS resolution on cetacean bycatch called for 
a reduction to 1.7% of the population.  As this resolution noted that even 2% was 
defined as ‘unacceptable’, it is interesting to note that a member of the regulatory 
community who had been involved in the pair-trawl ban policy process did not 
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recall this fact correctly during the interview.  It goes without saying that a 
unilateral ban is in contrast to the level playing field sought by UK fishermen in 
the context of European fisheries management.  This interviewee also argued that 
only banning UK fishermen from the area worked against the development of 
potential research on preventing bycatch as: 
 
“If you wanted any evidence or trialing [on] what to do for 
cetacean escapes, these were the only boats engaged in it, so by 
prohibiting their activity you were effectively just leaving it to the 
French, who weren’t doing anything” [RC-08]. 
 
It also acts against UK fishing interests on the European level, as: 
 
“There’s a long-term fisheries downside to that, which is it’s not a 
regulated stock and if it ever does come to be regulated and 
allocated between different member states, then your track record 
of catches will count.  So by restricting ourselves now, we are 
taking a lower share in the future” [RC-08]. 
 
It can be argued that the Commission’s decision to reject the UK’s request for an 
emergency closure hinged on the definition of ‘irreversible damage’ as outlined 
in the emergency measures Articles of the Basic Regulation, and defining this 
state for a stationary, slow-growing coral reef is easier than defining it for mobile 
populations such as cetaceans.  Another interviewee from the regulatory 
community summarized this issue well, when they commented that: 
 
 “For the Darwin Mounds, it’s clear that once you take a trawl 
through, you’ve irreversibly damaged it.  For dolphins, yes you’re 
damaging them but it’s not necessarily irreversible.  Particularly if 
you’re doing something and trying to develop mitigation at the 
same time” [RC-09]. 
 
One of the key issues that emerged during interviews with members of the 
scientific and regulatory communities was the role of science in policy-
formation, particularly with respect to the success of the Darwin Mounds closure 
and the failed attempt to ban pair-trawling for sea bass.  The theoretical 
framework set out in Chapter 3 emphasized the positive role played by science in 
setting the agenda and hence on overall environmental regime effectiveness, but 
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this issue is worth exploring further, and within the context of precaution and the 
complexity of the marine environment.   
 
6.3.1  ‘Whose science?’ Improving the science/policy interface 
The Darwin Mounds closure and the pair-trawl ban highlight some interesting 
interpretations of ‘precaution’, given it is one of the stated goals of the CFP 
Basic Regulation.  If a precautionary approach can be deemed as implying that 
nature conservation should be pursued in the face of scientific uncertainty, a flaw 
can be seen in the emergency measures provisions of the Basic Regulation, 
which require a degree of certainty, i.e. that ‘evidence of a serious threat’ must 
already exist.  The difficulty of determining what degree of damage or threat is 
required to have occurred before action can be taken remains an issue.  In the sea 
bass pair-trawl ban example, the Commission’s rejection of the UK’s proposal 
for a closure under Article 7 of the Basic Regulation was justified on the basis of 
lack of evidence as required under the Article, but this requirement is arguably 
inconsistent with the interpretations of the precautionary principle discussed 
earlier (see Chapter 3) and now incorporated into the EU Treaty.  As a member 
of the epistemic community commented: 
 
 “Well if you require damage before you start to introduce 
conservation measures, it’s a big concern.  You should be able to 
find out if you have a habitat that needs protection, then you go out 
and do it based on the habitat criteria, you don’t need to have 
anything to do with damage.  It’s just totally absurd”  [EC-06]. 
 
While this perspective can be viewed as a conservation scientist’s idealism, 
interestingly a member of the oil and gas industry spoke along similar lines with 
regard to the use of the precautionary principle in environmental decision-
making: 
 
“One of the things that [the failed pair-trawl ban] emphasized to 
me was how unable to control fisheries individual member states 
are.  Because there’s the science angle of it and then the political 
angle of quotas etc., and there isn’t a strong conservation ethic in 
many of the Member States or even necessarily a recognition of the 
issues.  So when it comes to debating fishing access or closures or 
whatever it is, I think the precautionary principle [...] is very low 
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on the priority ranking in decisions, which I think is a great shame 
[...] We set a lot of store by it but we don’t actually apply it.  We 
talk a lot about sustainability but certainly in terms of deep water 
fisheries our activities are clearly unsustainable and therefore why 
on earth are we doing it?  Are we – and Europe – are we that short 
of protein that we have to go damaging resources?”  [UCI-02]. 
 
Another member of the epistemic community made an interesting comment 
regarding perceptions of precaution and the differences between scientific and 
regulatory definitions of uncertainty: 
 
“The phrase ‘we have no evidence’ means different things to a 
scientist and a politician:  to a scientist it means we’ve examined a 
lot and concluded there’s no significant effect.  The political 
translation is they haven’t looked yet, or at all”  [EC-04]. 
 
A member of the regulatory community expressed the concern shared by many 
in the policy arena, i.e. whether to push forward with protecting areas “just 
because we’re not sure if there are corals [there] or not?  I think this is not 
proportional” whereas some areas “are more representative” than others, and 
should be prioritized [RC-01].  During the interview process, the issue of 
prioritizing and protecting ‘pristine’ areas came up frequently.  According to 
another interviewee from the regulatory community, a conscious decision has 
been made by the UK in its site selection process for offshore SACs, that rather 
than going for the “best” sites, they would go for “representative, and that’s a 
big shift [in approach]” [RC-10].  This interviewee went on to say that in 
situations where two areas of habitat (of the same type) are being considered for 
designation, and there is good information about one but not the other, the site 
with the better information will be prioritized while the second is “put to one 
side for a while [...] because otherwise you wouldn’t get anywhere” [RC-10].   
 
A member of the epistemic community commented on the precautionary 
approach as being two-fold, from the perspective of a researcher interacting with 
policy-makers.  First, for practicality’s sake, the science needs to be strong and 
obvious, “we can only do things where there’s strong evidence” [EC-14].  And 
second, the question of whether we are only looking for sites that have been 
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damaged, “we shouldn’t be protecting sites that are damaged, we should be 
protecting pristine sites that are vulnerable, so we want evidence of good areas 
that are in good vitality” [EC-14].  This raises another issue, however, if a site is 
pristine and hasn’t been damaged, why not?  Is the area inaccessible and 
consequently not in need of protection?  It can be argued that policy-makers are 
taking a precautionary approach by pursuing protection for ‘representative’ 
areas, but at the same time the necessity to have good information about a site 
before it can be protected is somewhat contrary to the philosophy of a truly 
precautionary approach.  This conflict is due to the complex physical nature of 
marine ecosystems and the inherent difficulty this presents for determining 
appropriate conservation measures.  A member of the epistemic community 
summarized this rationale well when they remarked that “in areas where fishing 
is going on, you have to find the corals first before you can implement the 
precautionary principle.  The burden of proof still lies with the environment” 
[EC-05].   
 
Some interviewees from the epistemic community expressed apprehension about 
the way science is being used in the political arena.  As one scientist put it: 
 
“I think the science has been usurped completely.  In the old days 
we used to argue with Greenpeace about issues but now 
Greenpeace goes directly to legislation. [...] Science has a 
relatively small role in this.  It’s public opinion-making rather than 
science”  [EC-06]. 
 
At the same time, a perception exists in the NGO community that the number of 
scientists “willing to engage” in communicating their findings to policy-makers 
in a form easily digested and applicable to the policy arena is limited, and 
therefore “maybe [NGO] science isn’t as broad-based as it should be” [NGO-
07].  NGO representatives also raised concern about the objectivity of science 
funded by industry, and data collection (i.e. monitoring) that occurs on fishing 
vessels where “major intimidation and bribes” [NGO-07] are a factor. 
 
Interviewees from industry also commented negatively about the role played by 
NGOs.  A representative from the fishing industry commented on the lack of 
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accountability that they saw in the NGO perspective, adding that the fishing 
industry doesn’t get much of “a positive reflection” [UCF-01] from Greenpeace 
and the Marine Conservation Society.  An interviewee from the oil and gas 
community also felt victimized in the public eye, explaining: 
 
“Greenpeace or pressure groups who are trying to make life 
difficult, [we] have to explain to them that the production of oil 
and gas isn’t necessarily the great Satan and it can be done in an 
environmentally sound manner and yes we are building renewable 
offshore wind farms at the same time.  A lot of it is about 
communication” [UCI-03]. 
 
The question remains, whose science counts?  This is an issue related not only to 
the role of political pressure and lobbying, but also one of trust between users, 
experts and policy-makers.  One of the aims of this thesis was to elucidate the 
perspectives of these groups on one another’s roles in marine governance.  In 
addition to the RACs described earlier (see Chapter 3, section 3.4.1), fisheries-
science partnerships have been established in recent years within the UK.  
Representatives from the NGO community were somewhat optimistic about the 
potential for improving fisheries management through consultation processes: 
 
“The UK [scientists] sit down with fishermen on a regular basis, 
and that’s taken a lot of the sting out of ICES being seen as a 
closed shop where they’re not listening to the wider views of the 
fishing stakeholder sector” [NGO-04].   
 
Representatives from the fishing industry had mixed reactions about their 
interaction with scientific experts.  While one emphasized that “the consultation 
process [with regard to establishing protected areas] is more effective nowadays 
[...] because we’re working a lot closer with the scientific community and parts 
of the government” [UCF-01], another felt that the fishing industry “needs more 
information, there needs to be a greater tie-in” to the policy process [UCF-02].  
This interviewee summarized the difficulty with applying a precautionary 
approach and integrating science into policy-making quite well, as follows:  
 
“In any other industry you would think that there would be a pretty 
simple structure for coming to a decision and there would be a 
process you would go through, evidence-based, and the decision 
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would be made.  Everything to do with fisheries is so politically 
motivated that the scientific evidence is given, the socioeconomic 
evidence is given and then the decision the Commission makes can 
be a million miles away because the French put pressure on, the 
Spanish put pressure on, the UK’s put pressure on, whatever.  
You’re asking people to give their expert advice and then you’re 
ignoring that advice and the Commission are making their own 
decision on it, which doesn’t fit with the advice that they’ve been 
given, because of political maneuvering.  And that can’t be good 
for the resource they’re supposed to be there to protect” [UCF-
02]. 
 
Taking a precautionary approach to offshore marine conservation poses serious 
challenges, given the complex nature of the marine environment and the political 
motivations behind the use of science in decision-making.  As a member of the 
legal community noted, there has been some improvement in the integration of 
precaution in fisheries management since the mid 1990s, albeit “incremental and 
not generally very applied” [LC-03].   
 
In the case of the Darwin Mounds, the ICES science brought to the Commission 
played a pivotal role, and was considered to be both strong and impartial 
evidence.  This evidence falls within what Haas (2004:574) would term ‘usable 
knowledge’, i.e. accurate information that is of use to politicians and policy 
makers.  Such knowledge must also be seen as representing consensus and 
contributing to the achievement of collective goals.  Perhaps even more 
important than the quality of the science itself, however, is the process through 
which the knowledge is transformed into decision-making.  As Skodvin and 
Underdal (2000:31) argue, the critical challenge for this transformation process is 
to provide an ‘enlightened, consensual and user-relevant interpretation’ of the 
policy implications of environmental science, without distorting the science itself 
or impairing the scientific process that produced it. 
 
In 2004, ICES was reorganized with the ecosystem approach in mind: “instead of 
structuring along disciplines” ICES is now divided into science groups and 
advisory groups with the advice being “pooled into one group under one head” 
[EC-10].  A member of the NGO community commented positively about 
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ICES’s incorporation of the ecosystem approach in its recent structural 
reorganization:  
 
“ICES has made a concerted effort to try and restructure itself to 
take on board an ecosystem-based approach with the way it’s 
reconfigured its committee structure, and you just don’t see any of 
that kind of fertile thinking at DG Fisheries”  [NGO-04]. 
 
ICES is limited in its advisory role by two factors: uncertainty regarding the state 
of fish stocks as well as “pure political pressure, lobbying” [EC-10].  In 
addition, a member of the epistemic community raised concern over the 
impartiality of ICES science, as, in their opinion, “the EU has been struggling 
with ICES for years, it’s been kind of trying to take over ICES” [EC-06].   
 
The information provided for the Darwin Mounds closure was comprehensive 
and unquestionable, but also required several years worth of material.  As a 
member of the regulatory community involved in the policy process described it: 
 
“We had evidence, there was no hesitation there.  For that year 
and for the year before and probably two years before, ICES was 
giving repeated advice that the main threat to deep water corals or 
sponges was trawling, so there was no doubt to apply the 
precautionary approach”  [RC-01]. 
 
Another member of the regulatory community who had been involved in the 
Darwin Mounds negotiations “found it odd that something where the ICES 
advice had seemed so clear – that we could end up having [...] quite a lengthy 
debate” [RC-03].  Despite the irrefutable evidence of damage to the Darwin 
Mounds observed in 2000, three years elapsed before the area was protected 
from bottom-trawling.  An interviewee from the NGO community put this down 
to the fact that ICES science “is very slow” and “you have to have everything 
absolutely beyond a doubt proven before that triggers anything in DG Fish” 
[NGO-03].  At the same time, however, the emergency closure Articles of the 
revised CFP did not come out until 2002, only a year before the area was closed.  
As described in Chapter 5, the Darwin Mounds designation process was 
relatively quick, but also measured and step-wise, i.e. precautionary. 
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As discussed earlier (see section 5.2.1 above), the science used by the UK for its 
proposals to the Commission to ban pair-trawling came from the SMRU.  The 
Commission, meanwhile, went to ICES for advice, which stated that a ban on 
pair-trawling in UK territorial would not achieve its objective of halting cetacean 
bycatch.  As a member of the regulatory community commented: 
 
“At the UK level, [decision-makers] will obviously listen to their 
internal science advisors be it [the JNCC] or SMRU.  At the 
European level, quite rightly the Commission wanted more 
international consensus, so that’s the ICES mechanism.  And since 
[the JNCC feeds] into the ICES mechanism, assuming we’ve got it 
approximately right, there’s usually very little difference” [RC-
09]. 
 
Thus it can be argued that by favoring ICES advice over that of the SMRU, the 
Commission was aiming for ‘international consensus’ rather than allowing a 
Member State to call for a conservation measure based solely on its own national 
scientific data, which might be less objective.  However, it seems more likely 
that the economic and political impact of shutting down a fishery largely 
dominated by French industry at the request of the UK, which had a minor stake 
in the fishery, played a greater role.   
 
International tensions aside, a key issue underlining the challenges to 
implementing a precautionary and ecosystem-based approach in the marine 
environment is the lack of integration between nature conservation and fisheries 
management measures.  This bifurcation occurs on both the international level 
(e.g. with OSPAR not including fishing issues, and NEAFC’s actions towards 
nature conservation being compromised by its members’ fishing interests) and 
also within the European Commission. 
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6.3.2  Disconnect within the Commission 
The origins of the bifurcation between fisheries management and nature 
conservation are described in more detail in Chapter 2 (section 2.4.3), whereby 
the European Commission gained legislative jurisdiction over fisheries measures 
while Member States retain nature conservation within their remit.  Figure 6.4 (a 
simplification of Figure 2.7 in Chapter 2) illustrates this split, with DG Fisheries, 
working on the advice of ICES, the Advisory Committee on Fisheries and 
Aquaculture (ACFA) and the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for 
Fisheries (STECF) produces Regulations that Member States must abide by, 
while DG Environment, with the advice of Habitats Committees (in the case of 
nature conservation issues), produces Directives which Member States must 
implement via national legislation (i.e. ‘direct effect’).   
 
Figure 6.4  Disconnect within the European Commission 
 
 
 
It is worth noting that the developing European Maritime Policy is being headed 
by DG Fisheries while the Marine Strategy Directive has come out from DG 
Environment.  In October 2006, at a Coastal Futures workshop on the Maritime 
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Policy Green Paper, a representative from the European Commission discussed 
its development.25  I spoke with this representative after the meeting and when I 
asked the reason for why DG Fisheries was heading the Maritime Policy, as 
opposed to DG Environment, she replied that (DG Fisheries) Commissioner 
Borg’s portfolio was “smaller than that of other possible Commission leaders, 
such as Environment and Transport”.  When pressed, she also added that the 
decision was “political”, i.e. going back to the tension and territoriality between 
the DGs.  As the Maritime Policy will involve industry sectors such as shipping 
and transport, it is not surprising that DG Fisheries would position itself to be the 
lead authority on policy affecting industrial stakeholders.  When I asked a 
member of the epistemic community who had been present at the Coastal Futures 
meeting about their opinion on the issue of DG Fisheries leading the developing 
Maritime Policy rather than DG Environment, they commented: 
 
“After the experience of the CFP do you really want Europe in 
charge?  Eurocrats are inefficient and the CFP is not a ringing 
endorsement of Europe when it comes to management” [EC-04]. 
 
While an inside Commission perspective described cooperation between the DGs 
as “generally good” and went on to say that “we have more in common, the 
draft Marine Strategy, the [...] future Maritime Policy, so they need us and we 
need them” [RC-01], all other relevant stakeholders interviewed disagreed, 
including members of the epistemic community, the UK regulatory community, 
NGO representatives and industry.  Consultation does occur between the DGs, 
however there is no formal process for communication.  Several interviewees 
offered anecdotes to illustrate the disconnect between DG Fisheries and DG 
Environment, either from their own personal experience or from what they had 
seen occur (or not) during the course of their career.  As one NGO representative 
put it: 
 
                                                     
25
 “Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the Union: A European Vision for the Oceans and 
Seas”, presentation given by Nathalie Hesketh, Maritime Policy Task Force, European 
Commission on 12 October 2006 at the Costal Futures Conference “Towards a European 
Maritime Policy”, School for Oriental and Asian Studies (SOAS), University of London, 
London, UK.  
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“I have to say that in the time that I’ve been doing this job, and 
that’s getting on 15 years now, I haven’t seen any improvement in 
the engagement between DG Environment and DG Fisheries” 
[NGO-04]. 
 
Another representative from the NGO community commented on the ingrained 
role played by this bifurcation within the EC in the pair-trawl ban: 
 
“ICES is going to DG Fish, it’s not going to the EU or the 
Council, it’s just going to DG Fish and that triggers DG Fish to 
action if the evidence is sufficient.  And the Member States don’t 
go to the Council, they go to DG Environment, so it’s a parallel 
situation.  And what’s not there is any communication between 
these two.  And I think my idea would be that DG Fish should 
absolutely listen to ICES but they must also listen to their 
colleagues when their colleagues say for us nature conservation, 
it’s our Habitats Directive.  When the red light is on you need to 
react, and that just doesn’t exist at all.  So these guys talk to each 
other but still Fish have one constituency and one scientific body 
and Nature has another” [NGO-03].   
 
A representative from the fishing industry commented that not only do “[DG 
Fish and DG Environment] barely speak to each other” but also “they seem to 
be fiercely territorial about what they cover respectively and unwilling to work 
with the other, in case they’re giving a little bit of their turf to the other group” 
[UCF-02].  As a representative from the UK government put it “the link between 
CFP and the HD, the interaction between those two, there are still issues 
surrounding that which we haven’t fully resolved with the Commission” [RC-
03].  This “lack of a coordinated approach in the Commission” [RC-03] 
between the DGs was noted by most interviewees, however the NGO community 
expressed the strongest concerns about this disconnect, for example: 
 
“If you ask DG Fisheries about things to do with the Habitats 
Directive, they just tell you to go speak with DG Environment 
about it quite a lot of the time, whereas you should be able to get a 
joined up answer from either end really.  So it is a real concern 
and I don’t really think that we’re going to move much further 
forward until we get out of this sort of structure we have at the 
moment – there is a real… crying out for some proper institutional 
sort of harmonization” [NGO-04]. 
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Members of the NGO community also commented that the blame should be put 
on DG Fisheries for this situation, i.e. “the impetus should be coming from them 
because DG Environment is quite a small DG and it doesn’t have the resources 
to lead on these sorts of things” [NGO-04].  As a member of the epistemic 
community put it, “DG Environment is doing the bare minimum on the Habitats 
Directive – they just don’t have enough resources” [EC-04].  It appears that 
there is a “completely clear but unwritten hierarchy” [NGO-07] whereby DG 
Fisheries not only perceives itself as being stronger than DG Environment, but is 
generally perceived by others to be higher up in the hierarchy than DG 
Environment, which is likely seen as “among the lowest in ranking” of all the 
DGs [NGO-07].  This may seem obvious, given the economic importance of 
fisheries as compared with environmental and conservation issues; however it 
was interesting that several interviewees commented on the inequality and lack 
of legal basis for it.  As one interviewee commented, DG Fisheries is “reluctant 
to engage or let DG Environment interfere in their sphere of competence” 
[NGO-04] although it recently renamed itself as the Directorate General for 
Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, a classification that several interviewees 
commented sounded more environmental, although this was likely not the case.   
 
At the same time however, devising a strategy for alleviating this discrepancy is 
problematic, or as one member of the regulatory community put it: “this 
impossible job of linking the two Directorates” [RC-08].  Clearly this issue will 
need to be addressed, given the forthcoming Maritime Policy and Marine 
Strategy Directive; any synergy between the two initiatives, which seems 
necessary for their success, will rely on direct communication between the DGs.  
The wider issue of a split between fisheries management and nature conservation 
in the EC will not be resolved without a stronger dialogue between the DGs and 
focused efforts to integrate the developing Maritime Policy and Marine Strategy 
Directive.  A member of the regulatory community commented that 
compromises will need to be made, and territory conceded, as: 
 
“I think either DG Environment’s going to have to come out and 
say ‘we have no competence to legislate in fisheries’ or DG Fish is 
going to need to come out and say ‘DG Environment can legislate 
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for fisheries in respect to environmental matters’ – if either of 
those statements happens then no court case will happen but 
otherwise I think a court case is almost certain to happen at some 
point” [RC-05]. 
 
Given the bifurcation between marine nature conservation and fisheries 
management in the EC, the outcome of the pair-trawl ban supports the argument 
that the tension between the DGs inherently threatens the successful 
implementation of an ecosystem-approach in European waters.     
 
 
CONCLUSION  
When compaired with the Darwin Mounds closure, the UK’s attempts to gain 
Commission approval to ban pair-trawling for sea-bass in its territorial waters do 
not bode well for the future of European marine nature conservation.  While the 
political situations surrounding these two cases were rather different, and this 
may be the primary reason for the difference in outcomes, at the same time one 
can not help but wonder whether the success of the Darwin Mounds measure was 
itself an impediment for future marine protection through the revised CFP Basic 
Regulation.  In other words, the Darwin Mounds closure may have simply been a 
relatively straightforward way to show that the revised CFP was ‘greener’.  
Compared with the pair-trawl industry, deep-sea fishing around the Darwin 
Mounds involved fewer fishermen, and as several interviewees (from the 
epistemic and NGO communities) acknowledged, fishing over coral reefs 
destroys nets and does not compensate a fisherman’s economic loss of having his 
gear ruined.   
 
“Fishermen don’t like trawling coral because it destroys their nets.  
Sensible fishermen wouldn’t try to go for any coral areas – they 
might try to get close to them but they’re very cautious about it 
because of the damage to their nets” [EC-14]. 
 
As outlined earlier, the revised CFP commits its EC membership to 
implementing precautionary and ecosystem-based approaches to fisheries 
management (Article 2.1).  It could be argued that the evidence required for a 
closure to be established was present in the dolphin strandings that clearly 
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resulted from the fishery.  Yet the Commission argued that there was less 
evidence for a closure, in comparison with the case put forward to the 
Commission for the Darwin Mounds.  As a member of the UK regulatory 
community involved in the pair-trawl ban policy process noted, the EC bycatch 
regulation had only taken effect at the beginning of 2004 and “there really just 
wasn’t the data on the French [fishery] bycatch” [RC-03] that could have 
changed the outcome.  Whether the EC decision-making process could have 
closed the fishery is another issue however, given the powerful lobbying 
potential of the French fishing industry, and the fact that the bycatch evidence 
put forward by the UK was called into question by the independent advice 
provided to the Commission by ICES.  A member of the NGO community spoke 
pessimistically about moving forward from the Darwin Mounds in the future, as: 
 
“I think it’s going to be a very very long, slow burn to get beyond 
things like the Darwin Mounds – vitally important as they are, it’s 
a one-off, and what we’re not seeing is the kind of mainstream 
thinking that would enable that to happen more widely. […] So you 
can imagine, you think hell – are we going to have to go through 
the Darwin Mounds on every offshore Natura 2000 site in 
Community waters?  It’s an alarming prospect, and you just don’t 
feel that it’s going to be easy” [NGO-04]. 
 
The Darwin Mounds closure required compromise and step-wise, careful 
diplomacy: repeating this process for every closure under the CFP emergency 
closure provisions is not a practical solution.  In the case of the UK, now that its 
legislation for implementing the Habitats Directive is soon coming into force (the 
Conservation (Natural Habitats etc.) Regulations), it should be easier to close 
areas within the UK’s 200nm EFZ.  Yet within European waters (i.e. 12-200nm), 
this issue remains contentious: some countries are certainly ahead of others with 
respect to prioritizing offshore SACs.  In the case of something like pair-trawling 
for sea-bass, where fishing interests came directly into conflict with a nature 
conservation issue, the revised CFP clearly favors economic interests through its 
requirement of firm evidence, despite its espousal of a precautionary approach to 
environmental protection.  Consequently, it is to the Member States’ benefit to 
enforce their national legislation for implementing the Habitats Directive 
throughout their offshore and inshore waters.   
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As mentioned earlier, a recent ECJ ruling (Case C-06/04) can be interpreted as 
requiring all Member States to apply the Directive offshore.  Whether applying 
the Habitats Directive fully is enough to overcome the underlying tension 
between fisheries management and marine nature conservation within EC waters 
remains to be seen.  Fully applying the Directive from 12-200nm will require 
more cooperation between the two DGs, but this may not be enough to address 
the underlying tension.  In fact, this bifurcation is likely to continue to pose 
problems, given the fact that the unifying legislation for European marine policy 
is also split along these lines, with the Marine Strategy Directive under the 
control of DG Environment, while the EC Maritime Policy is being headed by 
DG Fisheries.   
 
The next chapter goes into more detail on European marine legislation currently 
under development and whether/how these initiatives will (in conjunction with 
the legislative framework already in place) move towards the goal of 
implementing an ecosystem-based approach to marine nature conservation.   
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7 
 
DISCUSSION AND REFLECTIONS 
 
  
 
“When you have the facts on your side, argue the facts. When you have the law 
on your side, argue the law. When you have neither, holler” (Al Gore) 
 
“The marine environment can’t vote” [RC-04] 
 
OVERVIEW 
Building on the experiences of the Darwin Mounds offshore MPA and the ban on 
pair-trawling for sea bass, this chapter further explores issues raised by the 
different policy outcomes of the two case studies, namely how the complex 
institutional environment currently evolving will achieve its goal of 
implementing an ecosystem-based approach to offshore marine conservation.  
First, an assessment of the regime effectiveness theoretical framework set out in 
Chapter 3 is explored in light of the outcomes of the two case studies, 
highlighting some limitations of applying theoretical constructs to developing 
regimes given political realities and constraints.   
 
7.1  INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION IN THE NORTH-EAST ATLANTIC 
 
7.1.1  Potential effectiveness of an offshore MPA regime 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.1.1) many regimes show characteristics of 
multiple processes of regime generation.  This is the case for offshore MPAs: the 
regime for offshore marine conservation did not develop spontaneously, it 
evolved through the modification of existing legislation with the addition of new 
rules and regulations.  While the legislation involved has been ‘imposed’, the 
‘negotiation’ process surrounding the Darwin Mounds closure played a pivotal 
role in its establishment.  At the same time however, efforts at negotiation were 
not sufficient to ensure success for a ban on pair-trawling for sea bass in the 
English Channel.   
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In examining the developing regime for offshore MPAs in the North-East 
Atlantic, it is quickly evident that it has the potential to perform with ‘mixed’ 
effectiveness.  As discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.1.2), theoretical approaches 
to characterizing environmental regime effectiveness have recently focused on 
three key variables: the ‘type of problem’ being addressed, the ‘problem-solving 
capacity’ of the regime and the related ‘political context’ (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2, 
section 3.1.2, from Miles et al. (2002)).  Looking at these variables more closely, 
it is apparent that the ‘type of problem’ addressed by offshore MPAs can vary in 
malignancy and in the state of knowledge about the problem, given the range of 
objectives for which an area may be designated (i.e. species and/or habitat 
conservation, fish stock regeneration etc.).  In examining the potential 
effectiveness of the Darwin Mounds MPA, for example, the problem was severe 
(i.e. irreparable damage to a coral reef) but the state of knowledge was good.  For 
the failed pair-trawl ban on the other hand, there was less consensus on whether 
the best available data on dolphin bycatch represented a severe problem in that 
situation.   
 
With regard to ‘problem-solving capacity’, although no set procedure for 
adopting decisions related to offshore MPAs yet exists, there is some potential 
for congruence given the mechanisms already in place in the CFP and Habitats 
Directive, as both DG Fisheries and DG Environment use Qualified Majority 
Voting (QMV)1 within the Council of Ministers to adopt Regulations and 
Directives, respectively.  During the interview process, a few members of the 
regulatory community commented negatively on QMV, e.g. that “decisions 
[taken] are about the Lisbon Agenda2, keeping fishermen in work […] short term 
benefits” [RC-04].  As another member of the regulatory community explained: 
 
“[There are] drawbacks of relying totally on the Community 
process, because of qualified majority voting.  What would have 
happened at the end of this Darwin Mounds procedure if the 
                                                     
1
 QMV and the process of European decision-making are described earlier in the thesis, see 
Chapter 2, section 2.4.6 
2
 The Lisbon Agenda was mentioned earlier in the thesis (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.4.1 at note 
123). 
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Council had voted not to approve the closure?  Where would we 
stand with meeting our obligations under the Habitats Directive?” 
[RC-03]. 
 
Other factors related to the ‘problem-solving capacity’ of the regime involve the 
roles of an Inter-Governmental Organization (IGO) and the epistemic 
community, the leadership of one or more parties to a regime, and the 
distribution of power within the regime’s membership.  There is, as of yet, no 
specific IGO tasked with overseeing an offshore MPA regime, however there 
have been discussions at recent forums on the developing European Maritime 
Policy and European Marine Strategy Directive of a need for an international 
Marine Management Organization (MMO).  A well-structured IGO with well-
defined links to/from relevant actors would clearly increase the potential 
effectiveness of an offshore MPA regime.  The idea of establishing a national 
MMO has also been discussed with reference to the UK’s developing Marine 
Bill (see discussion below in section 7.2.2).  The epistemic community is already 
well-integrated into decision-making regarding offshore marine conservation, 
and expert evidence played an important role in the outcome of the Greenpeace 
judgment and the Darwin Mounds emergency closure.  Given the arguably less 
favorable outcome of the pair-trawl ban, however, it is perhaps more valuable to 
analyze the way the science is interpreted and used, rather than just looking at 
whether it is ingrained in the decision process (as discussed in Chapter 6).   
 
With regard to leadership, by designating the first European offshore MPA, the 
UK is viewed by many as ‘gold-plating’ environmental standards and can 
consequently be considered as a ‘pusher’ and/or ‘instrumental leader’ in the 
process.  Whereas other Member States tend to take a ‘copy-out’ approach to 
implementing European Directives, the UK has been described as more likely to 
‘elaborate’ them, in order to provide greater clarity and certainty (NAO, 2005).  
This proactive approach is viewed both positively and negatively, depending on 
the perspective, as users understandably feel constrained by obligations they see 
the UK adopting that are taken less seriously by other Member States.  As a 
representative from the fishing industry put it:  
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“One of the disadvantages the UK fishing industry has always had 
is a competitive disadvantage because of the UK’s approach to 
Europe, both on gold-plating of regulations and the unilateral 
approach of our government bringing in legislation that will only 
actually apply to UK vessels” [UCF-01]. 
 
However, from a regime effectiveness standpoint, if some players take on a 
leadership role and pressure others to follow, there is increased potential for 
overall success.  This is true not only with regard to the development of 
environmental regimes, but also the success of international conventions and 
treaties.3  It is also true of EC interrelations, as under Article 2274 of the EC 
Treaty, when a Member State feels that another Member State has failed to fulfill 
an EC obligation (including environmental commitments), it can bring the matter 
before the ECJ.5   Theoretically, the UK’s leadership role in the Darwin Mounds 
closure and attempted pair-trawl ban should have resulted in positive outcomes 
in both cases.  However, given the politics behind the pair-trawl ban, this was not 
the case. 
 
The ‘political context’ for the developing regime is less simple to define as the 
marine environment’s inherent biological and spatial complexity implies 
linkages between issues and institutions that make it harder to analyze than a 
comparable terrestrial ecosystem.  However, the developing UK Marine Bill, 
European Maritime Policy and Thematic Marine Strategy aim to take the 
different issue areas into account, for example addressing pollution and transport 
as well as nature conservation by utilizing a Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) 
approach, as discussed earlier in the thesis (see Chapter 3, section 3.4.2 above, 
and section 7.2.2 below).  The comprehensive analysis of environmental regime 
analysis offered by Miles et al. (2002) uses ‘ulterior motives or selective 
measures for cooperation’ as a benchmark for measuring the ‘political context’ 
                                                     
3
 Chasek et al. (2006:42) define four possible roles for states during environmental regime 
formation: serving as a leader, a supporter, a swing state or vetoing/blocking the process.  A 
lead state has a strong commitment to effective international action on an issue, moves the 
process of negotiations forward, and attempts to gain the support of other state actors.  
4
 Formerly Article 170.  
5
 This right has been used several times to threaten court proceedings, but on only one occasion 
has it resulted in a decision by the ECJ, when France successfully brought proceedings against 
the UK for having unlawfully enforced domestic legislation setting a minimum mesh size for 
prawn fisheries, Case 141/78, France v. United Kingdom [1979] ECR 2923 (Sands 2003:185). 
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variable.  However, with respect to marine conservation, this variable fluctuates 
considerably.  In the case of the Darwin Mounds, as discussed in Chapter 5, there 
was a strong impetus from the Commission and DG Fisheries to make sure the 
closure went through, as it was the first use of the emergency closure mechanism 
within the revised CFP, and an environmental success would highlight the 
‘greening’ of European fisheries.  From the UK’s perspective, the political 
context was also supportive of a closure, given the government’s concern about 
the new deep-sea TACs and quotas coming into effect in European offshore 
waters in the summer of 2003.   
 
The political situation surrounding the pair-trawl ban was quite different, and its 
less successful outcome may have been partially due to the success of the Darwin 
Mounds measure.  The Darwin Mounds emergency closure was achieved as a 
result of consultation and compromise, and while not a simple process, the area 
concerned was relatively small and involved a limited number of specialized 
deep-sea fishermen.  In comparison, the pair-trawling industry involved a larger 
number of (mostly French) pelagic fishermen, fishing over a larger area, and 
hence with greater lobbying power on the Commission level (given the economic 
impact a ban on their activities would have).  This lobbying power was likely 
more proactive and resistant following the Darwin Mounds closure.  Members of 
the regulatory community involved in enforcement spoke about the potential for 
“a monumental human cry if the situation develops as the conservationers [sic] 
are proposing at the moment” [RC-02].  From the perspective of enforcement 
agencies, this would entail “riots on the quayside [and] potentially conflict at 
sea between fishery protection vessels and boats that will just ignore [them]” 
[RC-02].  It would be understandable for the UK fishing industry to feel cheated 
with the outcomes of both closures.  With the Darwin Mounds, the deep-sea 
fishing industry was stopped from operating while pelagic trawls (largely 
Spanish) were allowed to continue, and only UK fishermen are prohibited to use 
pair-trawling methods for catching sea-bass in EC waters.     
 
As  a result, while some of the factors used by regime theorists (e.g. Miles et al., 
2002) to define regime effectiveness are useful indicators for offshore 
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conservation in the North-East Atlantic, others remain unclear.  It is therefore 
useful to step back and examine offshore MPAs within a broader regime 
interaction context in order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the 
developing regime. 
 
7.1.2  Conventions and interactions 
The  Maritime Policy for the European Union (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.4.1) 
currently under development is being designed to provide an overarching 
framework for marine protection.  In the Green Paper currently open to 
consultation, the Maritime Policy is described as resting on twin pillars: the 
Lisbon strategy6 (i.e. sustainable development) and the ecosystem approach.  It 
acknowledges the challenges posed by the global nature of the oceans and large 
number of actors involved, but it also aims to unite policies on maritime 
transport, industry, coastal regions, offshore energy, fisheries, the marine 
environment and other relevant areas.  This is an enormous task, and the 
Maritime Policy’s reliance on the Lisbon Agenda has raised concern among 
members of the NGO community, given its focus on economic development and 
what can be perceived as the antithesis of the ecosystem approach:   
 
“I think there’s a lot of concern following the Lisbon summit, 
there’s been a kind of redefining of sustainable development.  You 
know we think about sustainable development as this three-legged 
stool of social, economic, environmental – the environmental leg 
has got very wobbly as of late and there’s a really strong drive to 
redefine sustainable development as underpinning the profitability 
of the sectors and making sure all this social and economic criteria 
are met” [NGO-04]. 
 
The draft European Maritime Policy refers to a ‘common EU maritime space’ 
governed by the same rules on safety, security and environmental protection.  A 
recent paper (Suárez de Vivero, 2006) casts doubt on this concept and raises an 
important question: is a unified marine policy the way forward or will it lead to 
chaos if inter-institutional linkages are not clearly defined beforehand? 
 
                                                     
6
 As mentioned above in section 7.1.1.  
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Regarding the European Marine Thematic Strategy and related Marine Strategy 
Directive (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.4.2), as mentioned earlier, there were 
concerns raised about its definitions of ‘Good Environmental Status’ (GES) and 
the lack of linkages to other Community legislation, such as the CFP, Water 
Framework Directive and the developing European Maritime Policy.  Another 
serious concern is the lack of fisheries provisions in the draft Directive.  One 
interviewee from the NGO community stated that DG Fisheries had been 
responsible for removing the criteria that fish stocks had to be recovered in order 
to attain GES, as: 
 
“Fisheries still are absolutely considered to be a resource and not 
a nature conservation aim, and therefore there’s the argument that 
no environmental legislation can really speak about fisheries 
resources” [NGO-07]. 
 
Until the Marine Strategy Directive and Maritime Policy are finalized, it is 
difficult to analyze these initiatives within a regime effectiveness framework.  
However, the relationships between these EC initiatives and other institutions in 
the offshore marine environment can be examined in light of vertical and 
horizontal institutional interactions.  For the purposes of this discussion, vertical 
interactions are those operating from the international to regional and/or national 
level (i.e. of a hierarchical nature), while horizontal interactions occur between 
institutions operating on the same level (e.g. between international conventions 
or between regional conventions etc).  Figure 7.1 provides a visual representation 
of the complexity of institutional interactions in both the vertical and horizontal 
dimensions. 
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Figure 7.1 Vertical and horizontal levels of institutional interaction 
 
(From: Caribbean Large Marine Ecosystem Project report, 2007, available on 
the Ocean Security Initiative website www.osi-int.org) 
 
The institutions and legislation in place of relevance to offshore marine 
conservation in the North-East Atlantic can be viewed on the global, regional and 
national levels.  For the UK, these include UNCLOS, CITES and the CBD on the 
global level, EC legislation (including the draft Marine Strategy Directive 
(MSD), Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), Habitats Directive (HD) and the 
developing European Maritime Policy), OSPAR, the CMS and the Bern 
Convention on the regional level, and the developing Marine Bill and Offshore 
Marine Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) Regulations on the domestic level.  
Figure 7.2 gives a schematic representation of these levels of governance.7   
 
This hierarchy represents the legislative framework for implementing offshore 
MPAs, however in practice not all of these institutions are currently actively 
involved in European offshore marine conservation issues (i.e. CITES, although 
it does include marine species found offshore in its Annexes).  While not legally 
                                                     
7
 This legislation and provisions related to offshore marine conservation are discussed in depth in 
Chapter 2.  
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binding, the 2003 World Summit on Sustainable Development and the 2003 
IUCN World Parks Congress are both included as they highlighted offshore 
marine conservation and, as mentioned in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.4), these 
initiatives may help shape future legislation. 
 
Figure 7.2  Hierarchical view of international, regional and UK legislation 
relevant to offshore marine conservation  
 
 
 
International regimes establish rules applicable to their members, leaving their 
implementation up to the members’ domestic arrangements.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, in the European Community, environmental Directives are 
implemented by Member States through the establishment of national legislation, 
a process known as ‘direct effect’.  Consequently, the effectiveness of legislation 
implemented in this manner is dependent on the performance of Member States’ 
national institutions, which is likely to vary between countries.  Young (2002a, 
2002b) identifies three sets of factors that play a key role in the interaction 
between international regimes and national implementation: competence, 
compatibility, and capacity.  Competence relates to the political and legal 
authority needed to implement commitments made at the international level.  
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Compatibility describes the fit or congruence between institutional arrangements 
set up under international commitments and the social practices prevailing within 
individual states.  Capacity estimates the potential a state has to successfully 
implement international obligations, measured by the availability of social and 
material capital.  The recent expansion of the EC by ten members in 20048 and 
two more in 20079 will likely pose some additional challenges to implementing 
environmental legislation equally within the now 27 Member States, given the 
discrepancy between their individual levels of competence, compatibility and 
capacity.10  The EC expansion process also entails a geographic shift away from 
the Atlantic and towards continental Europe, with the new Member States’ 
maritime activities focusing on the Baltic, Mediterranean and Black Seas (Suárez 
de Vivero and Rodríguez Mateos, 2006).  How this shift will affect the 
developing EC maritime legislation remains to be seen. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, both the EC and several Member States are parties to 
UNCLOS, NEAFC and OSPAR11, and recent ECJ case law12 has held that under 
certain circumstances, a provision in an international agreement concluded by the 
EC may be directly applicable in its Member States (see Chapter 2, section 
2.4.5).  It can inferred from these rulings that Member States are obliged to treat 
Conventions to which the EC is a Party as Community law.  In May 2006, an 
ECJ ruling13 on the dispute between Ireland and the UK regarding a nuclear 
(MOX) plant in Sellafield clarified that the whole of UNCLOS is EC law and 
forms an integral part of the EC’s legal order.  Figure 7.3 provides a 
diagrammatic representation of these institutions and their participants.          
                                                     
8
 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia joined the EC in May 2004.  
9
 Bulgaria and Romania joined the EC in January 2007.  
10
 The European Commission released a communication in 1998 specifically addressing 
environmental challenges of enlargement with regard to candidate countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  In particular, the Commission focused on the following areas of 
environmental management as the most lacking for integration with European standards: air 
pollution, water pollution and waste management [COM(98) 294 final].  
11
 See Chapter 2, Table 2.1.  
12
 Case C-213/03, Syndicat professional coordination des pêcheurs de l’Etang de Berre et de la 
region v Électricité de France of 15 July 2004; and Case C-239/03, Commission of the 
European Communities v French Republic of 7 October 2004.  
13
 Case C-459/03, Commission of the European Communities v Ireland of 30 May 2006, at 
paragraph 82. 
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Figure 7.3  Example of institutional interactions in the North East Atlantic  
 
 
 
Given that the EC is a signatory to UNCLOS and OSPAR, following the recent 
ECJ rulings, it appears that all Member States can be held accountable for marine 
protection issues stipulated by these conventions whether or not they themselves 
are parties.  The diagram above also illustrates that although Norway and Iceland 
are not members of the EC, their activities in the North East Atlantic are 
governed by their commitments to NEAFC, OSPAR and UNCLOS.14  
 
The OSPAR network of MPAs described earlier (Chapter 2 section 2.3.2) 
currently under development will initially be based on Natura 2000 sites already 
designated or in the process of being designated as SACs under the Habitats 
Directive.  This relationship can be seen as synergistic, as the OSPAR site 
                                                     
14
 Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein participate in the European Economic Area (EEA) 
Agreement which entered into force in 2004 and allows these countries to participate in the EC 
Internal Market without assuming the full responsibilities of EU membership (see Chapter 2, 
note 81).  The EC has three fisheries agreements with Norway: (i) bilateral (in the North Sea 
and the Atlantic), (ii) trilateral (with Denmark, Sweden and Norway in the Skagerrak and 
Kattegat), and (iii) a neighboring agreement covering the Swedish fishery in the Norwegian 
waters of the North Sea.  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2214/80 of 27 June 1980 on the 
conclusion of the Agreement on fisheries between the European Economic Community and the 
Kingdom of Norway, OJ L 226, 29.08.80, p.47. 
UNCLOS 
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Russia 
Denmark 
Norway 
Iceland 
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selection criteria, being newer, will include features not present in the annexes to 
the Habitats Directive.  However, during the interview process different 
perspectives emerged on the potential for OSPAR to promote offshore marine 
conservation.  Members of the regulatory community often seemed skeptical of 
OSPAR’s potential, even referring to OSPAR as “a ginger group” [RC-09] for 
testing out ideas, and emphasizing its limitations given “it doesn’t have a remit 
[i.e. competence] in relation to fishing” [RC-03].  There was also uncertainty 
from the regulatory community as to what exactly an OSPAR network of MPAs 
will entail, not only in its definition (i.e. they may simply be “double-badging” 
[RC-04] existing Natura 2000 sites) but also regarding enforcement:   
 
“The OSPAR network is simply a declaration.  OSPAR doesn’t 
take any disciplinary measures on the network.  OSPAR only 
declares that this zone is part of the OSPAR network of protected 
areas, and they can even propose a management regime but they 
cannot implement it by themselves.  That will be for Member States 
to – well, if they feel bound by this sort of recommendation, if they 
feel bound by an OSPAR decision which is not binding” [RC-01].  
 
OSPAR parties will likely determine the management regime for protecting any 
MPAs designated within the OSPAR network themselves, according to their 
national legislation.  However there is concern from the regulatory community 
that it will take a lot of work to prevent OSPAR sites becoming “paper parks” 
[RC-04], as there is no mechanism currently in place for monitoring or enforcing 
a network of MPAs set up under the OSPAR convention by a third party.  For 
sites already designated under Natura 2000, accountability is clearer and Member 
States are held responsible under their commitment to the Habitats Directive.  
For areas beyond national jurisdiction, however, there is as of yet no mechanism 
for monitoring and enforcing these sites, though OSPAR “will probably look to 
NEAFC to propose sites” [RC-04].  This may be a non-issue however, as one 
NGO representative commented: 
 
“I know the UK has put forward a stack [of Natura 2000 sites for 
the OSPAR network].  Most of these sites are going to be in the 0-
12nm and then there’ll be a scattering of sites beyond 12nm and 
virtually none beyond that” [NGO-04]. 
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While the OSPAR network offers an opportunity to designate sites involving 
species and habitats not included in the Habitats Directive annexes, and to 
designate sites on the high seas within the OSPAR area, this potential 
opportunity is perceived by some in the regulatory and NGO communities as 
lacking a strong mechanism for enforcement, compared with European 
Directives.  Legally however, the OSPAR Commission has the power to adopt 
binding decisions15, which its predecessors did not, and it also establishes the 
right of access to information about the maritime area of the Convention.16  
Legal experts interviewed also emphasized OSPAR’s broader approach to 
marine conservation, incorporating both the precautionary principle and an 
ecosystem approach, as well as having more flexibility than the Habitats 
Directive, e.g. including multiple-use areas [LC-04]. 
 
The oil and gas industry had an interesting perspective on OSPAR, finding it a 
more accessible forum for addressing marine issues related to their activities 
than, for example, going to Brussels.  As one representative put it: 
 
“The beauty of OSPAR is that if I have a problem or the UK has a 
problem, we can go there and have direct input and change things 
if we can persuade others.  The EU is a much bigger, more 
amorphous organization and I can lobby through the government 
and there’s the UK representation over there but they’re trying to 
lobby on millions of topics” [UCI-03]. 
 
There is some suspicion in the oil and gas industry that OSPAR will eventually 
be superseded by the European Maritime Policy and Marine Strategy Directive, 
i.e. that “OSPAR will come to an end and the EU will take over” [UCI-03].  
That, however, would leave out non-EC Member States currently accountable 
under the OSPAR Convention, namely Norway and Iceland, who would then 
only be bound by their commitments under UNCLOS and participation in 
NEAFC (i.e. in the same position as Russia).  Representatives from the oil and 
gas industry also expressed concern over the plethora of site protection 
designations in the marine environment and questioned whether having SACs, 
                                                     
15
 Art 10(3) and 13(2) OSPAR Convention.  
16
 Art 9 OSPAR Convention. 
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SPAs, SSSIs, MNRs and now OSPAR MPAs was an efficient way forward 
[UCI-03].  The greatest concern from the oil and gas industry, however, and one 
that was repeated frequently during interviews, was an exasperation that the 
fishing industry continues to operate with so few restrictions on their activities 
compared to the oil and gas industry, which views itself as highly regulated and 
extremely compliant with environmental protection measures in comparison.  An 
example of this sentiment follows: 
 
“We don’t say it in public because we have a very good 
relationship with the fishing industry now […] it’s annoying and 
very frustrating that every other sector, particularly oil and gas, 
has to go through such a rigorous environmental assessment 
procedure and the fishing industry doesn’t.  A lot of people say 
that the fishing industry is far more damaging than any other 
industry” [UCI-01]. 
   
Nevertheless, OSPAR does not include fishing activities within its regulatory 
sphere; this issue is left to the governance of the CFP within EC waters and 
UNCLOS and NEAFC within and beyond Member States’ EEZs/EFZs.   
Compared with other Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs), 
NEAFC is perceived by members of the NGO and epistemic community as “old 
fashioned and not transparent” [NGO-07], and moving only slowly towards 
having a role in biodiversity protection and mitigating fishing impacts on habitats 
[NGO-01].  
 
“Since the Darwin Mounds […] the only other thing that’s come 
through is this NEAFC development and that’s almost coming 
through another route, because of international pressure in 
general on bottom trawling as an ecosystem impact issue rather 
than specifically protecting coral” [EC-13]. 
 
One NGO representative commented that they are modernizing “in terms of at 
least the wording they’re using” [NGO-07] as they recently revised their statute 
to formally include the ecosystem approach, however they only accepted some of 
the closed areas originally proposed by the EC in 2005, based on 
recommendations from ICES, and these were all reduced in size before NEAFC 
parties agreed to closing them.  As one scientist remarked:  
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“They actually rejected one of the areas where we know there’s 
coral because that was one of the areas where a lot of fishing was 
going on. […] They left out the coral areas around the Rockall and 
Hatton Banks or at least a good part of it because of fishing 
interest.  More or less saying they’re quite happy to conserve areas 
as long as there’s no fishing going on there” [EC-13]. 
 
Thus it can be said that the NEAFC, while it may be doing more than some other 
RFMOs, is still viewed as only doing “the absolute minimum” [NGO-07]. 
 
In analyzing different perspectives on the complex institutional situation in the 
North-East Atlantic, several underlying issues emerged during the interview 
process.  In addition to confusion regarding the way parties to overlapping 
institutions will manage their obligations, there is also concern that the non-EC 
countries fishing in the area are not under enough surveillance by their 
participation in UNCLOS and NEAFC alone.  One exception to this latter 
concern is the fact that Norway has a strong history of protecting Lophelia 
pertusa in its own waters.17  UNCLOS and its potential role in managing the 
offshore environment came up very rarely during interviews, aside from its 
emphasis18 on the role of RFMOs in fisheries management.  Given that the 
Maritime Policy and Marine Strategy Directive are still under development, the 
most pertinent European legislation currently in force in the region is the 
Habitats Directive and the CFP.  However the bifurcation between nature 
conservation and fisheries management in the EC creates a situation of tension 
that upsets the developing regime for offshore MPAs.   
 
7.2  IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN OFFSHORE MARINE CONSERVATION 
The remainder of this chapter reflects on the limitations of applying 
environmental regime theory to the developing regime for offshore MPAs.  An 
issue of particular concern to many interviewees was whether/how an ecosystem 
                                                     
17
 See Chapter 2 (section 2.4.1.2) at note 91 for a listing of Norway’s cold water coral closures. 
18
 Article 61 of the LOSC, on the conservation of living resources in the EEZ requires coastal 
States to ‘ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance 
of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over exploitation’ 
and that ‘the coastal state and competent international organizations (regional fisheries 
organizations) shall cooperate to this end’. 
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approach is being implemented in the European marine environment.  This 
discussion then explores some further tensions that have not yet been directly 
addressed in the developing regime, but which emerged during the interview 
process and have the potential to impact the development of marine conservation 
policy.  These issues include the impact of devolution on the UK marine 
environmental policy and the role of third parties (such as Russia) in European 
fishery politics. 
 
7.2.1  An emerging framework  
When examined within the context of political realities, the regime analysis 
theoretical framework set out in Chapter 3 does not answer a key question posed 
by this thesis: why did the Darwin Mounds closure succeed while the pair-trawl 
ban did not.  For the most part, scholars of environmental regimes take a post hoc 
approach, examining outcomes and processes of regimes that are already in place 
and have produced some results.  In the case of offshore marine conservation, 
while international commitments and a legislative framework exists, major 
components are still in various stages of development, both on the regional (i.e. 
the EC Maritime Policy and Marine Strategy Directive) and local (i.e. the UK 
Marine Bill) level.  Consequently, taking a purely theoretical approach to 
examining the potential for offshore MPAs in the North-East Atlantic is not 
sufficient, and inclusion of the human element through the methodologies 
employed in this analysis (i.e. semi-structured interviews and participant 
observation) provided a wealth of useful information and allowed a greater 
understanding of issues affecting the developing regime. 
 
Given the difficulty in applying regime effectiveness criteria to a developing 
regime, it may be useful to focus on progress towards a stated goal as a means of 
assessing the potential for future European marine conservation initiatives.  This 
thesis has already drawn attention to the emphasis put on attaining an ecosystem 
approach to managing the marine environment within the developing regime.  
Whether this goal is being met is worth exploring further, based on evidence 
(both positive and negative) distilled in the interview process and from 
participation in regional meetings on the subject. 
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7.2.2  Evaluating RACs and MSP as the way forward 
During the interview process it became apparent that different stakeholders had 
varied perspectives on whether an ecosystem approach was appropriate and/or 
being properly applied in the offshore environment.  As a member of the NGO 
community remarked, “developing an ecosystem-based approach, that just isn’t 
happening and […] it should be.  It’s got a hell of a lot to do with the 
relationship between DG Fisheries and DG Environment” [NGO-04].  This 
tension between the DGs and the bifurcation between fisheries management and 
marine nature conservation were explored in more depth in the previous chapter, 
but it is worth noting again here that this lack of synergy has led to confusion and 
mistrust, from many perspectives.  A member of the epistemic community 
commented that:   
 
“All the talk in this new Marine Strategy that’s coming out is on 
ecosystem management and sustainable development but nobody 
knows what that means.  It’s not managing ecosystems, it’s 
managing human impact on ecosystems, that’s what they’re talking 
about and it’s fundamentally different things.  And I don’t think 
anyone really knows how to do that”  [EC-06]. 
 
The bifurcation between marine nature conservation and fisheries management 
poses a serious challenge to the implementation of an ecosystem approach in the 
marine environment.  As a member of the regulatory community commented: 
 
“We are of the view that either under the Habitats Directive you 
give powers to control fishing – which I simply don’t think will 
happen – or fisheries authorities have a responsibility to do what 
they say when they say they’re going to adopt the ecosystem 
approach.  And we’re firmly in the latter camp and we want to 
bring in necessary protections” [RC-08]. 
 
In addition, there may also be a “lurking suspicion” [NGO-04] among fishermen 
that by helping to identify the best areas for their fishing activity, these areas will 
be the first to be designated for protection and closed off.  This sentiment of 
mistrust regarding management was evident when a representative of the fishing 
industry described the worse case scenario of an MPA to be one with “… no 
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tangible management objectives, [which] doesn’t get monitored, and then gets 
left in place even though it’s not having its desired effect.  And that again just 
gives people very little confidence in the system” [UCF-02]. 
 
Oil and gas industry representatives also expressed suspicion and worry over the 
designation of offshore sites, citing the potential for areas to be “sterilized by 
either SACs or MPAs” [UCI-01].   This representative went on to explain: 
 
“Every potential habitat is treated as a candidate area and the 
operations are perhaps having to spend more time and money than 
they should need to in operating in these areas.  JNCC have been 
in particular taking a very precautionary approach to this.  The 
industry would like some certainty and it’s not happening at the 
moment” [UCI-01]. 
 
Another member of the oil and gas industry commented from a similar 
perspective: 
 
“I do have a slight concern that when you actually add all the 
different habitats together, essentially the whole sea floor is of 
conservation interest.  Whilst I am strongly in favor of a better 
understanding of the seabed environment and therefore the threats 
to it and therefore how you can mitigate those threats, I don’t think 
we could say that 100% of the seabed must be protected from 
either some or all activities.  Because if you applied that thinking 
to the land, then where would we go?  What would we do?  And the 
answer is nothing” [UCI-02].  
 
And a third representative from the oil and gas industry spoke along the same 
lines: “[my concern] is that you don’t tie things up so much you make life 
impossible everybody, or for industry.  I think we do probably need significant 
protected areas but striking the balance [is difficult]” [UCI-04]. 
 
Not surprisingly, many interviewees pointed to the development of the Marine 
Spatial Planning (MSP) concept and the role of Regional Advisory Councils 
(RACs) as the best means for achieving an ecosystem-based approach.  As set 
out earlier in Chapter 3, current legal and institutional approaches to offshore 
marine conservation are embracing these two mechanisms for implementing an 
ecosystem approach. 
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The RAC process for integrating stakeholder involvement in marine 
environmental decisions in the North East Atlantic has met with mixed reviews.    
While representatives from the fishing industry and regulatory community were 
optimistic about the RACs’ potential, some members of the epistemic and NGO 
community were concerned that their effectiveness may already be hampered by 
an inability to incorporate an ecosystem-based approach: 
 
“The RACs aren’t going to take on board an ecosystem-based 
approach, they see it as kind of like wallpaper I think, a backdrop 
for what they do, but they don’t see it as something they should be 
putting any effort into – partly because they think it’s a horizontal 
issue and that shouldn’t be something they should be too worried 
about with a regional seas approach.  But I would argue that it 
should be much more in the core of the RACs, something they 
should think about in the work that they take forward” [NGO-04]. 
 
As one representative from an environmental NGO put it, if the RACs don’t take 
forward an ecosystem-based approach, “we’re always going to be reliant on DG 
Fisheries to spearhead efforts, so we need the European Commission to be 
strong on this” [NGO-04].  Understandably, representatives from the fishing 
industry had the most positive views on RACs as means of access to the policy 
process.  One interviewee elaborated:   
 
“If you look down at the regional, participatory, co-management 
models – they tend to work a lot better than the top-down sort of 
remote bureaucracy that typifies the CFP in the last 20 years.  And 
RACs have to be the first step towards that.  Hopefully eventually 
they’ll take on more of an advisory function” [UCF-01]. 
 
Another representative of the fishing industry described RACs as “a body 
through which […] regional interests can propose alternative solutions or new 
solutions and fresh ways of thinking” [UCF-02].  However, an NGO 
representative personally involved in the RACs commented that although there is 
progress being made from the fishing industry’s perspective, it is: 
 
“[…] very much from the point of view of them protecting their 
own interests rather than from them inserting fisheries into this 
gamut of human activities that have the potential to be ecosystem-
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damaging activities.  They’re not doing this in the spirit of an 
ecosystem-based approach, they’re doing it to protect fishing from 
things that could damage their fishing interests”  [NGO-04].   
 
Interviewees from the NGO community expressed stronger support for the 
Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) approach, with one representative even calling it 
“a portal into the ecosystem-based approach to managing the seas” [NGO-04].  
Representatives of the fishing industry, on the other hand, were less supportive 
of the MSP approach and expressed concern that it could evolve into a land-
based system being applied to the marine environment, as “it’s just trendy, in 
vogue” and “a double edged sword” [UCF-01].  From this interviewee’s 
perspective, while MSP “could be useful to protect something vulnerable” such 
as spawning areas, “the government’s track record on spatial planning tends to 
be focused on cash directions, wind farms, oil and gas” [UCF-01]. 
 
A member of the NGO community pointed to the fishing industry’s support for 
RACs as being a result of their concern about competition with other industries: 
 
“The reason that the fishermen not only welcomed that proposal 
initially but also were happy to make an environmental NGO chair 
of the working group, which was a surprise in some ways […], was 
because the fishermen are very very concerned about the 
encroachment of other human activities such as wind farms, 
aggregate extraction, all the things we know happen in those 
waters […] the encroachment of those activities on their fishing 
activities” [NGO-04]. 
 
At the same time, there is some optimism in the fishing community, as another 
representative put it: “this is quite an unusual phase and a positive one as well 
because at least we’re now being involved in the decisions and having a direct 
input to shape and develop policy in some cases” [UCF-02]. 
 
For European marine conservation legislation currently under development, the 
Marine Strategy Directive does not take a MSP approach “other than identifying 
eco-regions” [NGO-07].  The draft Directive “does not prevent Member States 
from using a spatial tool to implement protective measures in their national 
waters, but it also doesn’t explicitly encourage them to do that” [NGO-07].  It is 
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likely that MSP will be more tightly integrated within the European Maritime 
Policy, a logical assumption given the different economic activities being 
integrated within it.   
 
The duty of coordinating a MSP approach may eventually fall to a Marine 
Management Organisation (MMO), which is one reason why the discussions 
over creating a MMO both on the international and domestic levels (i.e. within 
the context of developing European legislation as well as the UK Marine Bill) 
continues.  A MMO may be “essential if we’re going to have a system of marine 
planning” and “will probably take over the coordinating role but not finding, 
promoting, or managing sites” [EC-07].  This coordinating role would have key 
functions, “overseeing Marine Spatial Planning” [EC-07], provided it’s a 
successful strategy.  Yet there is still concern within the oil and gas industry that 
the fishing industry will not take MSP regulations seriously if they place 
constraints on their activities.  As one oil and gas industry representative put it: 
 
“I’ve heard them say at public meetings, fishermen’s 
representatives will talk about marine spatial planning for 
example, which is now looking like a prospect, ‘erect your plans, 
make your laws, we won’t have anything to do with them, we’ll go 
where we need to [in order] to find fish and catch them’.  And I 
think that’s true”  [UCI-03]. 
 
At a May 2007 Coastal Futures conference on the ecosystem approach19, which 
examined the concept generally, a questionnaire was distributed by the 
conference organizers in order to gain participants’ opinions on the topic.  Sixty 
participants (i.e. members of the regulatory, user and epistemic communities) 
completed and returned questionnaires.  Table 7.1 lists the key questions and 
percentages of positive and negative responses.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
19
 Coastal Futures Conference “Implementing the Ecosystem Approach”, 17 May 2007, held at 
the School for Oriental and Asian Studies (SOAS), University of London, London, UK. 
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Table 7.1  Coastal Futures conference participants’ perception of the 
ecosystem approach 
 
Question Agree  Disagree  Undecided 
1.  A hierarchy of policies, ideas and 
objectives exists in our approach to the  
management of the environment. 
92% 7% 1% 
2.  Sustainable development has primacy and 
is the overarching conceptual framework being 
applied in the UK. 
70% 20% 10% 
3.  The ecosystem approach is an important 
concept / 'principle' but like other 'principles' 
(e.g. the precautionary principle, freedom of 
information, participation) it informs 
sustainable development. 
67% 18% 15% 
4.  The ecosystem approach can provide a 
way/mechanism for delivering sustainable 
development in the marine/coastal/other 
environments. 
92% 0% 8% 
5.  The ecosystem approach can provide a 
way/mechanism for delivering sustainable 
development that is particularly 
appropriate/relevant to the marine 
environment. 
68% 12% 20% 
6.  Do we need a clearly defined methodology 
for translating sustainable development into 
practice in the marine environment? (Yes/No) 
84% 16% --- 
7.  Do you agree that the CBD-coherence 
model provides the basis for implementing the 
ecosystem approach? 
54% 10% 36% 
8.  Do you think that applying one or more of 
the ecosystem concepts to routine management 
is the way the ecosystem approach should be 
applied? 
60% 30% 10% 
9.  Perhaps its not either/or but both?  Do you 
think that both these have utility and can be 
utilised in appropriate situations? 
76% 0% 24% 
10.  Management by objectives, using an 
iterative process with feedback loops, 
indicators, targets and monitoring etc, is a 
given; do you: 
86% 9% 5% 
11.  Adaptive management is no different to 
the fundamental approach to the management 
systems approach outlined above?  Do you: 
52% 33% 15% 
12.  Would a Government / Agency guidance 
protocol help clarify this terminology and its 
application? (Yes/No) 
76% 24% --- 
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The results of this exercise can be seen as providing a general barometer for 
assessing how the ecosystem approach is being perceived within the UK marine 
community as of 2007.  Interestingly, there appears to be rather widespread 
optimism regarding the potential for implementing this concept in maritime 
activities, as well as its contribution towards sustainable development.  For 
example, most respondents (68%) were positive about the ecosystem approach as 
a ‘way/mechanism for delivering sustainable development that is particularly 
appropriate/relevant to the marine environment’ (question 5).   
 
A majority of respondents (76%) was also in favour of having a 
government/agency guidance protocol to help clarify the approach and its 
application (question 12).  This large proportion is in contrast to the opinion of 
the fishing industry gathered during the interview process, and may be a result of 
the fact that the Coastal Futures meeting attracted a higher number of regulatory 
authorities than other sectors.  A representative of the fishing industry 
commented negatively in an interview about the plethora of government 
guidance documents, and a perceived lack of targeted time scales and outcomes: 
 
“I think the focus from the government department to date, or at 
least from the last 18 months, has been to produce these glossy 
documents on ‘this is our vision on it’ but they are seldom followed 
up in an appropriate time scale to my mind with dates for action 
and dates for meetings and dates to get the process rolling.  So I 
think all of the strategies are very laudable in what they say but we 
want to know well when is it going to make a difference to people’s 
lives and when are these things actually going to be put into place.  
That’s the gap in the system at the moment from everybody’s 
perspective”  [UCF-02]. 
 
During the conference itself, however, one presentation (by the Crown Estate) 
focused on the issue of whether the ecosystem approach was simply ‘reinventing 
the wheel’ of sustainable development.   There also appeared to be some 
confusion in the discussions following the presentations on the actual definition 
of taking an ecosystem approach, i.e. whether this means addressing 
environmental protection on an ecosystem by ecosystem basis, versus taking a 
holistic approach whereby the policies reflect the complexity and 
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interdependency of the system being protected.  For example, one participant 
asked a question on ‘how do we determine ecosystem boundaries’ – which 
shows that the mechanisms for pursuing an ecosystem approach need to be better 
clarified and disseminated throughout the marine management community. 
 
7.2.3  Unaddressed tensions 
Of the themes that emerged during the interview process, two areas of tension 
were worth noting in the context of both present stalemates and future 
challenges.  These issues were (i) the role played by devolution in complicating 
the UK’s ability to simultaneously address marine nature conservation and 
fisheries management, and (ii) the potential impact of third party (i.e. non-EC 
nations’) fishing activities in the North-East Atlantic, such as Russia.  While not 
directly addressed in the developing marine conservation and fisheries 
management legislation, these issues have already affected the policy process 
and will continue to do so.  It is for this reason that they are explored in this final 
section of this chapter. 
 
It can be argued that the process of devolution that began in 1999 further slowed 
the implementation of the UK’s Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) 
Regulations offshore following the Greenpeace judgment, which was already 
complicated by the underlying tension between fisheries management and marine 
nature conservation.  Mirroring the European-level jurisdictional situation, 
within the UK nature conservation is devolved while fisheries is not.20  As a 
result, when the UK sends delegates to Brussels to discuss fisheries measures, it 
is the Whitehall representative that has bargaining power, while the Scottish (and 
other devolved governments’) representatives have observer status.  Not 
surprisingly, devolution and its effects were of a greater concern to members of 
the regulatory community interviewed in Scotland than their English 
counterparts.  In particular, Scottish regulatory authorities emphasized that since 
“all fisheries legislation is decided at Europe practically,  […] DEFRA or the 
relevant Whitehall department reserves the sole right to act at the European 
                                                     
20
 This was touched upon earlier in the thesis.  See Conclusion of Chapter 2, section 2.6, at note 
146. 
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level” [RC-05] resulting in the Scottish authorities feeling unable to act or even 
withheld from acting at the European Council level.  When speaking about the 
Darwin Mounds closure, a Scottish representative emphasized that its 
achievement was “a high priority politically”, and:  
 
“[It had to be delivered] before the resolution of the tensions 
between the Habitats Directive and environmental protection and 
fisheries policy got resolved to our disadvantage, because if you’re 
adopting the ecosystem approach to fisheries management and you 
decide to institute a whole load of fisheries legislations under 
environmental powers, and those are held by London, then 
actually the primary issue of devolution to Scotland of fisheries 
management becomes redundant”  [RC-08]. 
 
Certainly devolution will complicate the UK’s implementation of future EC 
legislation on the marine environment, i.e. the developing Marine Strategy 
Directive and Maritime Policy.  Devolution already poses challenges to the 
developing UK Marine Bill, as a member of the NGO community remarked: 
 
“One of the biggest challenges for the Marine Bill and MSP is 
going to be the extent to which the devolved country issues can be 
addressed and resolved […] we’re beginning to see different 
layers of governance and different waters in what was formerly 
just UK waters, and that poses quite significant problems of 
jurisdiction and governance for the Marine Bill”  [NGO-04]. 
 
Another area of concern that emerged in interviews with members of the 
regulatory community and representatives from the fishing industry, was the role 
currently being played by Russian fishery interests in the North-East Atlantic 
through its participation in NEAFC.  Several members of the regulatory 
community commented that Russia is a “law unto itself” [RC-08] and blocks 
agreement regarding technical conservation measures, resulting in TACs being 
set according to levels that will “buy off” [RC-05] Russian fishery interests, 
which have a history of overfishing areas with inappropriate gear until stocks 
disappear, and then moving onto other areas.  As a member of the regulatory 
community involved in enforcement commented:  
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“Unfortunately they [NEAFC] can’t reach agreement on certain 
issues including technical conservation measures so Russians are 
in the NEAFC area are using mesh sizes that we would throw our 
hands up in horror at”  [RC-02]. 
 
A member of the regulatory community involved in NEAFC spoke plainly:  
 
“If it wasn’t going to cause such ruptions, we’d throw them out of 
NEAFC  because they are right now behaving appallingly” [RC-
08]. 
 
Representatives from the UK fishing industry indicated they feel constrained by 
their obligations under NEAFC and resent Russian activities in the area, which 
from their perspective “make absolute nonsense of the system” [UCF-02].  As 
shown in Figure 7.3 above, Russia’s legal obligations with respect to marine 
conservation in the North East Atlantic are bound only through UNCLOS and 
NEAFC.  Consequently, without a UN moratorium on destructive fishing 
practices, and given the way Russia has been lobbying within NEAFC, any 
constraint on its behavior seems unlikely.  In addition, as Russia does not have a 
VMS agreement with the EC, its vessels are not visible to enforcement 
authorities responsible for monitoring EC waters.  As one explained:  
 
“A Russian vessel is not normally visible to us because the EU 
doesn’t have any VMS agreement with Russia in the NE Atlantic, 
they have one in the Baltic but not the NE Atlantic.  VMS only 
works across countries where you have a data sharing agreement”  
[RC-07]. 
 
Consequently, enforcement authorities “would not expect to have any 
communications directly with the Russians in that regard because they’ve no 
fishery rights in EC waters” [RC-02] and “if they’re fishing illegally in EC 
waters they’re invisible to us” [RC-07].  However, as far as I could tell in 
conversations with enforcement authorities, no infringements of the Darwin 
Mounds closure by Russian trawlers have occurred, as one commented: “to be 
fair, I’ve just brought them up as a risk – they haven’t actually caused us any 
problems in the Darwin Mounds area” [RC-07].  Nevertheless, if the 
enforcement authorities do not have access to Russian VMS data within EC 
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waters, how can they be certain that vessels are not operating in MPAs within the 
200nm EFZs/EEZs of Member States?  An interviewee from the regulatory 
community appeared confused about the availability of information on Russian 
fishing vessels, and pointed to the enforcement authorities’ reliance on the 
observations of EC fishermen, who have an incentive to report sightings of non-
EC vessels from a competition perspective: “our boats are always complaining 
about them, we send the plane out, it sees them there and we send the protection 
vessel out” [RC-08]. 
 
Some Russian trawlers are licensed to operate in the Faeroese zone (north-west 
of Scotland) and Russians are also “active in the NEAFC area” [RC-07].  
Several interviewees involved in offshore fishery monitoring and/or NEAFC 
complained about Russian fishery practices.  As one member of the regulatory 
community that interacts with them put it, “Russia catches the same TAC every 
year regardless of what the science advice is”  [RC-05]. And:  
 
“Russia just completely ignores all environmental legislation, it 
fishes with tiny mesh size, lifting bags, blinders, a whole list of 
various things we’ve banned in the UK in the name of conservation 
and they’ve just totally ignored [them] and they’re just fishing and 
fishing and fishing” [RC-05]. 
 
According to this interviewee, NEAFC is not strong enough to control Russian 
fishing behavior, i.e. “you can’t really take strong enforcement activity, like you 
couldn’t ban Russia from the NEAFC area, that’s not going to happen”  [RC-
05].  A key concern that arises from watching Russia’s behavior within NEAFC 
is how offshore MPAs beyond EC waters will be protected.  While NEAFC has 
managed to put forward some fishery closures in recent years (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.3.4), these areas were reduced in size and number from the original 
proposals.  A member of the regulatory community summarized well the 
challenge of implementing international marine conservation in the offshore zone 
when they said: 
 
“How on earth do you close a fishery in international waters?  
That is going to be even more complex than the Darwin Mounds 
and god knows the Darwin Mounds were not a simple closure.  
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That’s the problem with managing fisheries in international 
waters, you cannot take unilateral action.  There’s a common cry 
out from the British, UK [and] Scottish fishing industry to 
withdraw from the CFP, repatriate the waters and manage it – 
ours alone” [RC-05]. 
 
The idea of withdrawing from the CFP was encountered only in interviews with 
members of the Scottish regulatory community, and only when discussing the 
tensions caused by devolution.  These interviewees did not speak about the issue 
of seceding as their own perspective, but that of fishing industry representatives.   
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the limitations of using regime theory to predict the 
potential effectiveness of marine conservation initiatives in European waters.  In 
examining the institutional framework set out in Chapter 2 within theoretical 
constructs of regime interactions, it is unclear how the different initiatives will 
co-exist, as they are still in a developmental stage.  The analysis of different 
interviewee perspectives sheds more light on how these initiatives are moving 
towards achieving their goal of implementing an ecosystem approach in the 
marine environment.  In particular, the establishment of RACs through the 
revised CFP and the implementation of MSP on a national level within European 
Member States should improve stakeholder engagement (in the case of the 
former) and better inter-agency integration with a more accurate ecological 
approach (though the latter).  However, these mechanisms must be implemented 
carefully and with repeated opportunities for feedback, i.e. through an adaptive 
management mechanism as outlined earlier in the thesis in Chapter 3 (section 
3.3.1). 
 
Some additional areas of potential concern have not been directly addressed in 
the developing regime, namely the impact of the political process of devolution 
within the UK and the role of non-EC member fishing industry activity in the 
North-East Atlantic.  With regard to the impact of devolution on the UK’s 
capacity for implementing nature conservation measures that intersect with 
fisheries management issues, it is evident that this policy has already resulted in 
complications, e.g. the delayed implementation of the UK’s Conservation 
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(Natural Habitats, etc.) Regulations offshore.  Whether this will continue to be a 
complicating factor in the UK’s participation in European marine conservation, 
or whether the process can be streamlined in some way, remains to be seen.  In 
addition to the challenge posed by the bifurcation between fisheries management 
and marine nature conservation in European waters, the irresponsible fishing 
activity of third parties such as Russia in the North-East Atlantic does not bode 
well for future offshore MPA development.  Already, NEAFC compromised on 
the size, number and locations of its recent fishery closures.  The lobbying power 
of less cautious fishing nations within NEAFC is not dissimilar to the politics 
within the European Commission, a result of which was seen in the outcome of 
the UK’s attempt to ban EC vessels from pair-trawling within its territorial 
waters.   
 
The next and final chapter summarizes key arguments and draws the thesis 
together, while pointing out areas of potential future research. 
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8 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
  
 
 “There are as many opinions as there are experts”  
(Franklin D. Roosevelt) 
 
OVERVIEW 
This thesis explores opportunities and challenges for the developing regime of 
offshore marine conservation in the North-East Atlantic.  Several key issues 
arose during the legal review and the interview process, which have been 
examined in light of theoretical approaches to international environmental 
governance and legal obligations associated with marine nature conservation and 
fisheries management.  Chapter 1 set out the following research questions, which 
this thesis has sought to address: 
 
• What are the challenges to the developing regime of offshore Marine 
Protected Areas? 
 
• What are the problems, gaps and issues with the current regime? 
 
• What role is played by the relevant actors and their regulators and what 
are their perspectives? 
 
• What is the potential impact of legislative reform currently underway? 
 
• How does the UK’s situation differ from that of other EU states under the 
same legal obligations?   
 
• What lessons are to be learned for offshore MPAs as a whole?  
Recommendations? 
 
This final chapter examines inter-related and overarching themes that emerged 
from the exploration of these questions, and highlights where further research 
would be beneficial.     
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8.1  OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
The legal framework outlined in Chapter 2 offers significant potential for 
synergy in the future development of offshore marine nature conservation 
measures in European waters.  At the same time, there is an underlying challenge 
posed by the legislative divide between fisheries management and marine nature 
conservation.  The designation of offshore MPAs is going forward: the UK has 
compiled a list of potential sites under the Habitats Directive and these, in 
combination with sites put forward by other Member States, will likely form the 
first batch of OSPAR MPAs (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3 in Chapter 2).   
 
Given the ramifications of the Greenpeace judgment and subsequent ECJ case 
law discussed in Chapter 2, all EC Member States are (i) required to implement 
the Habitats Directive out to the 200nm extent of their EFZs/EEZs (Case C-
06/04); and (ii) obliged to treat Conventions to which the EC is a Party as 
Community law (de Berre Case), including UNCLOS (MOX Case).  
Consequently, as the OSPAR MPA network develops, this legal precedent may 
provide an opportunity for ensuring EC Member State compliance.  As a result, 
while the potential tension between OSPAR and EC designations poses a 
challenge for offshore MPAs, it also presents an opportunity for OSPAR to push 
the EC process forward. 
 
Having designated the EC’s first offshore MPA around the Darwin Mounds, the 
UK is in a position of leadership compared with other Member States.  Yet, 
following the outcome of the UK’s attempt to ban pair-trawling for sea bass, it is 
evident that fisheries politics continue to pose a serious obstacle to the successful 
implementation of marine conservation measures in European waters.  This 
difficulty will only be magnified further offshore, and of course in international 
waters.  As a representative of the NGO community commented: 
 
“Certainly the UK is further ahead than other EU Member States 
(other than Denmark and Germany who have managed to move 
faster), but generally across the European scene the situation for 
offshore protection is really still quite weak and poor” [NGO-04]. 
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From a legal standpoint however, there is some potential for future stakeholder 
involvement in environmental decision-making through the provisions of the 
Aarhus Convention (discussed in Chapter 2).  If viewed within the ramifications 
of the Wadden Sea judgment,  which stipulates inter alia that fishing activities 
can be considered a ‘plan or project’ under the Habitats Directive, there may be 
increased potential for NGOs and the public to have a greater participatory role 
and affect decision-making in situations where fisheries management and marine 
nature conservation overlap.  Increased stakeholder participation is an objective 
of the developing European legislation for marine nature conservation, as 
evidenced by the recent establishment of RACs under the revised CFP.  However 
if these initiatives do not live up to the high expectations placed upon them, it is 
worth noting that legal action through the Aarhus Convention may eventually 
provide a back-up mechanism for ensuring this aim. 
 
Regarding a primary aim of the legislative framework currently under 
development, namely the implementation of a precautionary and ecosystem-
based approach to managing European marine waters, this thesis has 
demonstrated that meeting these goals is a significant challenge.  Indeed, the 
appropriateness of the revised CFP emergency closure mechanism as a 
precautionary approach can be questioned, given the Commission’s rejection of 
the UK proposal to ban pair-trawling in the English Channel.  This is not to say 
that the revised CFP is incapable of preventing damage to habitats and species 
resulting from fishing activities.  Rather, this rejection demonstrates that it is 
relatively inflexible in the face of scientific uncertainty and does not require the 
shift in the burden of proof to the fishing industry necessary to fully implement 
the precautionary principle and the Habitats Directive.  A representative from the 
NGO community raised a serious concern about the way the UK is addressing 
marine conservation objectives: 
 
“The UK government is looking to find areas that simultaneously 
provide conservation and fisheries benefit.  And […] the reason for 
doing that is that they’re trying to get more bang for their buck, 
it’s clearly an extremely expensive issue to manage a site network, 
whether it be Natura 2000 or OSPAR or whatever.  It’s pretty 
clear to me that the UK has been trying to find areas which will 
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deliver multiple benefits so that they can get the nature 
conservation and the fisheries benefits and tie it up in one parcel 
and get better value for money.  So that in itself shows you just the 
sort of constraint […] that begins to puts the policy-making 
through a bottle-neck immediately” [NGO-04]. 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, given the complex adaptive nature of the marine 
environment, having a complex institutional framework mirroring the nature of 
the environment it is designed to address may be the most flexible and effective 
means of ensuring successful protection.  Complexity allows for co-evolutionary 
processes and adaptive co-management.  The type and reliability of the science 
used in decision-making plays a key role in the successful establishment of 
protective measures, especially given the role of precaution in environmental 
decision-making.  While it can be argued that ‘precaution’ has been 
misinterpreted in some circumstances, it is nevertheless a key concept that has 
been integrated into the legislative framework governing marine conservation.  
In cases where it may appear that precaution is not being taken into account in 
the decision-making process, it is up to the policy-makers and the stakeholder 
community to ensure that a precautionary approach is prioritized.   
 
With regard to institutional blockages versus synergy, this thesis has explored the 
framework of legislation and institutions governing the marine environment in 
the North-East Atlantic, and has attempted to identify areas and issues that seem 
likely to pose challenges for implementing offshore MPAs.  The delay in the 
offshore extension of the UK’s national legislation implementing the Habitats 
Directive shows quite clearly the difficulty inherent in revisiting legislation that 
was drafted in a different policy environment, at a different time.  The remainder 
of this concluding chapter addresses overarching themes and areas for future 
research.   
 
8.2  IMPROVING THE POLICY PROCESS: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN MARINE 
NATURE CONSERVATION AND FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
The implications of the offshore application of the Habitats Directive should not 
be underestimated; the UK has already been prosecuted by the ECJ for delaying 
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the extension and implementation of its Conservation (Natural Habitats, etc.) 
Regulations.  In terms of designating offshore MPAs, the UK has “the largest 
area of offshore waters” compared with other Member states and “if we’re going 
to go about it in a systematic way it’s going to take us longer to come up with 
actual areas” [RC-10].  As a result, it is unlikely that the process of designating 
Natura 2000 and/or OSPAR sites will be completed for the UK’s EFZ quickly.  
As a representative from the NGO community put it, “we don’t expect to see 
Natura 2000 completed for UK waters for well into the next decade, probably 
2015 or something” [NGO-04].   
 
Another constraint on the UK policy process was highlighted by a member of the 
scientific community, who commented that “in the UK, marine research is not 
policy driven at all. […] Conservation is almost a dirty word”  [EC-13].  This 
feeds into the issue of ‘whose science’ which was addressed earlier in Chapter 6, 
i.e. if there is greater emphasis put upon science originating from, for example, 
ICES than from other sources, this may result in a situation where the actual 
conservation needs are not being  addressed.  As a member of the NGO 
community remarked:  
 
“ICES is largely dominated by fisheries scientists and it will just 
fundamentally be different to advice for the inshore for example 
that are led by ecologists, marine biologists.  I think in terms of 
effectiveness that has got to be a key issue, the basic standards and 
the ability to protect will be determined by very different sets of 
views” [NGO-03]. 
 
From an institutional effectiveness perspective and in examining the interactions 
between institutions currently addressing marine conservation issues in the 
North-East Atlantic, there are several areas of potential conflict that need to be 
addressed in order to facilitate the policy process.  While OSPAR will benefit 
from the Habitats Directive, by using the latter’s Natura 2000 network as a 
starting point for its own network of MPAs, there needs to be a concerted effort 
to make sure that the OSPAR network goes above and beyond the Habitats 
Directive and includes habitats and species not currently included in the 
Directive’s Annexes, as these are not likely to be amended in the near future.   
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Geographical issues with regard to the expansion of Europe and consequent 
strain on the monitoring of protected areas should also be taken into account, as 
should the destructive behavior of non-EC countries that operate fishing 
activities in the North-East Atlantic.  There is some potential for action from the 
UN towards a moratorium on deep-sea bottom trawling (although this initiative 
has already been delayed), however the current situation whereby Russia is 
perceived as a negative force within NEAFC and a threat to marine conservation 
in the offshore North-East Atlantic needs to be addressed.  There may be 
potential for other parties of both NEAFC and UNCLOS to take Russia to the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) if it is indeed not taking 
its responsibilities seriously and using inappropriate gear, as well as 
compromising the goals and TACs operating in NEAFC.  Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations (RFMOs) must improve their capacity to integrate 
fisheries management and marine ecosystem protection.  In the words of a 
member of the epistemic community: “whether or not [RFMOs] are actually 
competent to deal with the ecosystem impacts of deep sea fishing or to actually 
manage conservation areas [is questionable].  For the moment they probably 
aren’t” [EC-13]. 
 
The lack of communication between DG Fisheries and DG Environment must 
also be addressed, and their work should be joined in a more visible manner.  
Although they engage in consultations, the fact that the Marine Strategy 
Directive and Maritime Policy are institutionally separated during their 
development could prove problematic.  The fisheries sector in Europe needs to 
accept more responsibility for implementing an ecosystem approach, and to learn 
from ICES in that regard, as the latter have gone through a major restructuring 
recently which several interviewees commented was a progressive change they 
would also welcome seeing occur in DG Fisheries.   
 
The bifurcation between fisheries management and nature conservation must be 
formally addressed despite the inherent political difficulties in approaching this 
topic, as fisheries are no longer simply an agricultural product when activities 
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associated with the fishing industry are causing negative impacts on the marine 
environment on such a wide scale (compared with agriculture).  Although many 
interviewees agreed that this bifurcation was a serious issue, none offered 
suggestions on how to resolve it.  We have already seen some positive 
interaction between the CFP and Habitats Directive in the designation of the 
Darwin Mounds MPA, whereby the emergency closure mechanism available in 
the revised CFP was invoked and allowed for the protection of the Darwin 
Mounds where the Habitats Directive could not.  However, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, the subsequent attempt to use the CFP emergency closure mechanism 
to protect dolphins in the English Channel met with less success.  As a member 
of the epistemic community remarked: 
 
“Realistically, the CFP itself is in the early stages of developing its 
distinctly ‘environmentalist’ credentials and one dodgy call does 
not necessarily mean an abandonment of these principles, but in 
truth the failure to support the UK proposal does not augur well” 
[EC-03]. 
 
This does not bode well for the future converging of fisheries management and 
marine nature conservation interests.  The developing Maritime Policy and 
Marine Strategy Directive provide an opportunity to resolve some of the tensions 
inherent in this bifurcation, but do not appear to be taking this path. Although 
fisheries legislation has a long history of being viewed within the economic (i.e. 
agricultural) priorities of states, and has only recently been integrated with 
environmental concerns, there is room for improvement, and whether this will be 
part of the developing Maritime Strategy for Europe and the Marine Strategy 
Directive remains to be seen.  Even with these two initiatives, however, the 
disconnect is present, with the Maritime Strategy under the auspices of DG 
Fisheries, while the Marine Strategy Directive is being drafted within DG 
Environment.  Also, as pointed out by interviewees from the NGO community, 
there is a risk that these initiatives are being driven by economic rather than 
environmental concerns, following the Lisbon Agenda, with significant 
ramifications for the evolution of sustainable development and an ecosystem 
approach with regard to marine environmental management.     
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Nevertheless, the Darwin Mounds closure is a unique case, and hopefully not the 
only time that the revised CFP will be used successfully to implement an 
offshore closure for nature conservation purposes.  As a member of the 
regulatory community involved in enforcement put it, “I think if ten years ago 
you said to somebody that a conservation measure would be enforced through 
legislation that was introduced via the CFP, they would have laughed at you” 
[RC-02].  A representative from the NGO community remarked that: 
 
 “The Darwin Mounds is a fantastic step forward but it also 
throws into sharp relief all the challenges to the sector and 
engaging in the process.  I’ve heard that particularly from the 
French who did a lot of fishing out there – the Darwin Mounds 
really shook them to the core really, they thought my God, is this 
the start of a trend?” [NGO-04]. 
 
Increasing the role of stakeholder engagement during the development of the 
institutions described in this thesis should improve their addressing issues of 
overlapping interest, despite being drafted by separate DGs with limited 
willingness to collaborate.  It may be that the EC’s obligations as a Party to 
OSPAR will help push forward a more symbiotic approach to marine nature 
conservation in areas subject to threat by fishing activities.  This is not a 
certainty, however, given that OSPAR does not include fisheries within its remit.  
Rather, the CFP and NEAFC remain the primary management bodies for fishing 
activities in the North-East Atlantic.  Given the political situation within NEAFC 
discussed in Chapter 7, it seems unlikely that this RFMO will provide more than 
the bare minimum with regard to fisheries conservation measures.  With Russia 
pushing NEAFC in a negative direction and the French fishing lobby pushing the 
Commission on the use of the CFP emergency measures, one might think that the 
future for reconciling marine conservation with fisheries management has its 
hands tied.   
 
Further research comparing the performance of different RFMOs with regard to 
marine nature conservation, as well as how to address the tension between 
fishing and conservation on the high seas would be useful.  It would also be 
interesting to explore options for UN-based moratoria on the high seas, and 
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whether this is a feasible (or desirable) route.  While RFMOs may not be making 
great strides in the conservation of marine living resources, they are the only 
bodies currently affecting fishing on the high seas, and may provide the only 
means for controlling fishing in areas beyond national jurisdiction (in the 
absence of UN-based rules). 
 
8.3  A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD  
The quest for ‘a level playing field’ was an overarching theme that emerged 
during the interview process.  For the cases analyzed in this thesis, this issue 
involves not only the UK’s role within the EC, but also the ramifications of 
devolution within the UK.  Members of the regulatory community based in 
Scotland were predictably the most vocal about their sense of disconnect from 
the policy process due to the fact that fisheries management now lies within the 
remit of the Commission on the European level, and Whitehall on the UK level.   
 
Interviewees from the oil and gas industry expressed disappointment that they 
were held more visibly accountable for marine environmental protection in the 
public eye than the fishing industry, especially given the fact that the Darwin 
Mounds themselves were discovered by the AFEN industry-science partnership.  
As one representative from the oil and gas industry remarked: 
 
“It’s a shame [Greenpeace] cant find a way to reconcile their 
policy of no oil, it’s impractical, as a long-term aim I can 
understand – but if you shut off oil tomorrow you’ll get lynched in 
the streets, there would be civil unrest.  They say they need aims.  
What they need are sustainable, measurable, achievable, realistic, 
targeted aims.  We’re trying to have 10% renewables by 2010, 
20% by 2020, that’s the way to do it” [UCI-03]. 
 
The epistemic community voiced concern over the role of science in policy-
making, particularly with regard to the appropriate interpretation of their results 
without, for example, political priorities dictating which science to use in 
decision-making.  This is a complex issue that warrants further study, but it is 
interesting to highlight here that the scientists’ perspective can, like that of 
industry, be viewed as a quest for a ‘level playing field’ with regard to the use of 
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their work.  With stakeholder participation and public access to information on 
decision-making increasing, the further incorporation of NGO and public 
perspectives into the policy process may provide a more balanced approach 
towards gaining ‘a level playing field’. 
 
Members of the fishing industry expressed resentment that their livelihood was 
restricted, in comparison with that of other Member States, particularly with 
regard to the domestic ban on pair-trawling for sea bass in the English Channel.  
Interestingly, while UK fishing representatives expressed optimism that their 
involvement in the policy process was increasing through mechanisms like the 
newly-formed RACs under the revised CFP, it was also clear that had they had 
more access to information at the time, they may have voiced dissent about the 
Darwin Mounds closure.  As one representative put it, the closure was “done and 
dusted” [UCF-02] before they had a chance to voice their opinion.  This raises 
the question: did the fishing industry (in particular, the French) learn a lesson 
from the relatively quick and efficient policy process that went into the Darwin 
Mounds closure that caused them to lobby so strongly and successfully against 
the UK attempt to ban pair-trawling for sea bass in the English Channel?  While 
French interests pushed for the boundaries of the Darwin Mounds closure to be 
altered, this was largely a symbolic maneuver as it occurred late in the process 
and did not amount to a large area in which to allow the continuation of fishing 
efforts, however much or little may have been going on there.   
 
Representatives from the NGO community were also quite positive about their 
increased participation in the policy process, with one remarking that they felt 
their inclusion as observers within the OSPAR Commission since the adoption of 
Annex V in 1998 had given them a voice [NGO-02].  An interesting related issue 
is that of political synergy within the NGO community.  In the case of the 
Darwin Mounds closure, Greenpeace ignited the issue through its Atlantic 
Frontier Campaign and the subsequent Greenpeace judgment, and the campaign 
was then shepherded by WWF through the development of its North-East 
Atlantic Programme, lobbying for closures, with the Institute for European 
Environmental Policy (IEEP) working more behind the scenes in Brussels.  
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While this worked well for the Darwin Mounds closure, there was less success 
for the NGO coalition that pushed for a ban on pair-trawling on sea bass.  Could 
this be because in the case of the Darwin Mounds, the NGOs were acting more 
independently (i.e. not as a formal coalition), or perhaps because the political 
process in Brussels (including lobbying by the fishing industry) was strong 
enough forces to outweigh the benefits of having an NGO consortium behind the 
issue?   
 
8.4  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis has sought to address the potential opportunities and challenges for 
offshore marine conservation in European waters through an interdisciplinary 
synthesis.  This approach highlighted the limitations of taking a purely 
theoretical regime effectiveness approach to understanding a developing regime, 
such as is the situation in the European marine environment.  It would be useful 
to continue to examine the development of regional initiatives, i.e. the Marine 
Strategy Directive and European Maritime Policy, to see whether they will adapt 
in order to alleviate the tension between fisheries management and marine nature 
conservation.  Equally, it will be important to gauge the development of the 
OSPAR network of MPAs.  Comparing the progress of individual Parties and 
Member States towards their commitments under the Habitats Directive and 
OSPAR would also be useful, especially with the recent (and future) expansion 
of European Community membership.   
 
Further consideration of the effects of the Aarhus Convention on European 
environmental politics and decision-making would be valuable, including the 
role of stakeholder participation in the development of marine environmental 
legislation and whether this differs from terrestrial examples.  The continued 
development of the RAC consultation process may provide a comparative 
framework, especially as some regions are likely to be more active than others.  
In addition, an examination of how European expansion is affecting its 
environmental record with respect to marine conservation would also be 
interesting.   
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The uncertainty inherent in the complex nature of the marine environment is 
further complicated by political uncertainties.  A more in-depth examination of 
fisheries politics versus offshore marine conservation is an area that must be 
explored as more cases present themselves.  This examination should extend 
beyond Europe, comparing the EC’s legal and political situation with that of 
other regions (e.g. the Americas, South East Asia, etc.) in order to better 
understand tensions on the high seas and weaknesses within RFMOs.   
 
It would also be interesting to evaluate the actual monetary value of deep-sea 
fisheries and how this is changing as fishermen move offshore following the 
depletion of fish stocks closer to shore.  It would be particularly useful to 
examine stakeholder perspectives on how fuel prices affect fishing behavior, if at 
all, and how the fishing industry’s shift offshore has affected politics and 
decision-making in Brussels.   
 
As a result, a two-fold approach to understanding the interaction between 
fisheries and conservation in the offshore marine environment should be taken.  
On the one hand, the economic incentives for deep-sea fishing should be 
assessed, with a sense of how consumer demand (or lack thereof) can potentially 
affect this destructive practice.  On the other end of the spectrum, a closer 
analysis of how fisheries politics is affecting marine environmental politics in 
Brussels is necessary, as well as whether or not the mechanisms for incorporating 
stakeholder perspectives (e.g. RACs) are achieving their goals. 
 
Recalling the international initiatives towards networks of MPAs set out at the 
beginning of the thesis, it will also be key to monitor international progress 
towards the 2012 goal set by the WSSD, IUCN and CBD in order to assess 
international political will for offshore marine conservation.  This thesis has 
focused on UK scenarios, and given the UK is widely viewed as a leader in 
marine environmental affairs, the disparate outcome of the Darwin Mounds and 
attempted pair-trawl ban does not bode well for European-wide marine 
conservation initiatives.  However, as detailed in this study, legal mechanisms 
and practice are supportive of conservation, as long as the political will is in 
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place.  It would therefore also be worthwhile to examine this situation from the 
opposite direction, i.e. whereas this thesis has taken a top-down approach to 
assessing the perspectives of players in the process and untold stories, a bottom-
up analysis of stakeholder perspectives might be a useful compliment for 
monitoring the developing regime. 
 
In addition to telling the story of the Darwin Mounds offshore MPA, this thesis 
has sought to address issues of underling tension and potential opportunities for 
future offshore marine conservation initiatives.  It is hoped that the issues 
highlighted in this study will be of value to the future designation of MPAs in EC 
offshore waters, and even the high seas.  Establishing a representative network of 
MPAs in offshore waters and beyond is scientifically and legally feasible – 
whether the political will is in place is a different story, and given the economic 
weight given to fishing activities (and the resultant lobbying power the industry 
holds in the political arena), achieving progress from a conservation perspective 
will be difficult.  The enforcement of offshore MPAs also poses challenges, but 
advancements in satellite VMS tracking technology are making continued 
improvements.  Whether this technology can be harnessed to enforce high seas 
MPAs will depend on international political will and compromise.   
 
As the story of the Darwin Mounds has shown, compromise in conservation 
measures to appease the fishing industry can find a middle ground.  However, 
protecting a sedentary habitat versus a mobile species (such as cetaceans or fish) 
clearly poses a different set of challenges and political/economic circumstances.  
As a member of the regulatory community remarked: 
 
“For the High Seas and Exclusive Economic Zone, we have to 
learn the lesson of history – effectively, acting before it’s too late.  
Especially for the High Seas.  And being fooled that species are 
plentiful” [RC-04]. 
 
The developing UK Marine Bill’s role in addressing some of the challenges of 
marine conservation is also worth exploring.  Further research on these issues as 
the regime for offshore MPAs continues to develop will be crucial, especially 
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given the fact that the regime does not lend itself easily to a systematic 
theoretical analysis.  Rather, the examination of individual successes and failures 
will offer the most value for determining ways forward and solutions to 
underlying tensions.   
 
While the developing legislative framework for offshore marine conservation in 
the North-East Atlantic is complex, it is also providing opportunities to address 
the issues raised in the case studies explored in this thesis, namely a better 
integration of the regulatory activities of DG Fish and DG Environment, and 
provision for EC policies and decisions that are consistent with the precautionary 
principle.  Perhaps, with future hindsight, we will be able to look back and 
consider the catalytic role of these initiatives to be among their greatest 
achievements (De Santo and Jones, 2007a).  
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APPENDIX I:  SAMPLE LETTER OF INTRODUCTION TO INTERVIEWEES 
  
 
The following letter was sent to potential interviewees, with specific information 
tailored to the individual included as appropriate.  
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[ADDRESS OF INTERVIEWEE] 
 
 
 
[DATE, 2005] 
 
Dear [NAME], 
 
I am a PhD candidate at UCL working under the supervision of Dr. Peter Jones 
(Department of Geography) and Prof. Philippe Sands (Faculty of Laws).  My research 
focuses on the development of an offshore marine protected area regime around the 
Darwin Mounds area of deep-sea coral off the coast of the UK.  Please see the enclosed 
summary of my project, The Darwin Mounds - From Undiscovered Coral to the 
Emergence of an Offshore Marine Protected Area Regime: a History of Interactions and 
Consequences.  
 
To date I have completed an in-depth review of the legal and policy issues involved in 
this regime.  I am currently in the second phase of my research, interviewing members 
of the scientific, regulatory and user communities to gain insight and add personal 
histories to my analysis.  Given your [INSERT PERSONAL 
EXPERTISE/RELEVANCE] I would be very interested in meeting with you in person 
for an informal discussion about some of the issues I am exploring, which are set out in 
the attached research outline. 
 
UCL enforces rigorous ethical guidelines for research and therefore any information we 
discuss will be treated in strictest confidence and your anonymity is assured unless you 
agree otherwise.   
 
[ASK FOR RECOMMENDATION OF ANOTHER PERSON IF RELEVANT] 
 
Thank you very much for your time and interest, and I look forward to hearing from you 
soon and hopefully meeting you in the near future.   
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Elizabeth De Santo 
PhD Candidate 
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APPENDIX II: UK REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY MEASURES 
  
 
The following correspondence from July 2004 lays out the UK request to the 
European Commission for an emergency closure of the sea bass pair-trawl 
fishery in the Western Channel under Article 7 of the revised CFP (Regulation 
2371/2002). 
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COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION
GENERAL SECRETARIAT
DG B III - Fisheries
Brussels, 30 July 2004 
 
 
 
By e-mail 
 
URGENT 
 
 
 
 
NOTE TO DELEGATIONS 302/04 
(Working Party on Internal Fisheries Policy) 
 
 
Subject: Cetaceans emergency measures 
 - UK request under Article 7 of Regulation (EC) n° 2371/2002 
 
 
Delegations will find enclosed a copy of a UK request that the Commission takes 
emergency measures to tackle cetacean bycatch. This request has been communicated to 
the Commission today, 30 July 2004. 
 
Member States are kindly reminded that under Article 7(2) of the said Regulation, ”they 
may submit their written comments to the Commission within five working days of 
receipt of the request”. 
 
 
Klavs SKOVSHOLM 
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30 July 2004 
 
 
 
Dear Director-General, 
TACKLING CETACEAN BYCATCH: UK REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY 
MEASURES UNDER ARTICLE 7 OF THE CFP REGULATION 
My authorities have concluded that current levels of cetacean bycatch in 
the Western Channel pair trawl fishery for bass may constitute a threat to 
the common dolphin population and that Commission action to close this 
fishery is needed under Article 7 of Council Regulation EC (No) 
2371/2002. 
The UK Government has been concerned for a number of years about 
levels of bycatch of common dolphins in the bass pair trawl fishery 
prosecuted off the south west coasts of the UK.  My authorities have been 
committed to making progress on reducing these bycatch levels and have 
undertaken considerable research to identify the fisheries concerned and to 
seek mitigating measures which will allow those fisheries to continue 
whilst at the same time protecting this species. 
My authorities’ call for action is based on the grounds that bycatch levels 
may be above 1.7% of the relevant abundance estimate for the species.  
ASCOBANS and ICES consider such a level to be unacceptable level 
since any higher take is seen as inevitably leading to population decline.  
Alongside these serious levels of bycatch, it has become clear to my 
authorities from their most recent research that mitigation methods are not 
currently sufficiently developed to reduce bycatch to more acceptable 
levels.  Until such time as a proven means of reducing bycatch has been 
identified, my authorities believe that other more radical options to reduce 
bycatch in this fishery are needed.  This is why a request is being made to 
take action under Article 7 of Council Regulation 2371/2002.  Such action 
would address the bycatch problem in this fishery with immediate effect. 
My authorities have considered the use of other powers available under the 
CFP framework regulation to address this problem but have concluded that 
 U n i t e d  K i n g d o m 
 P e r ma n e n t  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
 T o  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n  
 
 Avenue d’Auderghem 10 
 1040 Brussels 
  
  
  
  
Jörgen Holmquist Esq 
Director-General for Fisheries 
European Commission 
Rue de la Loi 200 
1049 Brussels 
 
 
By fax and post 
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action under Article 7 would provide the most effective 
means in the short term to tackle this bycatch problem. 
You may question why the UK Government now sees the need for 
immediate action in a fishery which has existed for a number of years and 
which it has been closely observing over recent years.  In the first instance, 
it is precisely because my authorites have investigated this fishery that 
they have, they believe, sufficient information to justify concern at the 
levels of bycatch observed.  This has been re-iterated by the most recent 
report from this research, which also conveyed the disappointing news that 
the mitigation measures trialled by my authorities have not been as 
successful as we had hoped and will not provide a solution to the problem 
in the near future.  This is new data and the need for immediate action is 
dictated by the nature of the fishery.  It has now closed and will remain so 
until November this year.  There is therefore a window of opportunity in 
which the Commission can take action to protect common dolphins. 
You may also question why there is a need for action on a Community 
level.  This is because vessels from another Member State, namely France, 
prosecute the fishery.  This is why the UK has for many years, in the light 
of the research findings, pressed for meaningful action at an EU level to 
address the problems identified.  Furthermore, my authorities do not 
believe that the implementation of the recent Council Regulation (EC) No 
812/2004 provides an effective response to the threat now faced since this 
only requires increased observer coverage and would not be in line with 
the application of the precautionary approach to fisheries management.  
The UK government believes the data detailed in the attached case at 
Annex A substantiate its concern that the current levels of bycatch in this 
fishery would lead to population declines as defined by ICES and the 
Agreement on Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North 
Seas (ASCOBANS).  Such declines would also contravene the Ministerial 
Declaration of the Fifth International Conference on the Protection of the 
North Sea (the ‘Bergen Declaration’) of March 2002 which urged 
competent fisheries authorities to take all necessary measures to minimise 
incidental catches and, on a precautionary objective, to reduce bycatch of 
marine mammals to less than 1% of the best available population estimate.  
In these circumstances my authorities consider that the Commission 
should take action to close fishing for bass through the use of pelagic pair 
trawls in ICES area VIIe for the forthcoming season while permanent 
measures are considered.  
I am copying this letter, with the kind assistance of the Council Secretariat, 
to all Member States to enable them to make any comments in line with 
the provisions of Article 7.  I am also copying this letter to your colleagues 
John Farnell, Armando Astudillo and Jean Weissenberger. 
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Yours sincerely, 
Gareth Baynham-Hughes 
First Secretary (Fisheries) 
 
 
ANNEX A 
 
BASS FISHERY RESEARCH 
 
1. The UK funded the Sea Mammal Research Unit (SMRU) in 2000 to carry 
out a 3 year project into cetacean bycatch which included widening observer 
coverage of fisheries to target pelagic fisheries which had not been monitored 
previously. In observations made during 190 days at sea, no bycatch was seen in 
the fisheries for herring, mackerel, sprat, pilchard, blue whiting and anchovy. 
However, a significant bycatch was identified from surveys carried out in the 
offshore pelagic pair trawl fishery for bass off the South West coast of England: 
in observations made from 2001 to 2003 during 313 hauls, a total of 91 common 
dolphins were observed caught.  
Table One 
Sea Mammal Research Unit: Observations on board bass trawlers 
2001-2003 
 
Year Days at Sea No of hauls Dolphin bycatch 
2001 Total 72 116 53 
2002 
With exclusion grid 
Without exclusion grid 
Total 
4 
33 
37 
9 
57 
66 
0 
8 
8 
2003 
With exclusion grid 
Without exclusion grid 
Total 
49 
35 
84 
82 
49 
131 
2 
28 
30 
Combined total 193 313 91 
 
2. As a result of the level of bycatch observed in the offshore pair trawl 
fishery for bass, the focus of Defra research shifted to the identification and 
trialling of mitigation measures for this fishery. Trials of an exclusion grid 
designed to reduce common dolphin bycatch, undertaken by SMRU on Defra’s 
behalf, demonstrated that grid performance had a minimal effect on the levels of 
bass entering the net, but that dolphins should be able to escape the net.  
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3. In this season’s trial various designs of grids were 
tested, but bycatch remained high throughout.  A total of 169 dolphin 
casualties were observed, of which the larger part were bycaught while the 
grids were being deployed. The research also revealed a higher rate of   
bycatch in November (prior to the deployment of the grid), compared both 
to previous years and to any previously monitored month. Of 22 hauls 
observed in November, 7 were dolphin bycatch hauls with a total of 31 
animals taken. The trial has demonstrated clearly that there is no easy, or 
early technical solution to reducing the bycatch in this fishery through the 
use of mitigation devices. Bycatch levels across the whole fishery, 
including the majority French element, may constitute a threat to the 
conservation of common dolphin populations. 
 
Table Two 
Sea Mammal Research Unit: Observations on board bass trawlers 
2003-2004 
 
Time 
period 
Recorded 
effort 
(hauls) 
Hauls 
observed 
Observed 
bycatch 
rate 
Tow rate* 
Estimated 
mortality 
for UK 
fleet 
% effort 
observed 
Mid Nov to 
April 382 155 1.04 3.6 397 40 
*No of hauls in which one haul had a bycatch 
 
4. Based on observations made during the 2003/4 fishery, dolphin 
bycatch for the UK element of the bass offshore pair trawl fishery is 
estimated at approximately 400 animals.  On the assumption that bycatch 
rates are equivalent in the larger French element of the fishery, and on the 
basis of an abundance estimate of 75,000 (SCANS 1994) or 120,000 
(Source: Michel Goujon 1996, Captures Accidentalles du Filet Maillant 
Dérivant et Dynamique des Populations de Dauphins au Large du Golfe de 
Gascogne), it is estimated that bycatch of the common dolphins could be 
2% or over.  This is clearly in excess of the objective of reducing bycatch 
to below 1% of the best available population estimates accepted by North 
Sea Ministers in 2002 at the 5th North Sea Conference. 
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APPENDIX III: RESPONSE FROM THE COMMISSION 
  
 
The following letter from August 2004 outlines the European Commission’s 
response to the UK request for an emergency closure of the pair-trawl fishery 
operating in the English Channel. 
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APPENDIX IV: UK REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF DOMESTIC BAN 
  
 
The following letter from January 2005 shows the UK’s request to the European 
Commission to extend the application of its domestic ban to vessels from other 
Member States, under Article 9 of the revised CFP (Regulation 2371/2002). 
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26 January 2005 
 
 
 
 
TACKLING CETACEAN BYCATCH: UK REQUEST FOR 
EXTENSION OF A DOMESTIC BAN ON PAIR TRAWLING FOR 
BASS IN INSHORE WATERS 
My authorities have taken action to close the pair trawl fishery for bass to 
United Kingdom vessels within 12 miles of the south-west coast of 
England and now request that the Commission acts under Article 9 of 
Council Regulation EC (No) 2371/2002 to extend this closure to vessels of 
other Member States who have access to this area. 
The UK Government has been concerned for a number of years about 
levels of bycatch of common dolphins in the bass pair trawl fishery 
prosecuted off the south west coast of the UK.  The UK has been 
committed to making progress on reducing bycatches and has undertaken 
considerable research to identify the fisheries concerned and to seek 
mitigating measures which will allow those fisheries to continue whilst at 
the same time protecting this species.   
My letter of 30 July 2004 set out the levels of bycatch in the bass pair 
trawl fishery in the Western Channel, together with the results of UK 
research into mitigation measures.  It also requested that the Commission 
take emergency action under Article 9 of Council Regulation EC (No) 
2371/2002 to close this fishery. 
In the light of the Commission decision to reject the UK case for an 
emergency closure, my authorities have been considering what other 
powers are available to member states to take action for the protection of 
cetaceans from fishing activities.  They have concluded that the use of 
powers under Article 9 of the CFP framework regulation would now be an 
appropriate response. 
My authorities are aware that a large proportion of the effort in this fishery 
occurs outside the 12 mile zone.  However, the closure is seen as an 
interim step, using the full extent of powers available to member states 
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under the CFP, until more effective, co-ordinated action at 
a Community level is possible.  The results of the research programme 
‘NECESSITY’ and the observer programmes set up under Council 
Regulation (EC) No 812/2004 will be highly relevant in this regard. 
Some informal consultation on this measure has already take place.  
Notably, my authorities met Commission officials and representatives 
from some other member states at a technical meeting on 17 November 
2004 to discuss cetacean bycatch in pelagic trawls.  The UK referred to its 
intention to introduce a 12 mile closure at that meeting.  Separately, UK 
Fisheries Minister Ben Bradshaw MP has written to the French 
Government setting out plans to ban this fishery within the UK 12 mile 
limit and explaining that, for reasons of equity, the UK would also be 
applying to have this ban extended to all pair trawlers fishing for bass in 
the 12 mile zone.  UK legislation introducing the ban was made in 
December.  
It may be helpful to give an explanation of how the prohibition has been 
drawn up.  Article 3(2)(a) allows pair trawling for other pelagic species to 
continue.  My authorities understand that a bass pair trawl net is 
characterised by very large meshes in the forward wings of the net, and 
have used this to allow demersal pair trawl fisheries using the same mesh 
sizes in the cod-end as the bass fishery to continue (Article 3(2)(b)). 
I am directly addressing this letter in tandem to those member states 
(France and Belgium) with access to the relevant area to enable them to 
make any comments in line with the requirements of Article 9.  My 
authorities understand that there is little activity by French vessels in this 
area, possible only two pairs enter this zone. This action would therefore 
have little impact overall on the French pair trawl fishery for bass.  In 
addition, I am copying this letter to all other Member States as well as 
your colleagues John Farnell, Jean Weissenberger and Maja Kirchner. 
 
 
 
 
Gareth Baynham-Hughes 
First Secretary (Fisheries) 
 
